Nikos Soueltzis

This chapter offers a picture of retention or primary memory, i.e., the primal mode of experiencing past in the deepest level of time-consciousness. One of retention’s major features is its double intentional directedness: retention intends (a) the immanent temporal object by contributing to its constitution through “transversal intentionality,” and (b) the past retentional phases, i.e., the past phases of consciousness itself through “longitudinal intentionality.” Focusing on the latter’s function, I revisit the well-known debate concerning the levels of time-constitution and I briefly address some central questions related to it. The eventual rejection of the model of act-constitution as essentially inapplicable to the level of time-constitution mirrors in the dismissal of the “apprehension/content” schema for describing the lowest level of our awareness of time. However, I share the view that this dismissal should not amount to an overall rejection of the schema.

Here, I distinguish the subjective side of affection from its objective side. The former is not to be mistaken for the egoic response to an affection but should be delimited as our consciousness’s readiness to be affected. After this clarification, I turn my attention to the protentional dynamic of the subjective side of affection. I focus on the element which seems to exhibit a peculiar protentional dynamic, namely “instincts.” A discussion of Husserl’s theory of instincts and the various distinctions introduced by it is necessary in order to pinpoint some of the dimensions that are relevant to my investigation of the intertwinement between time-consciousness and protention, on the one hand, and instinctive striving, on the other hand. I analyze their intertwinement in a two-fold manner: (a) by viewing the temporal double intentionality as a basic mode of certain kinds of instinctual striving, i.e., of what Husserl calls the objectifying and the non-objectifying instincts, and (b) by considering the various protentional functions distinguished in the previous chapters as manifestations of distinct kinds of instincts.

This chapter discusses the main contours of Husserl’s analysis of time-consciousness. To do so, however, certain preliminary clarifications are in order. It is important to define what falls within a proper phenomenological analysis and what it is that we encounter once we suspend objective time the way Husserl invites us to do. In light of this, I refer to the “immanence” and the “absolute givenness” of the appearing time. I then sketchily present the structure of our living-present, i.e., its primordial articulation in proto-impression (Urimpression), retention and protention, in Husserl’s Hua X. The chapter ends with a brief discussion of Husserl’s understanding of Brentano’s conception of time-consciousness and his critical appraisal of it.

In this chapter, what has been said with respect to instincts and protention is now applied on the model of affective relief. Our “readiness to be affected,” i.e., the subjective side of the relief, is partly structured by our instincts and their corresponding formations. What is needed is to point out how the subject-side of the relief contributes to the unitary propagation of its affective force. I thematize the mode of appearing of instincts within the affective relief and pose the question whether their presence motivates the prefiguration of the continuity of instinctual striving itself in material terms. I briefly discuss two modes of considering the relation between the objectifying and non-objectifying instincts qua primal affection. In the end, I caution against a possible misunderstanding that could lead us to falsely identify the subject-side of the relief with the primal impressional self-affection. The latter can never appear as an “arching” of the relief.

In this chapter I turn to protention itself. Husserl’s gradual clarification of the role of protention in our time-consciousness goes hand in hand with his reworking of time-diagrams and leads to sweeping changes in his time theory. The development of his thought on the topic brings to light the significance of protention’s fulfillment in its double meaning, viz., both as particular and as general fulfillment. A certain complication arises regarding Husserl’s two accounts of temporal pre-reflective self-awareness, i.e., his initial account of retentional longitudinal intentionality and his later conception of “general fulfillment.” I suggest a way to reconcile both accounts by clarifying what protentional longitudinal intentionality amounts to. In addition to this, protention is examined according to its modes of making-intuitive (Veranschaulichung): the “confirming” (bewahrheitende) and the “picturing” (ausmalende) or “clarifying” (klärende) making-intuitive—a distinction introduced by Husserl in his Analysen zur passiven Synthesis. These modes as well as what Husserl calls “mere filling” (bloßes Füllsel) are extensively examined in their connection with general and particular fulfillment.

In this chapter I focus on certain methodological issues, i.e., on questions regarding the proper ways of carrying out a phenomenological description of time-consciousness. The suspension of objective time is now linked to a more systematic understanding of phenomenological reduction. I examine a specific conception of the reduction that chimes well with the analysis of time-consciousness, and in particular of protentional consciousness. The aim of this reduction is to identify the experiential ground on the basis of which one can properly describe protention. Once we perform the relevant reduction, we come across a peculiar supra-temporal element, viz., the structure of the ego-pole. Our encounter with the latter invites us to consider to what extent one can achieve a phenomenological analysis of time-consciousness by taking into account the relation of our primal awareness of time to our consciousness’s egoic aspect. This points us to issues discussed in later chapters of the book.

