Nicholas Randazzo

This paper defends the existence of a largely overlooked cognitive virtue within the framework of telic virtue epistemology: doxastic courage. Doxastic courage is an exercise of doxastic control that mediates between the vices of excessive doubt and reckless belief. On this view, doxastic courage focuses on one’s own reflective assessment of the strength of the justification for their beliefs, assessing when it is prudent to risk being wrong to achieve truth. I argue that doxastic courage operates as an Aristotelian mean between four vices of belief including: hyperbolic doubt (excessive skeptical suspension), gullibility (deficient skeptical suspension), anti-expertise (deficient self-confidence), and dogmatism (excessive self-confidence). Using lessons from Cartesian methodological skepticism, I demonstrate how doxastic courage enables one to critically assess defeaters without succumbing to skepticism or unfounded ‘certainty.’ I argue that Cartesian and skeptical doubts, in being excessively timid, do not access the aim of cognitive prosperity that is implicit in theories of justified belief. With this telos in mind, doxastic courage is meant to support a nuanced balance that fosters intellectual growth without compromising necessary rigor.