Niels Gottschalk-Mazouz

More than 20 years ago, Jürgen Habermas and Karl-Otto Apel started the philosophical research program of Discourse Ethics. This led to a broad discussion about the correct justification and application of basic principles of Discourse Ethics, from which several comprehensive new conceptions emerged in recent years. The authors of this anthology discuss central problems of the previous designs in a constructive way, they carry out alternative designs and thus open up new perspectives for discourse ethics. Niels Gottschalk-Mazouz: Einleitung - William Rehg: Discourse Ethics and Individual Conscience - Thomas Webler und Seth Tuler: Fairness an Competence in Citizen Participation: Theoretical Reflections from a Case Study - Nadia Mazouz: Das Gute Leben in der Diskursethik - Adela Cortina: Virtualitäten in einer erneuerten Diskursethik für die Bioethik - Micha H. Werner: Kants pflichtenethischer Rigorismus und die Diskursethik: Eine maximenethische Deutung des Anwendungsproblems - Niels Gottschalk-Mazouz: Diskursethik als kognitivistisches Rahmenkonzept - Konrad Ott: Noch einmal: Diskursethik - Hans Schelkshorn: Dialogische Vernunft und die Grundlagen interkultureller Ethik; Thesen zu einer Revision der Diskursethik - Matthias Kettner: Diskursethik: Moralische Verantwortung für diskursive Macht.

The usual logical analysis of argument focusses on the content and form, and not on the performative aspects. But, as it is proposed here, it is the proponent’s claiming (i. e. making a claim) that allows for an opponent in a dialogue situation to succeed with a transcendental argument. To work out this idea, a dialogical-logic inspired model of argumentation-as a fair game between a proponent and an opponent-is sketched. It is discussed what it means to play well, and to win in this game. It is also shown how, in different versions of transcendental arguments, the success of such arguments depends on the successful attribution of claiming. Such attribution relies on interpretation and on a -to some extent-shared praxis of interpretation. This does not require us to presuppose any common core of shared propositions, though; it is enough that we presuppose sufficiently large similarities in our beliefs and practices to make sense of ourselves as acting, reflecting and deliberating together. Only then, however, transcendental arguments can be successful.

The book discusses recent developments in Discourse Ethics and argues for a new proposal of how to spell out its core ideas. It finds that its basic principles ("D" and "U") are too specific: they focus on norms, identify those affected with those participating in discourse and use the narrow vocabulary of interests and consequences. It proposes instead: (D1) Only those claims are valid that can be defended against any objection of any possible agent. Discourse Ethics should be understood as a normative framework for ethical argumentation that allows for a plurality of moral principles and for reflections on their suitability for specific contexts. It demands that one acts according to one's best reasons.

The paper discusses recent developments in Discourse Ethics and argues for a new proposal of how to spell out its core ideas. It finds that its basic principles ("D" and "U") are too specific: they focus on norms, identify those affected with those participating in discourse and use the narrow vocabulary of interests and consequences. It proposes instead: (D1) Only those claims are valid that can be defended against any objection of any possible agent. Discourse Ethics should be understood as a normative framework for ethical argumentation that allows for a plurality of moral principles and for reflections on their suitability for specific contexts. It demands that one acts according to one's best reasons.