Nikolai Shurakov

The paper examines the influence of stakes on knowledge attributions, building on the retraction-based experimental design introduced by Dinges and Zakkou. Experiment 1 replicates Dinges and Zakkou’s original findings and extends the research to third-person knowledge ascriptions. The results show that raising the stakes increases the percentage of retraction in both first- and third-person scenarios. Experiment 2 addresses potential concerns about the retraction-based design, specifically whether participants genuinely endorse the initial claim and the worry of scenario sceptics – participants who disagree with a knowledge attribution. Experiment 2 introduces a modification to the initial design by adding a knowledge-ascribing question. This addition makes the act of retraction more realistic. The results confirm that the stakes effect persists even in an improved design. I argue that these findings constitute a serious challenge to classic invariantism and a potential challenge to subject-sensitive invariantism. Their competitors – epistemic contextualism and relativism – seem to be in a better position, even though the retraction-based design at its current stage is unlikely to distinguish between these two.

Several studies suggest that stakes matter for knowledge attributions. Based on these findings, one might wonder whether stakes – broadly construed – also matter for lying ascriptions. While several studies have addressed certain aspects of the role of stakes in lying, none have tested whether lying ascriptions are affected by stake manipulations. Given that lying is deeply embedded in our social life, empirical studies seem to be a natural approach to this question. To maximize the chances of finding a stake effect, we employed cases of deceptive implicatures, which are not clear-cut cases of lying. The findings of three experiments suggest stakes do not have a significant impact on people’s lying ascriptions. We discuss the implications of these findings and conclude that they are good news for the folk concept of lying.

Some pejoratives are slurs—they target people on the basis of protected characteristics. Other pejoratives are what we can call “cognitive-behavioural pejoratives”: they target contemptible conduct or character, not protected characteristics. These two classes of pejoratives are semantically similar, yet the ethical profiles of their use are radically different. There is an Estonian pejorative that targets people on the basis of a mixture of ethnicity (approximately: Russian) and a cognitive-behavioural trait (approximately: chauvinism). What is the ethical status of the use of such a word: a word that combines properties of ethically very different pejoratives? This paper draws upon interviews with members of the ethnic group that the word’s usage is associated with, and members of the ethnic group targeted by the word, to better understand the laudability and criticizability of various some uses of the pejorative. We defend the view that the pejorative had some plausibly laudable uses during the period when Estonia was annexed by Soviet Russia, and that (even these) uses of the pejorative are in principle susceptible to faults that, when they arise, make use of the word criticizable.