Nicla Vassallo

Any attempt to evaluate a naturalistic feminist philosophy of cognition and knowledge must acknowledge that there are two distinct core approaches to naturalism. Classical feminist naturalizations of epistemology have drawn inspiration from the Quinean naturalization, they have inherited its defects – the major one: being compelled to renounce doing real epistemology in favor of a merely scientific enterprise. Notwithstanding, the merits of these feminist naturalizations are more than one: they embrace the idea that epistemology needs contributions and help from the sciences, they raise serious doubts about the best science to involve in feminist epistemologies, they contrast our “local feminist philosophy” not only in its scorn for every science and its technological applications, but also in its conviction that there are essential differences between female/women and male/men about knowledge and cognition. I wish to propose a naturalized feminist epistemology which draws inspiration from the more moderate Goldmanian approach. Much work would be needed in order to combine those feminist approaches which believe in the individualism of the knowing subject with those that are anti–individualist. But, at least, taking inspiration from Goldman and his reliabilism, we may achieve a type of naturalism in feminist epistemologies, in which it would be feasible to understand the reliability of the cognitive faculties of the knowing subject and to understand scientifically whether or not there are differences between female and male faculties – avoiding any essentialist temptations.

Thanks to their heterogeneity, the nine essays in this volume offer a clear testimony of Donald Davidson's authority, and they undoubtedly show how much his work - even if it has raised many doubts and criticisms - has been, and still is, highly influential and significant in contemporary analytical philosophy for a wide range of subjects. Moreover, the various articles not only critically and carefully analyse Davidson's theses and arguments (in particular those concerning language and knowledge), but they also illustrate how such theories and ideas, despite their unavoidable difficulties, are still alive and potentially fruitful. Davidson's work is indeed an important and provocative starting point for discussing the future progress of philosophy.

One manner to solve the factivity problem consists of denying that the contextualists are committed to the premises of the conundrum. Thus, accordingly, one might allege that the contextualists are not committed neither to the truth of any specific knowledge ascription like (b), “Oliver knowsO that q”, nor to the claim that such a knowledge ascription is not knowable according to certain epistemic standards. In this chapter we will see two employments of this strategy. The first is due to Freitag, who develops a minimal reading of contextualism that does not entail any commitment towards knowledge ascriptions or knowledge denials; the latter is due to Dinges, who considers the factivity problem from a different angle—he aims to show that the certain entailments of the contextualist anti-sceptical argument can be coherently known and asserted in a sceptical context. We will conclude that if Dinges’ strategy fails since it cannot avoid the commitment towards (b)-like propositions, that proposed by Freitag is successful in solving the conundrum, but achieves this result by means of a serious weakening of contextualism.

The three approaches to the factivity problem that we analysed in this book may be taken as lying on three different understandings of contextualism: minimalistic contextualism (chapter three), moderate contextualism (chapter four and five) and bold contextualism (chapter six). Here we will provide a brief outline of the virtues and the vices of each reading of contextualism and we will claim that the moderate one is the version of the view that is more in line with the classical contextualist doctrine. If bold contextualism relies on an unjustified and questionable assumption, in fact, its amended version turns out to entail a radical revision of factivity that seems extremely unpalatable. The minimalistic version of contextualism, on the other hand, seems to be rather unappealing due to its non-Moorean nature.

In chapter four we saw that Brueckner’s and Buford’s solution solves the factivity problem but regrettably saddles contextualism with a statability problem: the anti-sceptical argument of the theory, in fact, turns out to be unknowable and unassertable. In this chapter we will analyse a solution to the above-mentioned statability problem that consists of denying the fluid view—the thesis that the mere mention of an error possibility is enough to raise the standard in place in the context. After a brief introduction of the fluid view we will first evaluate those arguments that favour an alternative stance about how the epistemic standard in place in a context can change; then, we will consider which epistemic standard should be in place in a sceptical context. In the last section of this chapter we will claim that the loss of even-handedness, an alleged valuable feature of the contextualist treatment of scepticism, does not represent a real problem for the contextualist anti-sceptical argument.

In the first chapter we saw that the principle of factivity and the principle of closure, in order to be efficaciously employed in the argument of the factivity problem, have to be rephrased to account for the contextualist understanding of the semantics of “know”. It could be wondered, therefore, if other principles that might tacitly play a role in the argument of the conundrum need a similar treatment. In this chapter we will try to reply to this question by scrutinizing the solution proposed by Baumann, who suggests reformulating both the principle of the transmission of warrant and the principle of closure. We will see that Baumann claims that the warrant necessary to know (according to a certain epistemic standard) that a given knowledge ascription “S knows that p” is true is different from the warrant necessary to know that p is true. We will maintain that, although Baumann’s proposal can overcome the factivity problem, it regrettably turns out to be based on an unjustified and implausible assumption. In the final section of this chapter we will also claim that the only way in which it seems possible to satisfy Baumann’s desiderata about contextualism is that of refusing the factivity principle in favour of a relativist version of it.

