Neil O'Hara

The first three chapters get us clear about what basic certainty and what morality is. In these next two chapters I go on to develop a key distinction (put forth by Daniele Moyal-Sharrock) between different kinds of basic certainty, the local and the universal. I apply this distinction to basic moral certainty, in order to explain both the underlying unity and the sometimes interminable conflict between different moral systems. In exploring the universal side of the distinction, I defend two examples of basic moral certainties that must be held by all functioning moral agents. My examples are the belief (i) that some killings are wrong (K); and (ii) that some wrongs are more serious than others, or that there is some hierarchy between morally evaluable actions.

Setting up a response to the challenge of moral relativism, I show that some basic moral certainties operate on a local level. I defend three examples—(i) the wrongness of pig sacrifice in ancient Judaism; (ii) the goodness of hospitality for the Pashtun; and (iii) the wrongness of cannibalism for the ancient Greeks. I also give an account of how moral certainties shift over time to help show that though morality is objective (in that it is underpinned by basic certainties we do not choose and which we cannot alter at will) it can change.

I start this chapter with a short account of what I mean by ‘morality’ (as contrasted with ‘the ethical’) and then outline the notion of ‘primary recognition’, which notion explains why we think morally at all—because when we recognise another as a human being we necessarily and without inference also recognise them as one due consideration and concern. This helps to establish that we are not just trained egoists but are morally concerned to the core. The notion of primary recognition is one of the main new contributions to knowledge in the book.

I bring to bear what has been said about primary recognition and basic moral certainty to current metaethics. I show how it gives us reason to resist three popular notions in metaethical debate—(i) that we are basically amoral creatures (I argue that primary recognition means we are necessarily morally concerned); (ii) that modern morality has lost its grounding (both G. E. M. Anscombe and Alasdair MacIntyre argue that modern morality is not properly grounded because it lacks rational grounding I argue all morality is arationally grounded); and (iii) the notion that moral norms are completely culture relative (some are but some are universal, and the universal set limits to what can count as local moral certainties).

Are there basic religious certainties? That is, are there any beliefs which religious people legitimately hold without the need for rational justification? The question has been tackled, in different ways, by both Hinge Epistemologists and by Reformed Epistemologists. For the former, discussion has revolved around very general religious beliefs such as ‘God exists’ (e.g. Pritchard, 2000; Helm, 2001; Hoyt, 2007; Ariso, 2020). Reformed Epistemologists, like Alvin Plantinga, argue that Christian theism and particular Christian beliefs are ‘properly basic’ in that ‘I don’t believe them on the basis of any other propositions’ (Plantinga, 1981, p. 42). In this paper I want to do two things. First, I give an account of what basic religious certainty is from a Wittgensteinian, Hinge Epistemology point of view. On this account I will argue that the clearest examples of basic religious certainties are found in local, historical and more narrow expressions of religious belief, as opposed to the very general acontextual religious beliefs usually discussed. Secondly, I challenge the Reformed Epistemological notion that Christian doctrine can be ‘properly basic’, mainly by showing that the New Testament writers did not treat very general religious beliefs, such as ‘God exists’ or God is good’, as properly basic in either the Hinge or Reformed Epistemological ways. I will conclude by drawing out some implications for contemporary Christian epistemology.

This paper aims to show that the experience of ‘primary recognition’ (O’Hara in Moral certainty and the foundations of morality, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2018) can be extended to human AI interactions. That is, I argue that human beings can (and do) experience non-rational, reflex moral responses to AI and social robots that fit O’Hara’s description of primary recognition. I give two plausible examples, one involving a military mine-sweeping robot and the other, a toy dinosaur called a ‘Pleo’. These experiences of primary recognition do not, however, settle the question of whether any particular AI can be considered a true moral patient or a ‘person’.

Moral certainty refers to those aspects of morality- moral acting, feeling, and thinking-that are beyond doubt, explanation, and justification. The essays in this book explore the concept of moral certainty and its application and usefulness in contemporary moral debates. The notion of moral certainty, which is inspired by the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, is emerging as a key reference point in contemporary moral philosophy. An investigation of the implications of moral certainty is called for, given that so many discussions in moral philosophy concern the possibility of justifying our moral beliefs. The concept of moral certainty also feeds directly into the emerging field of hinge epistemolo,gy. The chapters in this volume tackle the following issues: meta-questions around whether and how we can make sense of the concept of moral certainty; the role of moral certainty in contemporary debates on gender, racism, bias and historically unjust practices; ways in which radical change in society engendered by new technologies might affect moral certainties; the role of the notion of moral certainty in the debates on free will and moral responsibility. Philosophical Perspectives on Moral Certainty will appeal to researchers and advanced students working on ethics and moral philosophy, epistemology, philosophy of technology, and Wittgenstein.

What lies at the foundation of our moral beliefs? If we dig down far enough do we find that our moral values have no ground at all to stand on, and so are apt to collapse upon serious philosophical investigation? This book seeks to answer these and related questions by positing an indubitable foundation for our moral beliefs – they arise from the phenomenon of ‘primary recognition’, and are fundamentally shaped by ‘basic moral certainties’. Drawing on philosophers such as Ludwig Wittgenstein and Knud Ejler Løgstrup, this book draws together insights from both Analytic and Continental philosophy to provide a convincing new picture of our moral foundations. And it does so in a way that eschews moral conservativism and opens the way for a rich understanding of the variety and particularity of our human moral systems, while also keeping a significant place for those moral beliefs that occur universally, across cultures.