In this chapter I consider the affective aspect of our consciousness by entertaining the idea that affective elements are essential components of our living-present’s primal temporalization. Delimiting the affective structure of the living-present, I investigate affection’s relation to protention on the model of the “affective relief,” viz., the unitary nexus of affectivity that maps the gradation of affective force on our living-present. The model of affective relief, largely overlooked in phenomenological research though it is, has the benefit of emphasizing the dynamic-affective unity of our living-present on a level where the affective prominences (Abgehobenheiten) have not yet acquired the meaning of object-presentation. It will be shown that affection and protention are closely connected at the level of affectivity and this is brought to our attention once we pay heed to affective propagation (Fortpflanzung).

This chapter presents the book’s main claim, namely, that Husserl’s theory of protention reveals its richness once we move to the material analysis of protention. I discuss the senses in which protention appears as modification and the various protentional functions that are distinguished once one takes into account the peculiarities of protentional content. “Disappointment” and “phantasmatic self-affection” are given special attention. The pertinent works by Lohmar, Ferrer, and Rodemeyer serve as the main points of reference and also as the means to clarify and delimitate my approach. To illustrate protention’s function in a palpable way, I show how different protentional functions operate and cooperate at the perceptual level. This allows one to see that the specific qualitative determinations of the perceptual content correspond to the specific formal functions of protention. But since sense-perception brings us face to face with cases where protentions are disappointed, one important aspect remains to be discussed, i.e., how some cases of “disappointment” lead to a radical “corrective” transformation of our protentional horizons. In addressing the corrective transformation of protentional consciousness, we encounter the distinctively affective character of this primal experience, i.e., in irritation and surprise.

The chapter summarizes the main contributions of the study. Starting from the formal level of fulfillment, it gradually thematizes the material aspect of protention and its various dimensions. The latter’s link to affectivity is brough to our attention and I stress the fact that it is the model of the “affective relief” that enabled its analysis. The concluding remarks point out that there are further paths to be considered if we are to account for experiential dimensions that are tacitly operative yet unable to be thematized within the affective relief.

The paper discusses the phenomenology of touch by focusing on the peculiar phenomenon of _Empfindnis_, as articulated by Edmund Husserl and further elaborated by Emmanuel Levinas and Didier Franck. I begin with Husserl’s distinction between the phantom-thing and the material-causal thing, highlighting _Empfindnis_ as key to understanding the self-reflexive dynamics of touch. I examine in parallel Levinas’ conception of retention as the dephasing of proto-impression and his framing of _Empfindnis_ as immediate iteration. I then explore Didier Franck’s perspective on the precedence of flesh over time, highlighting the role of _Empfindnis_ in bridging hyle and flesh. I show that both frameworks, Levinas’ and Franck’s, supplement each other in terms of phenomenological legitimation against the backdrop of Husserl’s phenomenology. I then argue that _Empfindnis_ functions within an _Empfindnis-horizon_, a structural framework that integrates temporal and spatial aspects of lived bodily experience, maintaining the living relevance of _Empfindnis_. This horizon sheds light on the intricate interplay between time, space, and embodiment in phenomenological thought. The study concludes that _Empfindnis_ is a fundamental phenomenon that redefines our understanding of time-constitution and bodily self-awareness.

Every attempt to examine our consciousness’s passive life and its dynamic in its various forms inevitably intersects with our primal awareness of the future. Even though Husserl’s theory of time-consciousness enjoys a certain fame, his conception of our primordial relation to the future has not been adequately accounted for. The book at hand aims to offer a close study of Husserl’s view of protentional consciousness and to trace its unique contribution to our overall awareness of time. It offers an extensive analysis of various aspects of protention by investigating its connection to different fields and levels of experience. To achieve such a task, the book stresses the need to enrich the familiar formal account of protention with a material one. Thus, alongside issues pertaining exclusively to the form of protention, such as its relation to fulfillment as well as its double-intentional structure, various other dimensions are discussed, such as the phenomena of disappointment and correction as well as the role hyle plays in both of them. In the same vein, special attention is given to the relation between protentional consciousness and affectivity, thus shedding light on the dynamic unity of our living-present. What this study purports to show is that Husserl’s phenomenology is equipped to offer a solid account of the thinnest and subtlest ways in which we are aware of the future in our experiential life.