Nolan Whitaker

To consequentialize a moral theory is to give it a consequentialist representation. Even if you can consequentialize, why should you? Notational consequentializers say consequentializing reveals the true substantive differences between moral theories. Whether a theory counts as consequentialist or not is unimportant, for any non-consequentialist theory has a consequentialist counterpart that agrees both about deontic verdicts and the grounds of those verdicts. The two theories are thus notational variants of the same view. Earnest consequentializers say consequentializing yields a moral theory that is more intuitively attractive than standard versions of non-consequentialism. They say your normative theory can have it all: consequentialism’s Compelling Idea, but without any counterintuitive deontic verdicts. I argue that Notational and Earnest consequentializers share a false assumption about the nature of reasons for action. They say because we always act in order to bring about an outcome, any and all reasons to act must be features of outcomes. I argue this assumption should be rejected, as some moral theories say there are reasons that are not features of outcomes. This false assumption undergirds key premises in the arguments for notational and earnest consequentializing. The arguments for consequentializing therefore fail.