Nicolas Kuske

This paper examines how panpsychism and panagentialism—philosophies proposing consciousness and agency as fundamental features of reality—jointly inform a pantheistic understanding of the universe. By exploring their interdependence, it argues that these concepts form a parsimonious metaphysical framework, where the universe is both conscious and purposive, challenging materialist and dualist views. The paper suggests that all entities possess some degree of subjective experience and intentionality. It further proposes that the universe embodies divine properties of omnibenevolence, omnisubjectivity, and omniagency. In this pantheistic view, God is fully immanent as the conscious mind and agentive will of the cosmos, expressed through every aspect of the universe; consciousness and causality are expressions of God's immanence. By unifying panpsychism and panagentialism, the paper provides a coherent foundation for pantheism, providing insights into divine immanence and the purposiveness of reality, with the universe shaped towards the greater good.

If panpsychism is true, it suggests that consciousness pervades not only our brains and bodies but also the entire universe, prompting a reevaluation of our existential attitudes. Hence, panpsychism potentially fulfills psychological needs typically addressed by religious beliefs, such as a sense of belonging and purpose but also transcendence. The discussion is organized into two main areas: the implications of panpsychism for basic human existential needs, such as feelings of kinship, ommunication, and loneliness; and for greater existential questions relating to mystical experiences including transcendent unity and alleviation of the fear of death. In conclusion panpsychism may provide a deeper meaning in life for some people but its broader impact depends on individual dispositions and the cultural context in which it is embedded.

Panpsychism is a striking metaphysical claim: every part of the physical world has some form of consciousness. Does this striking claim have equally striking ethical implications? Does it change what duties we owe to which beings, or how we should understand the relation between self-interest and altruism? Some defenders as well as critics of panpsychism have suggested it does. Others have disagreed. In this paper, we attempt to survey and organize these existing discussions. We suggest that panpsychism is likely to have significant implications, but that they 1) stop short of some of the most radical implications sometimes associated with the view (by both critics and proponents), and 2) often depend heavily on the exact sort of panpsychism that is endorsed, as well as how one settles various independent questions about value and identity.