Nicole Fice

In research on pediatric vaccine refusal that occurred in the mid-2010s, an interesting theme emerged—that of the relative privilege of some parents who delay or refuse vaccines. However, privilege is not clearly defined. The author points to accounts of privilege in feminist philosophy to fill this gap but argues that existing accounts are vague about what privilege confers. She offers some clarifications: privilege confers both tangible resources and options to do certain things or be a certain way to dominant social groups. The author then returns to the case of vaccine refusal to demonstrate the nature and value of this distinction in what privilege includes.

Several philosophical accounts of homelessness have emerged in recent years. These include care-based approaches and liberal approaches. Bart van Leeuwen (2018) has argued liberal approaches face what has been called the “minimalist charge,” which holds such accounts will fail to justify robust policy responses aimed at addressing homelessness. Katy Wells (2022) raises concerns with care-based approaches, arguing that they fail to respect the autonomy of people experiencing homelessness by assimilating them into a category of people with diminished autonomy. To address the issues with care-based approaches, and to avoid the minimalist concern, Wells introduces her own autonomy-based approach. In this paper, I argue that Wells’s account is subject to the same worries she raises against care-based approaches: ultimately, it fails to properly respect the autonomy of people experiencing homelessness. Because Wells’s view is externalist in nature—meaning that it makes external conditions necessary for autonomy ascription—those who lack the required conditions will have diminished autonomy. To support this claim, I draw on recent criticisms of some feminist relational accounts of autonomy, especially ones that incorporate external conditions as necessary for autonomy. I introduce an alternative conception of autonomy that overcomes the theoretical problems with Wells’s account and offers some practical benefits.

Care ethics holds that, to live a good life, one should work to create and maintain healthy relationships. The feminist orientation of care ethics also reminds us that care isn't a personal matter, but that it is entrenched in social and political contexts. As in personal relationships, one should aim to care about and for one's wider communities in a way that promotes healthy relations. Care ethics appears in Avatar: The Last Airbender in at least two ways. First, the practice of caring is deeply rooted in the moral lives of some of the characters in the series. This chapter focuses on Katara, although similar arguments could be made about Iroh, Aang, and others. Second, care motivates the political goal of the Gaang which, ultimately, is to repair their world so people can live well. This requires the Gaang to address local and global harms caused by Fire Nation imperialism and industrialization.

One goal of feminist philosophy is to challenge unjust systems of power like patriarchy, which privilege some social groups while oppressing others. In this three-chapter dissertation, I argue that to achieve this goal, we need a better understanding of privilege and its implications. In chapter one, I raise objections to some existing philosophical accounts of privilege. These accounts are either too broad in defining privilege as always advantageous or they are vague regarding what privilege comprises. I provide an account of privilege which clarifies that privilege is generally advantageous and that privilege includes tangible resources and options to do certain things or be a certain way. In chapter two, I utilize my account of privilege in the context of feminist debates on relational autonomy. Recently, strong substantive and constitutive accounts of relational autonomy have come under criticism. Critics argue these accounts generate perverse conclusions about oppressed agents. I show these accounts generate the same perverse conclusions about privileged agents. Critics also argue these accounts are poorly suited to achieve feminist goals, which are to combat systems of power and to offer an account for how autonomy is influenced by oppression and privilege. I defend an alternative account of relational autonomy given by Andrea Westlund and explain how it avoids the perverse conclusions while still achieving the second goal, as it can explain how oppression and privilege can influence autonomy. However, I argue that autonomy alone is not enough to achieve the first goal of combatting systems of power. In chapter three, I investigate the issue of vaccine hesitancy, where parents delay or refuse routine vaccinations for their children. Some empirical literature suggests a proportion of these parents are privileged. However, this literature lacks a clear definition of privilege. I supplement and strengthen this research with my account of privilege. I demonstrate how my account of privilege captures additional elements of parents’ privilege. Using my account of privilege, I show how privilege can potentially influence some of the reasons parents have for delaying or refusing vaccines. I also clarify how my discussion impacts public health policies aimed at addressing vaccine hesitancy.