Nikita Golovko

Coherentism is the only proper account of justification of empirical knowledge. The final representation of Lawrence Bonjour’s coherentist conception of justification includes such theses as: (a) Justification is a function of coherence and depends on the fact that the system of beliefs is not only coherent at the moment, but remains coherent over a sufficiently long period of time, facing continuous input to its content due to the influence of reality. It is this stability that gives reason to believe that the coherence of the system most likely leads to the truth of beliefs; (b) The system contains a large number of different kinds of cognitively spontaneous beliefs that play the role of those with which all other beliefs of the system must cohere, as well as a sufficient number of law-like statements ascribing to these kinds (including those kinds of introspective and memory beliefs that are necessary in order to recognize other cognitively spontaneous beliefs) a high degree of reliability within the system regarding accompanying assumptions, causal explanations of their genesis, previous experiences in assessment situations, etc; (c) A necessary condition for justification is that the person must be able to cognitively grasp, explicitly or implicitly, at least the approximate content of the belief system and its coherence. This Presumption justifies the only thing that connects our belief system and reality – cognitively spontaneous beliefs. The most controversial element of the conception (d), meta-justification (the demonstration that the standards of coherentist justification are truth-conducting) is a priori in nature and does not require additional justification, since it itself is a consequence of the chosen metaphysical constraints, primarily of internalism. The review is a detailed analysis of the second part of L. Bonjour’s book «The Structure of Empirical Knowledge» (chapters 7–8), dedicated to foundations for a coherentistic theory of justification of empirical knowledge.

Laurence Bonjour believes that foundationalism is a dead end. Literally all possible reasons for basic beliefs have been analyzed – externalism, the doctrine of the given, and a priori justification. Externalism, where the basic factors of justification are tied up to the causal or nomological in nature relations between the subject and the world, cannot overcome skepticism and is the way for accepting belief as basic only for those who are aware of these relations. Direct apprehension of the given can provide epistemic support only if the knowledge itself is constructed in such a way that this support is necessary. The appeal to the fact that basic beliefs, justified a priori, can stop the regress of empirical justification does not pick out the difference between justification and warrant. The conclusion is not comforting: there is no way in which basic empirical beliefs could be justified without their justification being dependent on other empirical beliefs that themselves require justification. The argument against the existence of basic empirical beliefs and the accompanying reception of the problems of justification of empirical knowledge in a line with classical epistemology (internalism, realism, correspondence theory of truth) are still the best examples of a corresponding philosophical reflection over the past forty years. The review is a detailed analysis of the first part of L. Bonjour’s book «The Structure of Empirical Knowledge» (chapters 1–4), dedicated to the criticism of foundationalism.

The key point of Laurence BonJour’s coherentist conception of the justification of empirical knowledge is the coherentist concept of observation, which (a) postulates that there is a special class of cognitively spontaneous beliefs with which the system’s beliefs must cohere in order to be considered justified; (b) their reliability is determined within the system as a consequence of our generalization on a set of facts when a belief appears, and it is highly likely to be true, and it is likely to appear in a situation in which it will be true; and (c) the subject has the ability to reflexively grasp the approximate content of his own belief system. Among the main sources of inspiration used by L. BonJour, one can find the conceptions of “language-entry transition” by W. Sellars and “truth-sufficiency” by W. Alston. Much of the material is devoted to arguing for the final argument for cognitively spontaneous beliefs. The review is a detailed analysis of the second part of L. BonJour’s book «The Structure of Empirical Knowledge» (chapters 5–6), dedicated to foundations for a coherentist theory of justification of empirical knowledge.

The paper aims to answer the question: «How does an electron exist at the beginning of the 21st century?» from the point of view of the general logic of the philosophy of science discourse, taking into account con­temporary philosophical concepts that explain what an «electron» is, and in what sense we could talk about the «existence» of such objects in the first quarter of the 21st century. A good concept of the existence of an object postulated by a successful scientific theory should at least take into account two contexts of proper philosophical reasoning – reasoning «from science», grasping the questions of the philosophical and meth­odological justification of knowledge at the level of certain «standards of rationality» that correspond to the chosen theory, and reasoning «from metaphysics», which, in the appropriate context, interpret «elec­tron» as an element of objective reality, as if the electron of scientists «actually» existed. Our thesis is that by choosing as the main elements of the concept the Dennettian ontology of patterns project and the E.J. Lowe’s neo-Aristotelian categorical ontology project, we will be able to block the problem of pessimis­tic meta-induction (H. Putnam, L. Laudan, etc.). The electron exists as a pattern that we extract from the whole set of empirical data associated with the theoretical entity «electron», whose «real definition» right now is given by the Standard Model and the accompanying concepts from quantum mechanics. In the course of the scientific revolution, the electron, as a pattern, does not disappear anywhere, since parts of the «real definitions» of the patterns of the old «paradigm», those that can be retrospectively interpreted and functionally meaningfully coupled with the new one, will be asserted within the «real definitions» of the new patterns, which indicates on the existence of a relationship of «essential dependence» between the «old» and the «new» patterns.

