Nikki Fortier

The resonance constraint holds that something can benefit someone only if it bears a connection to her favoring attitudes. It is widely taken as a decisive reason to reject objective views of well-being since they do not guarantee such a connection. I aim to show that this is a mistake and that felt-quality hedonism about well-being can in fact meet the constraint. First, I argue that the typical way of putting the constraint is misguided in its demandingness. I then introduce alternatives and argue that the most plausible among them are compatible with felt-quality hedonism. I proceed to show that the same considerations which animate traditional resonance concerns motivate another kind of resonance which the hedonist is well-positioned to accommodate. One upshot is that the constraint does not provide us with a reason to favor subjective views of well-being, as they are traditionally formulated, over objective ones.

ABSTRACT Many views of well-being hold that a person’s desires directly contribute to well-being. Such views need to account for the plausible thought that not all satisfied desires benefit. An influential way of doing so—chiefly defended by Chris Heathwood—holds that only ‘genuine-attraction desires’ count toward well-being. I aim to show that we lack the conceptual grounds to distinguish genuine-attraction and other kinds of desire. I argue that if we appeal to phenomenology to explain the difference, we face a heterogeneity objection and we are unable to accommodate the intuition that the satisfaction of calm desires can benefit. If we cannot appeal to phenomenology, it is unclear what the difference is meant to be. I present two strategies that aim to account for the distinction non-phenomenologically and argue that neither is viable. I conclude that, without further analysis, the key distinction remains too unclear for the genuine-attraction strategy to work.