Nicholas Abernethy

In 2021, in response to the Superior Court of Quebec’s decision in Truchon v. Canada, the Canadian Parliament amended the Criminal Code to allow Medical Assistance in Dying (MAiD) for some people who don’t have a “reasonably foreseeable natural death.” Debate rages over this amendment. In particular, some academics and activists argue that it should be repealed because it discriminates against disabled people. In 2024, these arguments appeared in a Canadian court proceeding; two disabled individuals and four disability rights organizations filed a lawsuit in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, challenging the amendment. In this paper, I critically analyze the harm-centric arguments in the applicants’ notice of application (which crystallizes the broader opposition to the amendment). In doing so, I draw on analysis from both sides of the ethical debate over the amendment. Ultimately, I conclude that the applicants’ arguments — and those from other opponents of the amendment — don’t succeed. Some of my recurring objections include that the alleged harmful effects of the amendment are either 1) harmful only if the applicants’ dubious ethical assumptions are true, 2) not attributable to the amendment, or 3) nonexistent, negligible, or unlikely. In defence of the amendment, I discuss how it respects people’s autonomy and avoids instrumentalization.

In late 2022, the large language model (LLM) known as ChatGPT was released for public use, and a few researchers began crediting it as a coauthor of publications. The academic reaction was overwhelmingly negative; experts condemned LLM coauthorship, and major journals banned LLM coauthorship. In this paper, I challenge this reaction. Specifically, my main thesis is that journals should allow LLMs to coauthor articles. My two sub-theses are that journals should allow “heavy LLM usage” and that journals should allow LLMs to be credited as coauthors when they are heavily used. However, I argue that journals should do this only in conjunction with adopting policies like the ones I propose. Unlike the existing publications that share my conclusion, this paper is extensive, covering the enormous number of prima facie plausible reasons for banning LLM coauthorship. As I show, the alleged downsides of LLM coauthorship are either exaggerated, similarly applicable to human coauthorship, heavily mitigated by existing journal policies and/or my proposed journal policies, or outweighed by the upsides of LLM coauthorship.

Debate rages over whether Canadian provincial and territorial governments should allow healthcare institutions to conscientiously object to providing medical assistance in dying (MAiD). This issue is likely to end up in court soon through challenges from patients, clinicians, or advocacy groups such as Dying With Dignity Canada. When it does, one key question for the courts will be whether allowing institutional conscientious objection (ICO) to MAiD respects (i.e., shows due regard for) the consciences of the objecting healthcare institutions, understood as unitary entities. This question has been thoroughly explored elsewhere in the academic literature. However, another key question has been underexplored. Specifically, precedent set by the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Loyola High School v. Quebec (Attorney General) suggests that the courts will consider whether allowing ICO to MAiD respects the consciences of the personnel within objecting healthcare institutions. My answer to this question is no, by which I mean that allowing ICO to MAiD shows undue disregard for some consciences and undue regard for others. To justify this answer, I analyze the arguments that hold that allowing ICO in healthcare respects the consciences of the personnel within objecting healthcare institutions. My conclusion is that none of these personnel-based arguments succeed in the case of ICO to MAiD. Some fail because they are wrong about the nature of conscience and complicity. Others fail because they contradict the arguments’ proponents’ positions on conscientious objection by individual healthcare providers. Still others fail because they are internally inconsistent.