Niall Roe

In this article, we summarise and critically evaluate Ryan Nefdt’s The Philosophy of Theoretical Linguistics: A Contemporary Outlook (2024). In this book, Nefdt brings the tools of philosophy to bear on contemporary linguistics, targeting perennial debates in syntax, semantics, pragmatics, phonology, and the evolution of language. In so doing, Nefdt sketches several tantalising paths for progress on these topics. Although some of Nefdt’s arguments are underdeveloped, this book serves as a worthwhile introduction to the philosophy of linguistics.

Among much else, Peirce was concerned with understanding the nature of experimentation. And while Peirce scholarship frequently appeals to the role of experimentation in his philosophy, no one has yet provided the account appealed to. This is not because Peirce's understanding of experimentation is too obvious to deserve discussion, nor is it because Peirce was quiet on the subject. Indeed, Peirce attempted to articulate what he meant by an experiment in many ways over the course of decades. But these articulations have received limited attention and have not been brought together with the aim of understanding Peircean experimentation. Notably, two of the key sources—Peirce's writings on Petrus Peregrinus de Maricourt and his many drafts of "What Pragmatism Is"—have received little critical engagement. This essay has two aims. The first is to lay out and bring together Peirce's various discussions on the nature of experimentation, providing a sketch of the whole picture. The second is to draw attention to three aspects of this sketch—(1) that experimental inquiry is interest-based, (2) that abduction occurs at key stages throughout, not merely in the production of hypotheses, and (3) that experimental inquiry clarifies and distinguishes two roles for doubt: as a skeptical attitude held towards a hypothesis, and as an uncomfortable state caused by surprise, with only the first sense being crucial.

This thesis examines the roles played by history in Charles Peirce’s philosophy of science. History is seen to have two roles. First, it contributes to the philosophy of science: in examining the history of science we are able to learn about science and scientific progress. In this way, studying history can teach us about inquiry itself. Secondly, history is the subject of the philosophy of science. The methods of inquiry learned about and developed in the philosophy of science should be applied to historical inquiries. In this way, history contributes to philosophy of science, and historians benefit from this contribution.