• One Reactive Attitude to Rule Them All
    In Bradford Cokelet & Corey Maley (eds.), The Moral Psychology of Guilt, . pp. 171-191. 2019.
    P. F. Strawson famously gives pride of place to the reactive attitudes in his account of moral responsibility, though he says little about guilt or any other self-reactive attitudes. This inattention is curious, given that on his view lacking capacity for self-reactive attitudes is grounds for exemption from the moral community. Perhaps because of Strawson’s limited remarks regarding them, the self-reactive attitudes have not received much attention in commentaries on his view. In this paper, I …Read more
  •  4
    Blame, Nudging, and the Actual Moral Relationship
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 1-18. forthcoming.
    T. M. Scanlon posits a universal moral relationship in response to the worry that his relational approach to blame cannot answer the question of how strangers can fittingly blame one another. However, commentators have noted that appealing to universal moral standards seems to explicitly deviate from a relational approach’s basis in actual relationship norms. This paper argues that Scanlon’s idea of a moral relationship can nevertheless provide a basis for response to the problem of strangers if…Read more
  •  6
    Strawsonian Incompatibilism
    History of Philosophy Quarterly 39 (4): 373-384. 2022.
    Although philosophers sympathetic to Peter Strawson's view in “Freedom and Resentment” tend to be compatibilists, they need not be. This paper develops a recent suggestion that Strawson's view can be read as consistent with libertarianism by showing that an important distinction Strawson makes between personal and moral reactive attitudes leaves room to be a Strawsonian compatibilist with respect to personal responsibility and a Strawsonian incompatibilist with respect to moral responsibility. U…Read more
  •  36
    Strawson's underappreciated argumentative structure
    European Journal of Philosophy. forthcoming.
    The orthodox reading of Peter Strawson's “Freedom and Resentment” tends to hide interesting elements of its underlying argumentative structure. Recognition of a distinction Strawson draws between two classes of reactive attitudes raises a question about how the distinct discussions are related. The orthodox reading seems to assume the only relevant difference between the two classes is one of perspective; however, this reading obscures the analogical nature of Strawson's argument and encourages …Read more
  •  12
    Engineering responsibility
    Ethics and Information Technology 24 (3): 1-10. 2022.
    Many optimistic responses have been proposed to bridge the threat of responsibility gaps which artificial systems create. This paper identifies a question which arises if this optimistic project proves successful. On a response-dependent understanding of responsibility, our responsibility practices themselves at least partially determine who counts as a responsible agent. On this basis, if AI or robot technology advance such that AI or robot agents become fitting participants within responsibili…Read more
  •  5
    Incapacity, Inconceivability, and Two Types of Objectivity
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (1): 76-94. 2022.
    Many critics and defenders of P. F. Strawson’s approach to moral responsibility in ‘Freedom and Resentment’ have attributed to Strawson a claim of psychological incapacity or impossibility with respect to our (in)ability to abandon or radically change the framework of reactive attitudes that constitute (at least) an important part of our responsibility practices. In this essay I show that commentators have conflated two distinct arguments within Strawson’s discussion in a way that increases his …Read more
  •  2
    Retrospective Attitudes and Non-Identity
    Southwest Philosophy Review 37 (2): 187-202. 2021.
    Many philosophers think the non-identity problem undermines the ability for future generations to have been wronged by past ones. This problem has prompted a number of responses, some of which purport to vindicate the relevant claims of wrongdoing. However, I argue that a closely related issue remains even for those convinced by these responses. It is commonly thought that wrongdoing makes certain retrospective attitudes, such as resentment, fitting toward the wrongdoer. In this paper, I shift a…Read more