Noah Greenstein

This paper looks into deep disagreements, both epistemic and moral, and investigates how to find common ground between them. Illegitimate cases of deep disagreement, such as dogmatism and moral encroachment are first identified and separated out, and then the underlying philosophy of the deep disagreement literature is interrogated. While current theories often rely on unanalyzable Wittgensteinian hinges, an epistemic compounding theory from Greenstein (Southwest Philosophy Review 38, 2022) is used to provide more fine-grained analysis. This epistemology allows us to locate the source of our deeply held beliefs, i.e. the hinges, in our everyday lives. This theory is then extended to moral certainties, creating a moral etiquette. From there, we have a possible means of adjudicating between disputants of both epistemic and moral deep disagreements by finding common ground.

We investigate the formal cause of diagrams, initially realizing that diagrams have no obvious form. It is argued their form is to mimic expert perspectives. This perspective provides a organizational structure that represents the relations important in understanding the worldly situation. We then shift to a study of how we are to understand an expert perspective. Using the distinction between intuitive and formal logic, logica utens versus logica docens, we identify games of habituation: games of focus and distraction. The skills required for games of focus and distraction are phenomenological in regulating the way we see, i.e., how we approach and analyze different situations. This unique phenomenological skill is characteristic of diagrammatic reasoning.

Brock and Glasgow recently introduced a new definition of paradox and argue that this conception of paradox itself leads to paradox, the so-called Paradox Paradox. I show that they beg the questions during the course of their argument, but, more importantly, do so in a philosophically interesting way: it reveals a counterexample to the equivalence between being a logical truth and having a probability of one. This has consequences regarding norms of rationality, undermining the grounds for the Conjunction Fallacy.

Knowledge is analyzed in terms of the cost incurred when mistakes are made — things we should have known better, but didn’t. Following Wittgenstein at the end of On Certainty, an Epistemic Wager, similar to Pascal’s Wager, is set up to represent the cost differences not in belief vs. disbelief, but in knowledge vs. skepticism. This leads to a core class of absolutely certain knowledge, related to Moorean Facts, that is integrated into our everyday lives. This core knowledge is resistant to both radical skepticism, such as a Cartesian Demon, and Gettier style objections, while providing a small, but sufficient base for future epistemological research.

This paper presents an alternative conceptual foundation for biological evolution. First the causal and statistical perspectives on evolutionary fitness are analyzed, finding them to implicitly depend on each other, and hence cannot be individually fundamental. It is argued that this is an instance of a relativistic perspective over evolutionary phenomena. New accounts of fitness, the struggle for life, and Natural Selection are developed under this interpretation. This biological relativism is unique in that it draws from General Relativity in physics, unlike previous theories that drew upon statistical mechanics or Newtonian dynamics. A mathematical law of evolutionary change, as well as new theoretical biological concepts to underpin it, are likewise developed. The law and theory are then applied to give examples of how both cornerstones and edge cases can be understood using these new methods. Using General Relativistic Biology provides fresh insight into evolution, all while preserving the core, canonical scientific research program.