I completed my doctorate degree in Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science at the Institut Jean Nicod (CNRS/EHESS/ENS, Paris, France) under the supervision of Dr. Roberto Casati. I have been a part of ENACTIVE, the European Network of Excellence (IST-2002-002114 of the European Commission) since 2003 and in 2006 was awarded the Enactive Network Mobility Fellowship for collaborative research. At present I am a postdoctoral fellow at the University of Bristol. I am working in the AHRC project(grant number AH/E511139/1) CONTACT (Consciousness in Interaction) which is a part of the ESF Eurocores Consciousness in the Natural and Cultural Context …
I completed my doctorate degree in Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science at the Institut Jean Nicod (CNRS/EHESS/ENS, Paris, France) under the supervision of Dr. Roberto Casati. I have been a part of ENACTIVE, the European Network of Excellence (IST-2002-002114 of the European Commission) since 2003 and in 2006 was awarded the Enactive Network Mobility Fellowship for collaborative research. At present I am a postdoctoral fellow at the University of Bristol. I am working in the AHRC project(grant number AH/E511139/1) CONTACT (Consciousness in Interaction) which is a part of the ESF Eurocores Consciousness in the Natural and Cultural Context scheme. I orginally worked with Prof. Susan Hurley and after her death I am currently working with Dr. Finn Spicer.
Some of my current research interests are:
(A) The analysis of the relation between cognition and action in terms of attention and subsequent application of the analysis in an explanation of consciousness in a real-world situation. I am particularly interested in developing this line of thought by focusing on empirical studies in perception, as for example, the phenomenon of gaze redirection which presents a most interesting and challenging domain for the study of the interaction between cognition and action in the context of consciousness.
(B) The analysis of consciousness as sense of "presence" in a context and associating it with the sense of agency, especially as the performer of perceptually guided actions, along with the role of conscious perception in action as the awareness of possible states of affairs.
(C) Consideration of whether acceptance of "action" as a fundamental explanatory notion essentially implies a commitment to explain experience in terms of mechanisms of which the subject is aware and which are under the conscious control of the subject. Conversely, does the acceptance of the notion of "representation" essentially imply that conscious experience can be boiled down to sub-personal level phenomena? What could be an optimal choice for a theory that seeks to understand consciousness as a matter of dynamic interaction of a situated agent with the environment?
