Nicholas Bunnin

I explore two important ways of thinking that the philosophical understanding of morality requires metaphysics: the moral metaphysics I ascribe to Xunzi and Kant’s metaphysics of morals. Both Xunzi and Kant held that a metaphysics of nature is inadequate for a metaphysical understanding of human moral agency. Xunzi invoked the human Dao to allow for the agency of the heart-mind, and Kant invoked the Categorical Imperative to allow for the agency of the moral self. Both Xunzi and Kant stretched metaphysics through rejecting the wrong sorts of rigour as preventing us from having an appropriate understanding of metaphysics and morality. I turn to their different placements of humanity that reflect deep differences in Xunzi’s and Kant’s underlying metaphysics. Xunzi placed humanity as a virtue or power that allows our psychology to become a moral psychology. Kant placed humanity as an ideal that allows our psychology to be a moral psychology.

This article examines Mou Zongsan’s claim that “if it is true that human beings cannot have intellectual intuition, then the whole of Chinese philosophy must collapse completely, and the thousands years of effort must be in vain. It is just an illusion.” I argue that Mou’s commitment to establishing and justifying a “moral metaphysics” was his main motivation for rejecting Kant’s denial of the possibility of humans having intellectual intuition. I consider the implications of Mou’s response to Kant for the future of Chinese philosophy, for the interpretation of crucial aspects of Kant’s own critical thought and for organizing the perspicuous comparison of Chinese and European philosophy.

In this personal tribute to Pamela Sue Anderson, based on many conversations, I try out the idea that she was seeking to locate an underlying metaphysical and ethical unity that makes our human vulnerability, love and reflective self-understanding both possible and intelligible. I trace this unity in Pamela’s philosophical imaginary to resonances or retrievals from three philosophers who featured in her “internal dialogues”: Spinoza, Kant and Levinas. I also allude to the great influence on Pamela and myself of our mutual friend Adrian Moore. My thought is that Pamela was pursuing something fundamental about our humanity as open, creative, fluid and risky becoming rather than being. I suggest that she found kinship with Spinoza’s thinking of vulnerability and love together and his vision of underlying unities to make sense of ourselves. In Kant’s First Critique, I suggest that she found a unified deduction of the possibility of objectivity and subjectivity and that she also traced in his moral philosophy the richer conception of ourselves offered by the “humanity” version of the categorical imperative and by the joint origin of the objectivity of the moral law and the subjectivity of our moral agency. These resources made room for human vulnerability, self-love and the love of others within the scope of the Kantian project. Of the three philosophers, Levinas was closest to Pamela’s perception of vulnerability and love and her conception of gendered human selves living lives of complex becoming rather than of being. His fusion of morality and metaphysics and the unity of his post-phenomenological deduction of subjectivity and saying bring into focus the influences I discern.

The French feminist philosopher Michèle Le Doeuff has taught us something about “the collectivity,” which she discovers in women’s struggle for access to the philosophical, but also about “the unknown” and “the unthought.” It is the unthought which will matter most to what I intend to say today about a fundamental ignorance on which speaker vulnerability is built. On International Women’s Day, it seems appropriate to speak about – or, at least, to evoke – the silencing which has been imposed on women by an oppressive form of ignorance. My question is: how do our resounding voices as women – on 8 March 2016 – avoid what feminist philosophers have distinguished as wilful forms of silencing? Silencing exploits vulnerability; and speaker vulnerability is an exposure either to violence or affection, in its dependence on an audience. My response seeks to undo the silencing of women by transforming an ignorance of vulnerability into a distinctively ethical avowal. To see the significance of this undoing, we will consider how our contemporary global world reduces vulnerability to an openness to violence, ignoring what has been unthought: an openness to affection. A wilful ignorance of vulnerability develops not as a lack of knowledge but its disavowal – on which various forms of oppression are built. An active disavowal of thinking (the unthought) is the other side of a striving for invulnerability; and this striving is encouraged by a social world which remains ignorant of its own wounding, as well as its own potential for ethical relations in vulnerability. Like la mauvaise foi of the French existentialist, invulnerability is a form of self-deception; and those who claim it embrace ignorance of their own and others’ vulnerability too.

Pamela Sue Anderson urges feminist philosophers to embrace Michèle Le Doeuff’s revaluation of women in philosophy through according “fair value” to intuition as an intellectual faculty, a view of intuition articulated by Henri Bergson. She asks whether women who follow Bergson could be given fair value along with intuition. She turns from Le Doeuff’s writings on intuition to writings by Bergson and by Beauvoir, but periodically returns to Le Doeuff herself. In the end, a picture of freedom, friendship and feminism emerges from readings of all three. This is a portrait of confident and capable interactions in creativity and dynamic projects, which transform our becoming within life, on the assumption that the love of friendship is between like-minded, embodied and interrelated selves. She explores whether we transform our lives in freedom and in love between friends. Although attracted to the human – and humane – solidarity in freedom of “great souls,” as in Beauvoir’s women of action, she instead aligns herself with Le Doeuff’s critical caution against naturalizing a timelessly abstract female soul for contemporary feminist philosophers. She concludes her proposed orientation with a Le Doeuffian feminist image of living life freely for and with friends.

Leading Chinese and Western philosophers work alongside one another to explore the writings of one of the twentieth century’s most perplexing and original ethical and metaphysical thinkers. Comparative discussion of Lévinas on phenomenology, ethics, metaphysics and political philosophy within European philosophy and with Chinese philosophy Innovative accounts of Lévinasian themes of surpassing phenomenology, post-Heideggerian philosophy, the philosophy of saintliness, transcendence and immanence, time and sensibility, desire, death, political philosophy, the subject, and the space of communicativity

Since our visual perception of physical things essentially involves our identifying objects by their colours, any theory of visual perception must contain some account of the colours of things. The central problem with colour has to do with relating our normal, everyday colour perceptions to what science, i.e. physics, teaches us about physical objects and their qualities. Although we perceive colours as categorical surface properties of things, colour perceptions are explained by introducing physical properties like reflectance profiles or dispositions to cause certain experiences in normal human perceivers. Hence, it seems as if colours as they are experienced by us have no place in the physical world, because they are fundamentally different from the properties which we ascribe to physical objects in scientific accounts of colour perceptions. This special issue on perspectives on colour perception presents new suggestions to solve to this major problem