Nick Hughes

This is an opinionated guide to the literature on epistemic dilemmas. It discusses a number of different situations where epistemic dilemmas appear to arise, including: conflicts between first-order epistemic norms and higher-order epistemic norms; conflicts between factive and non-factive epistemic norms; conflicts between substantive and structural norms of epistemic rationality, conflict for non-ideal agents involving stereotyping; situations where one’s evidence appears to rule out suspending judgement at the same time as prohibiting belief and disbelief; situations where one has compelling evidence that one believes that p if and only if not-p; conflicts between epistemic norms and norms of morality and practical rationality. It surveys dilemmic, dilemmish, and non-dilemmic takes on them and objections to dilemmic views along with dilemmists’ replies to them.

This chapter argues that Greco’s argument against the possibility of unavoidable epistemic residue goes wrong in three ways: it mistakenly assumes that it is irrational to pre-emptively epistemically ‘blame’ people for what they believe; it overgenerates, leading inexorably to the conclusion that there are no epistemic norms whatsoever; and it cannot account for the fact that epistemic norms apply to non-human animals. The chapter concludes that we shouldn’t identify epistemic dilemmas with unavoidable epistemic residue. It then argues that even if we did, there could still be epistemic dilemmas. The last part of the chapter compares dilemmism with some dilemmish theories and argues that dilemmism is preferable to them.

This dissertation is comprised of five independent essays on the theme of the nature and roles of knowledge. The essays are intended to be free-standing pieces of work and should be read as such. Contents: 1. An Existential Argument For Pragmatic Encroachment -- 2. Environmental Luck Gettier Cases And The Metaphysical Roles Of Knowledge -- 3. Might The Simulation Heuristic Influence Knowledge Attributions? -- 4. Excuses And Epistemic Norms -- 5. From Moore's Paradox To The Knowledge Norm Of Belief And Beyond.

This volume of essays is about the possibility, nature, and scope of epistemic dilemmas—situations where every available option is epistemically unacceptable or unjustifiable from a rational perspective. Recently, epistemologists have become increasingly interested in whether there can be epistemic dilemmas, and, if there can, where and how they arise. The 17 essays in the volume push the discussion forward. They shed new light on many topics in epistemology, including the fundamental norms of belief, higher-order evidence, epistemic akrasia, moral encroachment, the relationship between the epistemic and the practical, paradoxes of self-reference, inquiry, and science communication, amongst others.

Epistemologists spend a great deal of time thinking about how we should respond to our evidence. They spend far less time thinking about the ways that evidence can be acquired in the first place. This is an oversight. Some ways of acquiring evidence are better than others. Many normative epistemologies struggle to accommodate this fact. In this article I develop one that can and does. I identify a phenomenon – epistemic feedback loops – in which evidence acquisition has gone awry, with the result that even beliefs based on the evidence are irrational. Examples include evidence acquired under the influence of confirmation bias and evidence acquired under the influence of cognitively penetrated experiences caused by implicit bias. I then develop a theoretical framework which enables us to understand why beliefs that are the outputs of epistemic feedback loops are irrational. Finally, I argue that many popular approaches to epistemic normativity may need to be abandoned on the grounds that they cannot comfortably explain feedback loops. The scope of this last claim is broad: it includes almost all contemporary theories of justified/rational belief and of the epistemology of cognitive penetration.

Epistemologists often appeal to the idea that a normative theory must provide useful, usable, guidance to argue for one normative epistemology over another. I argue that this is a mistake. Guidance considerations have no role to play in theory choice in epistemology. I show how this has implications for debates about the possibility and scope of epistemic dilemmas, the legitimacy of idealisation in Bayesian epistemology, uniqueness versus permissivism, sharp versus mushy credences, and internalism versus externalism.

Daniel Greco (forthcoming) argues that there cannot be epistemic dilemmas. I argue that he is wrong. I then look in detail at a would-be epistemic dilemma and argue that no non-dilemmic approach to it can be made to work. Along the way, there is discussion of octopuses, lobsters, and other ‘inscrutable cognizers’; the relationship between evaluative and prescriptive norms; a failed attempt to steal a Brueghel; epistemic and moral blame and residue; an unbearable guy who thinks he’s God’s gift to women; excuses; stupid games involving hats; radical permissivism; how I’ll never be able to afford to buy a house in Hampstead; and many other exciting topics.

It is widely thought that moral obligations are necessarily guidance giving. This supposed fact has been put to service in defence of the ‘ought-implies-can’ principle according to which one cannot be morally obligated to do the impossible, since impossible-to-satisfy obligations would not give guidance. It is argued here that the supposed fact is no such thing; moral obligations are not necessarily guiding giving, and so the ‘guidance argument’ for ought-implies-can fails. This is the result of no non-trivial condition being ‘luminous’.