Nilüfer Öztürk

This study investigates skeptical fideism in early modern philosophy by analyzing its historical origins, epistemic foundations, and connection to religious fictionalism. Emerging from the revived Pyrrhonian debates, particularly the “Pyrrhonian crisis” and the “problem of the criterion of truth,” skeptical fideism articulated a systematic opposition between reason and faith, reinforced through skeptical arguments. Within early modern Catholic thought, this approach gained particular significance as a strategy to defend faith in the face of rational critique. Key figures such as Erasmus, Montaigne, and Bayle contended that the mysteries of faith resist rational comprehension yet remain defensible through a skeptical stance. Since rational justification inevitably leads to further skepticism, they argued, reason must be bracketed in matters of faith. Accordingly, faith isn’t construed as justified belief but as a pragmatic commitment fostering communal harmony. By situating this perspective in dialogue with religious fictionalism, the article illuminates the historical, epistemic, and semantic dimensions of skeptical fideism.