This paper draws upon “affect-as-information” research on moods and defends an account of mid-level virtues for epistemology. While much research has gone into the more intense field of emotions, far less has focused on moods, in particular on their epistemic role. Moods are evaluated for reliability, power, and portability. Smith argues that moods are reliable and powerful, but they are not very portable, which means that their reliability and power only operate in a narrow range of circumstanc…
Read moreThis paper draws upon “affect-as-information” research on moods and defends an account of mid-level virtues for epistemology. While much research has gone into the more intense field of emotions, far less has focused on moods, in particular on their epistemic role. Moods are evaluated for reliability, power, and portability. Smith argues that moods are reliable and powerful, but they are not very portable, which means that their reliability and power only operate in a narrow range of circumstances. She examines creativity and flexibility to develop a virtue-responsibilist response to epistemic situationism that uses moods as essential components of mixed epistemic virtues.
