Nguyễn Hạnh

The cognitive subject in I. Kant's philosophy occupies a central position in the development of modern epistemology, marking a decisive shift from object-centered to subject-centered theories of knowledge. This article investigates the key characteristics of Kant’s cognitive subject through a critical analysis of his major works, particularly Critique of Pure Reason, and situates it within the broader context of Enlightenment thought. The study applies dialectical and historical materialist methodology to reveal six defining features: (1) the cognitive subject is formed through Kant’s critical method, emphasizing self-reflection and the limits of reason; (2) it is proactive, dynamic, and creative, not a passive recipient of external stimuli; (3) it raises foundational questions about dialectical logic and the conditions of knowledge; (4) it is speculative and ahistorical, reflecting Enlightenment individualism; (5) it is characterized by epistemological limits, as Kant asserts the unknowability of the “thing-in-itself”; and (6) it unifies the cognitive, moral, and aesthetic dimensions of the human subject. The article also critically examines the legacy of Kant’s conception, highlighting both its enduring influence on epistemology and its limitations, particularly the abstraction from social and historical context.

El sujeto epistemológico en la filosofía de Kant desempeña un papel crucial en el desarrollo de la teoría del conocimiento. Basado en la perspectiva del materialismo dialéctico y del materialismo histórico, este estudio ofrece una reflexión crítica sobre el sujeto epistemológico en la filosofía de Kant. Esta reflexión crítica sigue dos direcciones principales: por un lado, evalúa el significado del sujeto epistemológico kantiano para la teoría del conocimiento del materialismo dialéctico e histórico; por otro lado, señala las limitaciones de este sujeto epistemológico. El sujeto epistemológico en la filosofía de Kant presenta tanto valores como limitaciones. A través de este concepto, Kant afirma de manera singular el poder del intelecto humano, expresa un anhelo de conocimiento infinito y, al mismo tiempo, delimita los límites del conocimiento humano.

the epistemological subject in Kant’s philosophy plays a crucial role in the development of epistemological theory. Based on the standpoint of dialectical materialism and historical materialism, this study offers a critical reflection on the epistemological subject in Kant’s philosophy. This critical reflection follows two main directions: on the one hand, it evaluates the significance of Kant’s epistemological subject for the epistemological theory of dialectical and historical materialism; on the other hand, it identifies the limitations of this epistemological subject. The epistemological subject in Kant’s philosophy contains both strengths and weaknesses. Through this concept, Kant uniquely affirms the power of human intellect, expresses an aspiration for boundless knowledge, and at the same time delineates the limits of human cognition.