Noah Lemos

The common sense tradition in philosophy holds that we have a great deal of common sense knowledge, that there are many ordinary truisms that almost everyone knows, and that this knowledge should have a great deal of weight in philosophy. Such knowledge provides a check on philosophical speculation. In this paper, I have two main aims. First, I contrast the common sense tradition in philosophy with two other philosophical approaches, a Wittgensteinian approach and the Method of Wide Reflective Equilibrium. Second, I respond to criticisms of the common sense tradition which claim that the appeal to common sense belief and knowledge is unphilosophical, useless in philosophical debate, or unable to positively support philosophical theses. These critics of the common sense tradition are not radical skeptics, but I will argue their views do not give common sense knowledge sufficient weight and do not adequately recognize its importance in philosophical inquiry.

Many attempts to respond to the problem of evil appeal to the concept of an organic unity. The first part of Chapter 8 explains Roderick Chisholm’s views on organic unities, the concept of defeat, and how he thinks they bear on the problem of evil. The second part examines three prominent and recent objections to the principle of organic unities. Roughly, the objections are that (1) the principle of organic unities is incoherent, (2) it leads to “evaluative schizophrenia,” and (3) the examples that allegedly support it, do not, in fact, do so. It is argued that these objections give us no good reason to reject the principle of organic unities.

In this paper, I discuss Rescher's view of the relationship between common sense knowledge and philosophy and his defense of the demands of common sense. In the first three sections, I summarize his account of common sense beliefs, his views on the practical nature of common sense beliefs and its relevance to their authority, and his views on the relationship between common sense and philosophy. In the last three sections, I discuss his views critically. I argue that Rescher is mistaken in claiming that common sense can only exercise a veto over philosophical views, and that our common sense beliefs can be “legitimated” by “cultural selection.” Finally, Rescher suggests that the pragmatic character of common sense belief and knowledge distinguishes them from “merely common” belief and knowledge, and suggests that common sense beliefs and knowledge are widely held because they are practical. I raise some doubts about the pragmatic character of some common sense beliefs, and suggest an alternative explanation for their being widely held.

I distinguish between two theses, DPJ and DGP. DPJ asserts that one’s justification for accepting particular epistemic propositions positively depends on one’s being justified in believing general epistemic principles. DGP claims that one’s justification in believing general epistemic propositions positively depends on one’s being justified in believing particular epistemic propositions. I claim that methodism accepts DPJ and rejects DGP and particularism accepts DGP and rejects DPJ. I argue that we should reject DGP and methodism roughly because these views imply that many of us do not know epistemic propositions that we do know. This point is made by Roderick Chisholm in The Problem of the Criterion and challenged by Robert Amico. I consider Chisholm’s arguments and Amico’s objections. Finally, I argue that even if we reject DPJ and methodism, we need not embrace particularism, since we could reject both DPJ and DGP.

Now revised and containing three new chapters, this book provides a clear and accessible introduction to epistemology, or the theory of knowledge. It discusses some of the main theories of justification, including foundationalism, coherentism, reliabilism, and virtue epistemology. Other topics include the Gettier problem, internalism and externalism, skepticism, the problem of epistemic circularity, a priori knowledge, naturalized epistemology, and the epistemic significance of testimony and disagreement. Intended primarily for students taking their first classes in epistemology, this lucid and well-written text will provide an excellent introduction to anyone interested in knowing more about this important area of philosophy.

I begin by making some brief remarks about commonsense particularism. Commonsense particularists hold that we know pretty much what we think we know and hold that some of these beliefs are more reasonable than competing skeptical principles. However, commonsense philosophers often differ about what justifies these particular beliefs. Michael Bergmann holds that that our commonsense epistemic beliefs depend for their justification on epistemic intuitions or epistemic seemings. After a brief description of his views, I raise some questions about the nature and epistemic role of these epistemic seemings.

Is Moore’s principle of organic unities true? Does it matter whether it is? I argue that it is true and important. I defend the principle of organic unites and the view that intrinsic value can be defeated by presenting examples of the defeat of intrinsic value. I next respond to two objections. The first claims the examples fail since the allegedly defeated parts lack actual intrinsic value—they are “evaluatively inadequate”. The second is that the principle of organic unities lacks “theoretical significance” since there is no precise way to measure intrinsic value. Finally, I illustrate the importance of the principle by considering the Indispensability Argument which claims that if some type of good is an indispensable good, then it is the only good, that pluralism must be false. I argue that appealing to the concept of defeat allows the pluralist to consistently hold both that pluralism is true and that some goods are indispensable for a life or a world to be very good. Since the debate between pluralists and monists in axiology is important and since the concept of defeat provides the pluralist with a reasonable way to reply to the Indispensability Argument, the principle of organic unities is important.

