Nick Zangwill

This chapter attempts two things. First, the formulation of the debate over moral motivation is reconsidered. A modal conception of the issue is criticized, and an agent-causation reconception is proposed. Second, on that reconceived basis, a pro-externalist argument from moral indifference is refined. Cases of rational cynicism have more to teach than cases of depression. The actual prevalence of rational cynicism yields a best explanation argument for the externalist view that moral motivation has its source in a desire that is distinct from moral judgement. Lastly, moral motivation, and the lack of it, is compared with our motivation or lack of motivation in the case of other normative judgements, such as judgements of sport, religion, law, and rationality. It is argued that judgements of epistemic and practical rationality may move us without a distinct desire, and in this they contrast with moral judgements.

This paper argues that theorists who want to respect common sense morality must respect not just verdicts but also grounds for verdicts. Just as theories that baldly deny that there is any value in personal commitments or who say that personal commitments do not generate duties are problematically reversionary, so are theories that say that there is value in personal commitments but it is something foreign to common sense morality. Indirect consequentialism is in fact committed to a massive error theory about ordinary moral thought. Thus it loses the advantage it was supposed to have in comparison with direct consequentialism. In one case the massive error is over verdicts, in the other over grounds for verdicts. Neither form of consequentialism can respect matters of the heart.

What are propositional attitudes, and what distinguishes different propositional attitudes from each other? These questions are addressed here, focusing on beliefs and desires, in the light of the debate over ‘direction of fit’. To this end, a distinction is made between ‘vertical’ (mind-world) and ‘horizontal’ (mind-mind) accounts of propositional attitudes, and also between non-normative and normative accounts. Criticisms are first directed against vertical accounts, both non-normative and normative, such as some truth-based accounts. After that, horizontal non-normative accounts, such as dispositional or second-order accounts are criticized. Given the difficulties for non-normative horizontal accounts, normative horizontal accounts seem preferable. But they too have difficulties. Finally, it is argued that intrinsic accounts are superior both to vertical and horizontal normative accounts, whether non-normative or normative.

In this paper, I assess Dickie's institutional theory of art. I compare the earlier and later forms of the theory, and I point to various problems of detail with these accounts. I then proceed by arguing that Dickie's definition excludes Krispy Kreme doughnut boxes from possessing the status of being works of art, and it excludes those who made them from possessing the status of being artists. The intention is not to offer a counter example to Dickie's account. Rather, the complaint is that there could be no philosophical point or interest in a concept of art which excludes these doughnut boxes. The best way to see this is by contrast with a concept of art that includes them. Thus I outline what I call a ‘creative’ account. What we want is a concept of art which helps us understand a certain phenomenon in the world – the phenomenon that we call ‘art’. In this light, I argue that Dickie's institutional theory tells us nothing about why people want to make art and nothing about why they want to experience it. By contrast, the creative theory, which embraces both doughnut boxes and things in galleries, is more explanatory.

The question of whether or not God exists matters a great deal to billions of people. The question is taken to be an important question. Theists and atheists agree on this. And the question generates much heat. Much is thought to turn on it. But there is a puzzle about why this should be. First, I clarify the question at issue, distinguishing it from various other issues. Then I reject a number of familiar ideas for addressing this question. Having cleared the ground, I offer a positive suggestion according to which theism is committed to shared essences between human beings and God, plus a dependence relation between those essences. The debate turns out to be one about human nature, in such a way as to make sense of heat generated. After that, a familiar Aristotelian theist view is contrasted with Platonist shared essentialism to the advantage of the latter. Lastly, I consider some religious consequences of the shared essentialism.

I defend the application of the notion of essence to music. I appeal to the essences of events rather than objects, and I focus on functional events, such as handshakes, which have historical essences. Musical essences are like that. This allows us to clear up a number of worries about essences in music. I then celebrate and defend Hanslick’s appeal to musical-beauty, and make some interpretative points. I defend the appeal to pleasure in the musically-beautiful against Taruskin’s appeal to the sublime. Next, I turn to the notion of absolute music and characterize it in a certain way. I show how Hanslick can and does allow much non-absolute music. Nevertheless, absolute music retains a certain explanatory priority with respect to the other things that music does for us. Political criticisms of formalism about music are navigated in passing. Lastly, I diagnose Taruskin’s worry that talking about essence gets something wrong about the cultural dimensions of human life. In reply I show how essence is essential for understanding human action, and thus also for understanding cultural human action.

How do we know what kinds of things constitute knowledge or justified belief? Naturalized epistemology is committed to denying a priori insight into the kinds of kinds that are and are not knowledge or justification makers. By contrast, it is argued here that knowledge of these matters is a priori knowledge of a special kind. Such knowledge may be called “categorial.” The dialectical give and take between categorial and naturalized epistemology is pursued, before endorsing an argument that breaks the standoff in favor of categorial epistemology. In particular, an argument is given for a certain kind of mathematical skepticism that is entirely a priori. The skeptical argument turns on categorial claims about actuality. Responses are considered before defending a method of categorial dumbfounding in certain circumstances. This yields a positive argument for the categoriality of fundamental epistemic principles. The categorial rationalist conclusions are embraced and some consequences noted.

Kant makes modest and ambitious claims with his idea of disinterested pleasure. The modest claim is that all aesthetic pleasure is disinterested. The ambitious claim is that all and only aesthetic pleasure is disinterested. I defend only the modest claim. I initially give a basic explication of what Kant had in mind by the doctrine. I then argue that if aesthetic pleasure were not basically disinterested, judgements of taste could not make the normative (or “universal”) claims they do. Normativity is essential to judgements of taste; they would not be what they are without it. And basic disinterest is essential for normativity. Therefore, we cannot reject basic disinterestedness without rejecting judgements of taste altogether. I then distinguish various other notions of disinterest and argue that none of them allow Kant to make his ambitions claim.

I raise the issue of the role of God with respect to morality and why we should be concerned with Him. Then the difficulty that God existence is still irrelevant even if He created the world and even if the Divine Commandment Theory is right that He is responsible for Morality. A Jewish Neo-Aristotelian solution is considered but rejected, and the Jewish Neoplatonist solution endorsed and sympathetically but cautiously endorsed. Free Will is considered from the Neoplatonist point of view. Something like Jewish incarnation is suggested at the end, with an appendix on sex.

I argue against inferentialism about logic. First, I argue against an analogy between logic and chess, before considering a more basic objection to stipulating inference rules as a way of establishing the meaning of logical constants. The objectionthe Mushroom Omelette Objectionis that stipulative acts are partly constituted by logical notions, and therefore cannot be used to explain logical thought. I then argue that the same problem also attaches to following existing conventional rules, since either those rules have logical contents, or following those conventional rules is done for logical reasons. Lastly, I compare this argument with other arguments found in Quine’s early work, and consider two attempts to reply to Quine.