Niël Conradie

There is considerable and ongoing dispute about whether some notions of collective agency and collective responsibility should play a role in our responsibility practices. One important normative objection against collective responsibility is the unfairness objection, an objection that any theory of responsibility, or its component parts, must take seriously. In this piece, I argue that provided we both clearly and accurately identify the collective agents at stake in collective responsibility and ensure the legitimate distribution of blame, sanctions, and burdens between collectives and the individual agents that form their members, collective responsibility survives this objection in good health. It will still be the case that failures to adhere to the rules for the fair and legitimate application of collective responsibility will occur, but in this it is in good company with individual responsibility. Furthermore, the best way of combatting these harmful and unfair cases is not to remove collective responsibility from our arsenal of responsibility concepts, but rather to take it more seriously so as to regulate its practice for the better.

Foreword The following guideline emerged from the project DUMFE: Dual Use and Misuse of Research Results (“Dual use und Missbrauch von Forschungsergebnissen”), funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF, 01GP2187). In recent years, dual use has become a significant issue in research ethics for numerous reasons, garnering considerable attention not only within the ethical community but also in the broader scientific community and among political and security circles. Among the reasons for this attention are the dissemination of scientific developments with high misuse potential, such as gain-of-function experiments (Imai et al. 2012; Herfst et al. 2012; Imperiale and Casadevall 2018); political factors, including recent shifts in the global security landscape (Nationale Akademie der Wissenschaften Leopoldina (Leopoldina) and Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) 2024, 9ff.); and heightened awareness of historical misuses of science (De Block and Adriaens, 2013). There is detailed advice on the handling of dual use research of concern provided by the Joint Committee (“Joint Committee on the Handling of Security-Relevant Research”) of the German National Academy of Science Leopoldina and the German Research Foundation (DFG) (2022). The Joint Committee also provides networking and exchange opportunities for Committees for Ethics in Security-Relevant Research (Kommissionen für Ethik sicherheitsrelevanter Forschung), so-called KEFs. Nevertheless, additional information and guidance on handling dual use research of concern is a regular request in particular from scientists, but also a request often heard in forums with policy experts, managers and administrators of institutions in research and education. The present guideline provides such additional in-depth information on the definition, examples, legal as well as ethical issues and options for governance of dual use research. It has been written by ethicists and philosophers of technology, supported by lawyers and members of the commission for ethics in research of Forschungszentrum Jülich. It is intended to provide additional information supporting the design of and deliberation in institutional bodies dealing with ethics of security-relevant research. It aims to highlight decisions and options relevant to different institutions and refers to further sources of information throughout.

Smart wearable technologies have seen an explosive growth over recent years, with some research indicating that the wearable technology industry is expected to grow from USD 24 billion today to over USD 70 billion in 2025. This proliferation has extended across disparate domains, ranging from medical applications and fitness and social technologies to military, industrial, and manufacturing applications. As with any emergent technology, these wearables present opportunities for our moral benefit as well as moral challenges to be addressed. A crucial dimension of this discussion is the ethical evaluation of the impact of smart wearables on the autonomy of human decision-making. Nowhere is this a more pertinent concern than when dealing with persons uniquely vulnerable to autonomy infringement. This contribution, undertaken from an explicitly normative and ethical perspective, investigates the potential impact of smart wearables on various dimensions of the decisional autonomy of vulnerable persons.

In this paper I investigate the relationship between moral bioenhancement and the actual-sequence account of moral responsibility (AS). I first provide definitions of the notions of moral bioenhancement and moral responsibility that I use in this paper, where these notions are based on the capacity definition put forward by DeGrazia (2012) and the guidance theory account of responsibility developed by Fischer and Ravizza (1998) respectively. I then address some shortcomings in these accounts and offer improvements. Thereafter, I explore the relationship between them along two dimensions: backward-looking and forward-looking responsibility. On the backward-looking path I contend that, when assessed through the lens of the AS, moral bioenhancement is permissible only provided that it does not override or degrade the reasonsresponsiveness of the enhanced agent. However, if these conditions are met, such enhancement will in many cases be normatively desirable, and in perhaps some cases –when the foreseen threat of harm resulting from the absence of enhancement is sufficiently great– even obligatory. Along the forward-looking track, I argue that moral bioenhancement is permissible, ceteris paribus, and normatively desirable given there is a pro tanto reason to pursue promotions of reasons-responsiveness. Finally, I argue that the demands of moral responsibility do not – on their own terms – rule out the possibility that moral bioenhancement can sometimes be obligatory.

