I'm currently a postdoctoral research fellow in the School of Philosophy at the Australian National University. My research addresses three central questions:
(1) How do good moral agents (learn to) determine what morality requires of them? To address this question, I’m developing a conception of good practical reason based on the skill model of virtue—the idea that moral virtue is like, or just is, a practical skill. This idea has been extensively developed in the eudaimonist tradition going back to Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics. I, however, critique the eudaimonist approach to the skill model and advance an alternative, deontological ac…
I'm currently a postdoctoral research fellow in the School of Philosophy at the Australian National University. My research addresses three central questions:
(1) How do good moral agents (learn to) determine what morality requires of them? To address this question, I’m developing a conception of good practical reason based on the skill model of virtue—the idea that moral virtue is like, or just is, a practical skill. This idea has been extensively developed in the eudaimonist tradition going back to Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics. I, however, critique the eudaimonist approach to the skill model and advance an alternative, deontological account of good practical reason as moral skill.
(2) How should we understand and evaluate inner conflict in moral agency? Building on my dissertation, I note certain puzzles that arise from Aristotelian conceptions of virtue, vice, continence, and incontinence and offer new ways to think about the psychology of each of these states. The result is a comprehensive account of the nature and value of inner conflict in moral life which identifies several complexities overlooked by the Aristotelian approach.
(3) How can human moral agency shape, and be shaped by, sociotechnical systems? Funded by a grant from the Templeton World Charity Foundation, my postdoctoral research focuses on how artificial intelligence technologies stand to reshape morally relevant skills like attention, role-taking, and decision-making, as well as how AI systems might themselves be made morally skillful and what this would mean.
My postdoc is also partly funded by a grant from the Australian Research Council, on AI and socially responsible insurance. For this project, I'm investigating the social function and normative foundations of insurance and developing a multi-layered approach to evaluating the fairness of algorithmic insurance pricing practices.