The concept of basic intrinsic value is important for axiology. Michael Zimmerman and Timothy Perrine each present necessary and sufficient conditions for something’s having basic intrinsic value. I argue that neither account is satisfactory. I present two objections to Zimmerman’s view. First, I argue that his view cannot accommodate some widely held and plausible views about the intrinsic value of knowledge and true belief. Second, I argue that it cannot accommodate some plausible views about the intrinsic value of states when one state occurs in virtue of the other. It cannot handle “clusters” of intrinsically valuable states. In the final section, I explain Perrine’s view and argue that his account also cannot accommodate some plausible views about the value of knowledge and true belief.

Joel Kupperman’s Value…And What Follows ranges widely over topics in value theory, moral epistemology, normative ethics and political philosophy. Given its breadth, and the generally high quality of the discussion, Kupperman’s work should interest philosophers working in one or more of these areas. The book is divided into three parts, entitled “Axiology”, “Axiology and Conduct”, and “Axiology and Social Choice”. The first part on axiology receives the most attention and consists of five chapters, while the second part consists of three chapters, and the third part of two. Among the views defended are that some things are intrinsically good or good as an end, that we can have justified beliefs about what has this sort of value through various sorts of experiences, that it is sometimes best to do what does not have the best consequences, and that a moderate or limited perfectionism is a defensible social policy compatible with certain forms of political liberalism.

In this paper, I present briefly a view about intrinsic value, one connected to the concepts of ethically required attitudes of favor, disfavor, and preference. If lives can have both welfare value and intrinsic value, how are these values related? I defend the view that the welfare value of a life does not track the intrinsic value of that life. Some philosophers, however, deny that anything can have intrinsic value or absolute value. Some argue that to hold that something is both bad for a person and bad simpliciter leads to an objectionable double counting. Others hold views that would, if true, diminish the practical importance of intrinsic value. Some hold that our relations with others should not be guided by what is intrinsically good or bad, but only by what is good or bad for someone. Others hold that the concepts of love, benefit, and harm are tied exclusively to welfare value or well-being. Still others suggest that the moral principles of beneficence and non-maleficence are tied exclusively to welfare and well-being. I argue that these views are mistaken. In this regard, I attempt to defend the practical importance of intrinsic value.

This book addresses some basic questions about intrinsic value: What is it? What has it? What justifies our beliefs about it? In the first six chapters the author defends the existence of a plurality of intrinsic goods, the thesis of organic unities, the view that some goods are 'higher' than others, and the view that intrinsic value can be explicated in terms of 'fitting' emotional attitudes. The final three chapters explore the justification of our beliefs about intrinsic value, including coherence theories and the idea that some value beliefs are warranted on the basis of emotional experience. Professor Lemos defends the view that some value beliefs enjoy 'modest' a priori justification. The book is intended primarily for professional philosophers and their graduate students working in ethics, value theory and epistemology.

There are two main tasks which I undertake in this thesis. First, I consider critically certain concepts of one's own good and the relation of these concepts to egoism. I distinguish between subjective and objective views of one's own good and argue that no subjective account, such as that offered by R. B. Brandt, is satisfactory. I attempt to provide an objective account of one's own good which is compatible with Moore's criticisms of the concept of "good for me". Unfortunately, the objective account which I present appears ill-suited to egoism, and I therefore consider whether there is either a non-subjective or objective account of one's own good which is compatible with egoism. I present and consider both a strong and weak "personal" conception of value, along with Kalin's view of formal value. I argue that the weak personal account of value does not accord with our preanalytic notions of one's own good and is not suited to egoism. I argue that neither the strong personal conception of value nor Kalin's formal conception of value is satisfactory. In discussing these views, I consider the relation of such views to universal egoism and the view that virtue or having a good will is part of one's own good. The second main task is to consider the objections to moral egoism raised by Richard Brandt, G. E. Moore, Brian Medlin, and Richard Feldman. The objections raised by these philosophers are of three sorts: that egoism is either not a moral theory, not a coherent theory, or an unsatisfactory account of our actual moral obligations. Of these objections I find only the third to be compelling. But even the force of this objection diminishes somewhat where the concept of one's own good is understood objectively and such things as virtue and having a good will are held to be intrinsically good for a person