In the argument of the factivity problem the contradiction seems to follow from the assumption that an asymmetrical knowledge ascription like (c), “Elio knowsE that Oliver knowsO that q”, holds. Here we will scrutinize two different solutions that propose to reconsider the role of this kind of ascriptions. The first is due to Brueckner and Buford and maintains that asymmetrical knowledge ascriptions should be refuted; the contextualists would not be in the position to utter them since they do not know that one of its necessary conditions is satisfied. The second solution is that proposed by Montminy and Skolits, who claim that asymmetrical knowledge ascriptions should be considered as weak assertions, namely assertions that do not present their contents as properly true. We will see that if the latter strategy seems to fail, the former solve the factivity problem but has the effect that, from the contextualists’ point of view, a proposition like (c) is not true, and that this conclusion entails some statability limitations for the theory. In Sect. 4.4 we will see that the statability limitations cannot be overcome by allowing only certain sceptical arguments in the sceptical context. For these limitations seem to be rather serious, we will conclude that Brueckner’s and Buford’s proposal as it stands cannot be considered as true improvements in the solution of the factivity problem.

Contextualism is the thesis that the truth-conditions of knowledge-ascribing and knowledge-denying sentences can vary depending on certain features of the context of the knowledge attributor. According to a recent objection labelled “the factivity problem”, contextualism, if combined with the principle of factivity and with the principle of closure, would turn out to be an inconsistent theory. In this chapter are presented the contextualist stance—from both a semantic and an epistemic point of view—the argument of the factivity problem and the implications of the issue.

According to the minimal version of the traditional analysis of knowledge, there are (at least) three necessary components to knowledge, that is, truth, belief and justification. In this paper we will argue that even in a global sceptical scenario, all three conditions minimally necessary for knowledge can be satisfied. In particular, we will focus on the justification requirement and analyse two “traditional” theories of justification, i.e., coherentism and foundationalism, as well as a more “innovative” one, i.e., reliabilism. Then, we will conclude that if we want to continue to claim that, in a global sceptical scenario, a cognitive subject does not know (almost) anything, we should recognise that she may still have justified true beliefs, and we should, therefore, look elsewhere for the reasons why she lacks knowledge.

La discussione generale sulla filosofia della scienza contemporanea è complicata dal numero e dall’eterogeneità delle scienze, mentre lo studio di temi specifici porta inevitabilmente a dissertazioni specialistiche che mancano nel dare ragione della trama di senso sottostante. Questo Piccolo trattato di epistemologia intende occupare uno spazio vuoto, proponendo alcuni temi chiave per la comprensione dei meccanismi alla base della conoscenza scientifica: i rapporti tra filosofia e scienze, siano esse naturali o umane; la complessa relazione tra fatti e valori; la distinzione tra scoperta e giustificazione; la necessità di un discorso etico sulla ricerca, che chiami in causa categorie come fiducia, empatia, altruismo ed egoismo. Con un approccio chiaro e rigoroso, il volume intende rivolgersi a quell’ampia fascia di pubblico interessata alle tematiche centrali dell’epistemologia, della filosofia e delle scienze.

Reason and rationality represent crucial elements of the self-image of human beings and have unquestionably been among the most debated issues in Western philosophy, dating from ancient Greece, through the Middle Ages, and to the present day. Many words and thoughts have already been spent trying to define the nature and standards of reason and rationality, what they could or ought to be, and under what conditions something can be said to be rational. This volume focuses instead on the relationships of reason and rationality to some relevant specific topics, i.e., science, knowledge, gender, politics, ethics, religion, aesthetics, language, logic, and metaphysics, trying to uncover and clarify both the connections and differences in their various characterisations and uses.

This volume offers a meta-philosophical reflection on feminist philosophies of science. It emphasizes and discusses both the connections and differences between "traditional" philosophies of science and feminist philosophies of science. The collection systematically analyses feminist contributions to the various philosophies of specific sciences. Each chapter is devoted to a specific area of philosophy of science: general philosophy of science, philosophy of biology, philosophy of climate sciences, philosophy of cognitive sciences and neurosciences, philosophy of economics, philosophy of history and archaeology, philosophy of logic and mathematics, philosophy of medicine, philosophy of psychology, philosophy of physics, and philosophy of social sciences. Since some of these areas have so far rarely been addressed by feminist philosophers, this new collection provides new angels and stimulates the debate on pivotal issues that are part and parcel of both "traditional" philosophies of science and feminist philosophies of science. Using a range of different methodologies and styles, the essays all show great clarity in both arguments and contents.