•  69
    Distal engagement: Intentions in perception
    Consciousness and Cognition 79 (March 2020). 2020.
    Non-representational approaches to cognition have struggled to provide accounts of long-term planning that forgo the use of representations. An explanation comes easier for cognitivist accounts, which hold that we concoct and use contentful mental representations as guides to coordinate a series of actions towards an end state. One non-representational approach, ecological-enactivism, has recently seen several proposals that account for “high-level” or “representation-hungry” capacities, includi…Read more
  •  46
    Irreducible Aspects of Embodiment: Situating Scientist and Subject
    Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (2): 219-223. 2018.
    Feminist philosophers of science have long discussed the importance of taking situatedness into account in scientific practices to avoid erasing important aspects of lived experience. Through the example of Gillian Einstein’s [2012] situated neuroscience, I will add support to Gallagher’s [2019] claims that intertheoretic reduction is problematic and provide reason to think pluralistic methodologies are explanatorily and ethically preferable.
  •  72
    Gender and the senses of agency
    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (2). 2018.
    This paper details the ways that gender structures our senses of agency on an enactive framework. While it is common to discuss how gender influences higher, narrative levels of cognition, as with the formulation of goals and in considerations about our identities, it is less clear how gender structures our more immediate, embodied processes, such as the minimal sense of agency. While enactivists often acknowledge that gender and other aspects of our socio-cultural situatedness shape our cogniti…Read more
  •  9
    Stuck in the Middle With You
    The Philosophers' Magazine 75 51-56. 2016.