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27Properties, Concepts and Empirical IdentityActa Analytica 37 (2): 159-171. 2022.Properties and concepts are similar kinds of thing in so far as they are both typically understood to be whatever it is that predicates stand for. However, they are generally supposed to have different identity criteria: for example, heat is the same property as molecular kinetic energy, whereas the concept of heat is different from the concept of molecular kinetic energy. This paper examines whether this discrepancy is really defensible, and concludes that matters are more complex than is gener…Read more
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43Continuants, identity and essentialismSynthese 197 (8): 3375-3394. 2020.The question of whether it is permissible to quantify into a modal context is re-examined from an empiricist perspective. Following Wiggins, it is argued that an ontology of continuants implies essentialism, but it is also argued, against Wiggins, that the only conception of necessity that we need to start out with is that of analyticity. Essentialism, of a limited kind, can then be actually generated from this. An exceptionally fine-grained identity criterion for continuants is defended in this…Read more
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8The Problem of Perception, by A.D. Smith (review)Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 36 (1): 102-103. 2005.
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42Before logic by Richard Mason. Albany NY: State university of new York press. 2000. Pp. 153. $23.50, $22.95Philosophy 80 (312). 2005.
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27The Nature and Structure of Content. By Jeffrey C. King. (Oxford UP, 2007. Pp. x + 230. Price £37.50 Hardback. £17.99 Paperback) (review)Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249): 876-878. 2012.
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14Belief, Truth and Radical DisagreementIn Pedro Schmechtig & Martin Grajner (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Norms, and Goals, De Gruyter. pp. 117-136. 2016.
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30Transitivity and the ontology of causationSouth African Journal of Philosophy 33 (1): 101-111. 2014.It is argued that it is very hard to analyse causation in such a way that prevents everything from causing everything else. This is particularly true if we assume that the causal relation is transitive, for it all too often happens that causal chains that we wish to keep separate pass through common intermediate events. It is also argued that treating causes as aspects of events, rather than the events themselves, will not solve this problem. This is because aspects have to be highly disjunctive…Read more
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25The Faces of Existence: An Essay in Nonreductive Metaphysics (review)Philosophical Books 30 (3): 162-164. 1989.
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12Recent Philosophers: a supplement to A Hundred Years of PhilosophyPhilosophical Books 28 (2): 87-88. 1987.
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80Deflationist Truth is SubstantialActa Analytica 28 (3): 257-266. 2013.Deflationism is usually thought to differ from the correspondence theory over whether truth is a substantial property. However, I argue that this notion of a ‘substantial property’ is tendentious. I further argue that the Equivalence Schema alone is sufficient to lead to idealism when combined with a pragmatist theory of truth. Deflationism thus has more powerful metaphysical implications than is generally thought and itself amounts to a kind of correspondence theory
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55It is often claimed, following Joseph Levine, that there is an ‘explanatory gap’ between ordinary physical facts and the way we perceive things, so that it is impossible to explain, among other things, why colours actually look the way they do. C.L. Hardin, by contrast, argues that there are sufficient asymmetries between colours to traverse this gap. This paper argues that the terms we use to characterize colours, such as ‘warm’ and ‘cool’, are not well understood, and that we need to understan…Read more
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52Locke on language and real essences : a defenseHistory of Philosophy Quarterly 13 (2): 205-219. 1996.
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91Why Do Colours Look the Way They Do?Philosophy 86 (3): 405-424. 2011.A major part of the mind–body problem is to explain why a given set of physical processes should give rise to perceptual qualities of one sort rather than another. Colour hues are the usual example considered here, and there is a lively debate as to whether the results of colour vision science can provide convincing explanations of why colours actually look the way they do. The internal phenomenological structure of colours is considered here in some detail, and a comparison is drawn with sounds…Read more
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15Ernest Sosa and His Critics - Edited by John Greco (review)Philosophical Books 48 (2): 170-172. 2007.
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51Relativism and Moral ComplacencyPhilosophy 60 (232): 205-214. 1985.Moral relativism is the doctrine that morality may vary from culture to culture. Given the difficulty of saying when two individuals belong to the same culture it can be taken in more or less radical forms. In its least radical form it means nothing more than that, although morality is fixed and universal for human beings, Martian morality may be different. In its most radical form it implies that each person has his own morality which may vary from one individual to another and from one moment …Read more
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785A major part of the mind–body problem is to explain why a given set of physical processes should give rise to qualia of one sort rather than another. Colour hues are the usual example considered here, and there is a lively debate between, for example, Hardin, Levine, Jackson, Clark and Chalmers as to whether the results of colour vision science can provide convincing explanations of why colours actually look the way they do. This paper examines carefully the type of explanation that is needed he…Read more
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43An expressivist theory of consciousness is outlined. The suggestion that attributions of consciousness involve an essentially projective element is carefully examined, as is the view that ‘zombism’, defined as the thought that certain people are unconscious although physically normal, is a largely affective and not wholly cognitive (hypothetical) disorder. A comparison is drawn between ‘zombism’ and the Capgras delusion. The notion of supervenience is shown to be deeply problematic when applied …Read more
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46A line of argument, presented by David Lewis, to show that the correspondence theory of truth is not a real alternative to deflationism is developed. It is shown that truthmakers, construed as concrete events or states of affairs, are unsatisfactory entities, since we do not know how to individuate them or how to identify their essential qualities. Furthermore, the real work is usually done by supervenience relations, which have little to do with truth. It is argued that the Equivalence Schema i…Read more
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45Aiming at truthPalgrave-Macmillan. 2007.The author argues that is not obvious what it means for our beliefs and assertions to be "truth-directed", and that we need to weaken our ordinary notion of a belief if we are to deal with radical scepticism without surrendering to idealism. Topics examined also include whether there could be alien conceptual schemes and what might happen to us if we abandoned genuine belief in place of mere pragmatic acceptance. A radically new "ecological" model of knowledge is defended
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184Divine hoorays: Some parallels between expressivism and religious ethicsPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3): 659-684. 2008.Divine law theories of metaethics claim that moral rightness is grounded in God’s commands, wishes and so forth. Expressivist theories, by contrast, claim that to call something morally right is to express our own attitudes, not to report on God’s. Ostensibly, such views are incompatible. However, we shall argue that a rapprochement is possible and beneficial to both sides. Expressivists need to explain the difference between reporting and expressing an attitude, and to address the Frege-Ge…Read more
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185Norms and Negation: A Problem for Gibbard’s LogicPhilosophical Quarterly 51 (202): 60-75. 2001.A difficulty is exposed in Allan Gibbard's solution to the embedding/Frege-Geach problem, namely that the difference between refusing to accept a normative judgement and accepting its negation is ignored. This is shown to undermine the whole solution.
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Meta-Ethics |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
General Philosophy of Science |