Nicolas Schneider

This paper analyses some political and epistemological implications of the encounter between philosophy and anarchism. It sets out from Catherine Malabou’s observation that Reiner Schürmann’s philosophy of anarchy both lacks a clear political articulation and reproduces a questionable ethnocentric perspective. To assess those points of critique, the paper first compares Schürmann’s notion of ‘ontological anarchy’ to the homonymous concept at the centre of a recent debate in anthropology between Eduardo Viveiros de Castro and David Graeber. It is argued that Schürmann’s philosophy provides a viewpoint that can help situate both sides of the discussion within what he calls ‘our historical site’, in which the end of the world plays out as an ongoing and open-ended sequence of disintegration. The paper then turns to debates in standpoint theory, indicating that Schürmann’s topology of broken hegemonies can also offer a fresh approach to the dispute between particularist standpoints and universalist claims. Against the backdrop of these analyses, the paper argues that Schürmann’s philosophy of anarchy can contribute to the reconceptualization of an anarchist universalism.

Translators’ Abstract: In this introduction to his Italian translation of Reiner Schürmann’s, Gianni Carchia offers a short yet incisive interpretation of the compelling originality of Schürmann’s reading of Heidegger. Carchia points out that, contrary to much Heidegger literature, Schürmann insists on a three-tiered temporal difference rather than on a simple dichotomy between beings and being as the driver of the deconstruction of metaphysics, and it is only through this distinction that the an-archic as the evental and ahistorical origin of being comes into view. What this displacement affords is a certain historicization of Heideggerian philosophy that brings out the anarchic, polymorphous, and protean nature of being and restores to acting its spontaneity and innocence. Observing that this anti-humanist naturalization of an-archy may indeed be closer to Eugen Fink’s cosmology, which grants autonomy to the extra-human, than to Heidegger’s history of Dasein, which confines us to “the prison of the human,” Carchia locates the contribution of Schürmann’s work in its deconstruction of the Idealist remnant in Heidegger.

To circumvent both historicism and utopianism, Reiner Schürmann develops an account of a three-tiered temporal difference in which the entitative and the event-like are connected by an “economy of presence.” This paper investigates Schürmann’s notion of “economy” to draw out the historical-systematic status of what he construes as “economic anarchy” in distinction from both Giorgio Agamben’s idea of a “true anarchy” purged of all oikonomia and from Miguel Vatter’s rights-based notion of “politico-legal anarchy.” What is at stake in “economic anarchy” is the preparation of a place that puts an end to domination by first principles without fantasizing a clean cut that ends up reproducing hegemonic fantasms. Rather, Schürmann insists on the aporetic and incongruous nature of that “caesura-place” in which the synchronic and the diachronic, universalization and singularization, are bound together. At variance with both Agamben’s appeal to a destituent potential and Vatter’s assertion of constituent power, Schürmann draws out the discordance of times that is implied by what he calls originary or individual practice. The paper concludes with a brief confrontation of Schürmann’s critique of epochal economy with a Marxian critique of political economy.

This article develops a critique of the post-foundationalist conception of politics put forward by Oliver Marchart. Confronting the depoliticizations that follow from both the foundationalist insistence on transhistorical foundations and the anti-foundationalist rejection of all foundations as fictions, post-foundationalism casts resistance as determinate negation of concrete political institutions rather than as opposition to phantasmatic totalities. I argue that this precludes the possibility to consider phantasmatic referents (be they divine right, natural law, the nation or the demos ) as neither transhistorical/fictional nor exclusively political but to interpret them in terms of a conflict between competing modes of presencing. I elucidate this claim with reference to the work of Reiner Schürmann, which Marchart introduces as an exponent of post-foundationalism but which is better grasped as outlining a ‘para-foundational’ view. In focusing on the ultimate double bind that subtends foundations, Schürmann affords a more comprehensive perspective on the life and afterlife of the Western political and philosophical tradition.