The paper aims to make а fair supplement to the concept of "metaphysics of relations" (bу М. Esfeld) with а coгrect coгresponding interpretation of the dispositional natшe of characteristics within Е. J. Lowe's ontology. А reasoning from science to philosophy leads М. Esfeld to the conclusion that "quantum entanglement understood in terms of non-separability of states speaks for the metaphysics of relations that denies the presence of intrinsic characteristics of the related systems". The same naturalistic argument provides rationale for the Е. J. Lowe's claim that "the attribution of а characteristics to а given kind could bе metaphysically contingent" for "the laws of nature can bе exactly what they are revealed to us, only because there are no other substantial kinds that could instantiate objects". As а heuristics for the intentional interpretation ofE. J. Lowe's dispositionalism we deal with the requirements of "time-relativeness" and "relevance to causality" from W. Malzkorn's list of criteria of satisfactory representation of dispositions.

The paper aims to unfold the «internal» content of Gettier’s argument as a skeptical argument against knowledge in terms of answering the question: «why he could be right when he says what he says». Our initial hypothesis is that E. Gettier does not say anything about the «accidentality of the fact that Smith has 10 coins in his pocket», but he uses the words «entailment» and «deduction», which substantiates the «truth of the conclusion», and on the basis of which he attributes «knowledge» to Smith. The article comes out at a certain time, E. Gettier uses the rhetoric of necessary and sufficient conditions, with regard to justification an analogue of the closure principle is given, there are exactly two examples – all this lead to the assumption that E. Gettier’s «justification» in the form he speaks about it in the staging part of the article – is a logical relationship between beliefs that are interconnected by the relationship of entailment and are fixed in the same way in the person’s belief system. Much of the evidence on pages two and three is an illustration of why this «logical interpretation» of reasoning doesn’t work. Contrary to most popular points of view, E. Gettier managed to show only that the implementation of formal relations between beliefs does not allow one to get to «knowledge» in the form in which he defines it. In particular, such a reading makes it possible to block various attempts to propose a «fourth condition». It must meet the task set – to restore confidence that the fulfillment of the formal relations between beliefs can help to get to «knowledge». However, within the framework of the linguistic turn paradigm, in which E. Gettier works, this is impossible, because in general, it simply lacks adequate means of discussing the persuasiveness of the inference. In this sense, «knowledge» is, by definition, a fuzzy concept that brings us back to «classical notions» in which the persuasiveness of an argument implies not only validity, but also soundness, relevance, and usefulness.

The paper aims to show how in practice the requirement to maintain the coherence of the system of beliefs and the corresponding behavior of «spontaneous beliefs» within the concept of empirical knowledge by L. Bonjour can be correlated. The main example considered is P. Kosso’s arguments about the reliability of Thucydides’ «History» connected with the idea of possibility of justification restricted to a single source of evidence. As a heuristics we deal with the problem of how to establish the contextual dependence of inference and, in general, of the structure of the justification of knowledge within the given situation. First, it is possible to extend L. Bonjour’s concept with the idea of the nonmonotonic nature of justification and coherence of the original system of beliefs. Such a step, in particular, will make it possible to abandon the need for the argument «from meta-justification». Second, the interpretation of «spontaneous beliefs», their justification and facts fixing whether these beliefs violate the coherence of the original system or not, as patterns (in the sense of the fundamental concept of existence by D. Ross) makes it possible (for example, due to the exact understanding of «interpretative perspective» and «functional role» of the projection) to meaningfully interpret the «context dependence» in each particular case.

The critical scientific realism by I. Niiniluoto is one of the few concepts that speaks not only of scientific realism, but also of reality itself. Such an elements of the concept, like tropic realism - the minimal ontological realism (in the Putnam’s sense), stating that there is no single true description of reality, or the idea that the knowledge can be a subject of the analysis of false beliefs (by definition, truthlike beliefs do not have to be true) - are the best ways to illustrate how I. Niiniluoto understands the contemporary trend to imply vagueness into definitions of the main philosophical categories like “ontological object”, “truth value”, etc. Reflections on the book: Niiniluoto I. Critical Scientific Realism. Oxford University Press, 1999.