It has been extensively argued that emerging autonomous technologies can represent a challenge for our traditional responsibility practices. Though these challenges differ in a variety of ways, at the center of these challenges is the worrying possibility that there may be outcomes of autonomous technologies for which there are legitimate demands for responsibility but no legitimate target to bear this responsibility. This is well exemplified by the possibility of techno-responsibility gaps. These challenges have elicited a number of responses, including dismissals of the legitimacy of these demands, attempts to find proximate agents that can be legitimately held responsible, and arguments for prohibiting the use of technologies that may open such gaps. In this piece we present a general argument that an overlooked but valuable option lies in adopting a strategy of taking responsibility for the outcomes of autonomous technologies even when the conditions for being legitimately held responsible are not met. We develop a general argument that the adoption of such a strategy is often justified not only by the demands of being responsible, but by practical considerations rooted in our relationships: the need to preserve of the quality of our relationships and the trustworthiness of the socio-technical system of which the autonomous technology is both a result of and embedded in.

Many recent AI policies have been structured under labels that follow a particular trend: national or international guidelines, policies or regulations, such as the EU’s and USA’s ‘Trustworthy AI’ and China’s and India’s adoption of ‘Responsible AI’, use a label that follows the recipe of [agentially loaded notion + ‘AI’]. A result of this branding, even if implicit, is to encourage the application by laypeople of these agentially loaded notions to the AI technologies themselves. Yet, these notions are appropriate only when applied to agents, which current AI technologies are not; and the concern is that this misapplication creates an incentive to inappropriately attribute trustworthiness or responsibility to AI technologies. We endeavour to show that we have good reason to avoid any general AI policy that uses agentially loaded labelling. We suggest labelling these policies not in terms of some qualification of AI, but rather in terms of our approach to the technology and its wider development and use context – focusing on being trustworthy and responsible about AI, rather than on trustworthy or responsible AI.

Robotic and artificially intelligent (AI) systems are becoming prevalent in our day-to-day lives. As human interaction is increasingly replaced by human–computer and human–robot interaction (HCI and HRI), we occasionally speak and act as though we are blaming or praising various technological devices. While such responses may arise naturally, they are still unusual. Indeed, for some authors, it is the programmers or users—and not the system itself—that we properly hold responsible in these cases. Furthermore, some argue that since directing blame or praise at technology itself is unfitting, designing systems in ways that encourage such practices can only exacerbate the problem. On the other hand, there may be good moral reasons to continue engaging in our natural practices, even in cases involving AI systems or robots. In particular, daily interactions with technology may stand to impact the development of our moral practices in human-to-human interactions. In this paper, we put forward an empirically grounded argument in favor of some technologies being designed for social responsiveness. Although our usual practices will likely undergo adjustments in response to innovative technologies, some systems which we encounter can be designed to accommodate our natural moral responses. In short, fostering HCI and HRI that sustains and promotes our natural moral practices calls for a co-developmental process with some AI and robotic technologies.

The introduction of Autonomous Military Systems (AMS) onto contemporary battlefields raises concerns that they will bring with them the possibility of a techno-responsibility gap, leaving insecurity about how to attribute responsibility in scenarios involving these systems. In this work I approach this problem in the domain of applied ethics with foundational conceptual work on autonomy and responsibility. I argue that concerns over the use of AMS can be assuaged by recognising the richly interrelated context in which these systems will most likely be deployed. This will allow us to move beyond the solely individualist understandings of responsibility at work in most treatments of these cases, toward one that includes collective responsibility. This allows us to attribute collective responsibility to the collectives of which the AMS form a part, and to account for the distribution of burdens that follows from this attribution. I argue that this expansion of our responsibility practices will close at least some otherwise intractable techno-responsibility gaps.

There is a conceptual knot at the intersection of moral responsibility and action theory. This knot can be expressed as the following question: What is the relationship between an agent’s openness to moral responsibility and the intentional status of her behaviour? My answer to this question is developed in three steps. I first develop a control-backed account of intentional agency, one that borrows vital insights from the cognitive sciences – in the form of Dual Process Theory – in understanding the control condition central to the account, and demonstrate that this account fares at least as well as its rivals in the field. Secondly, I investigate the dominant positions in the discussion surrounding the role of control in moral responsibility. After consideration of some shortcomings of these positions – especially the inability to properly account for so-called ambivalence cases – I defend an alternative pluralist account of moral responsibility, in which there are two co-extant variants of such responsibility: attributability and accountability. The latter of these will be shown to have a necessary control condition, also best understood in terms of a requirement for oversight, and in terms of the workings of the dual system mechanism. I then demonstrate how these two accounts are necessarily related through the shared role of this kind of control, leading to my answer to the original question: if an agent is open to moral accountability based on some activity or outcome, this activity or outcome must necessarily have positive intentional status. I then apply this answer in a consideration of certain cases of the use of the Doctrine of Double Effect.