The relationship between theory and reality in archeology is a classic example that illustrates the significance and diversity of the main problem of philosophy of science. From the epistemological point of view, the problem of the status of archaeological data is one of the examples of the problem of the theory-ladenness of observations within the corresponding naturalistic perspective. Trying to solve the problem of epistemic independence of the data, which corroborates the justification of the statements about the past, Peter Kosso offers a concept of «weighted coherence». Reflections on the book: Kosso P. Knowing the Past: Philosophical Issues of History and Archaeology. Amherst, New York: Humanity Books, 2001.

Selective skepticism in relation to fundamental scientific theories and criticism of the inference to the best explanation as an eliminative approach to substantiate hypotheses, enable K. Stanford to interpret and combine in his own way the classical arguments against the scientific realism - the arguments of the pessimistic meta-induction and that of the underdetermination of theory by data. Despite the fact that his justification of the instrumentalist interpretation of scientific knowledge is just another version of the argument «from error», K. Stanford’s book should be recommended to anyone who wants to understand how diverse and deep the problems of scientific realism could be. Reflection on the book: Stanford K. Exceeding Our Grasp: Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives. Oxford University Press, 2006.

The emphasis on the fact that the philosophy of science is not always the philosophy of physics, and the use of immunology as the main example makes it possible for Robert Klee to clearly demonstrate that the essence of introduction is not only and not so much to show the development of problems in a historical context, but to point out to the fact that even the most fundamental assumptions and basic intuitions are not immune to criticism. Wide coverage - from formal presentation of theories, Duhem - Quine thesis and the problem of explanation to social constructivism and the feminist philosophy of science, together with the relentless justification of the need for scientific realism, makes the textbook one of the best in its genre. Reflections on the book: Klee R. Introduction to the Philosophy of Science: Cutting Nature at Its Seams. Oxford University Press, 1997.

Jonathan Lowe believes that metaphysics should regain its central place in philosophy. It is an autonomous philosophical discipline, which task is to outline the realm of what is really possible by defining a system of fundamental ontological categories under which everything that exists falls, and relations of ontological dependence in which objects of various ontological categories are related to each other. Metaphysical categories are what gives meaning to our experience, however, unlike I. Kant, they are not the result of a priori constraints – on the contrary, they are subject to revision in the face of experience. The question of why there is something in the world rather than nothing, is solved with a non-Wittgensteinian understanding of what the world is (world is the sum of all existing objects because world as “the totality of facts” lacks determinate identity-conditions), as well as an understanding that universals must be actually instantiated in particulars. Far from being an easy textbook in the proper sense, this book is a brilliant example of the return of Aristotle to modern metaphysics. Reflections on the book: Lowe E. J. The Possibility of Metaphysics: Substance, Identity, and Time. Clarendon Press, 1998.

Derek Turner believes that a proper interpretation of Arthur Fine’s natural ontological attitude can help to reveal the nature of the difference between «historical» (geology, archeology, forensics) and «empirical» (physics, chemistry) sciences. From his point of view, the apparent asymmetry between these sciences is a consequence of different understanding of the possibilities to «manipulate» the objects of study and the role played by background theories. In our opinion, Turner’s concept is a good example of how profound and inviting the instrumentalistic concept of science could be. First, it is «reflexive» in the sense that it constrained other instrumentalist theories (B. Fraassen’s constructive empiricism deeply flawed). And secondly, it is «constructive» – the emphasis that «the strength of arguments for or against scientific real- ism can vary depending on the scientific context» quite unexpectedly leads to the fact that «ideographic / nomothetic division is not very helpful», and to the fact that «epistemic disadvantage, but the same epis- temic status». Reflections on the book: Turner D. Making Prehistory: Historical Science and the Scientific Realism Debate. Cambridge University Press, 2007.

The development of string theory shows an unusual situation within the development of knowledge theory. Science achieves progress in understanding nature without direct empirical confirmation. Definitely, “an altered conception of scientific progress emerges” (R. Dawid). In our opinion, the only possibility to understand the new situation is to adopt some kind of naturalized epistemology. Naturalization viewed as declining of the a-prioriticity of philosophical knowledge, first, and reintroducing of psychology, second (P. Kitcher), gives many naturalized approaches in the realism debate field. Is it possible to extend realism heritage into the ironic science like string theory? Yes, but of course we should be bothered by the semantics issue in such a case. As Michael Devitt noted, the main question is not even the question about the connection between realism and truth, but the question about the role of semantics in general. We think that Devitt’s interpretation of the semantics role allows to extend realism even into the ironic science.