This article investigates the Metaethics of Ubuntu by placing the debate that has raged on for decades in Western analytical discourse between Moral Realists and Moral Anti-Realists in an African Context. I consider whether Ubuntu, as it can be examined in literature today, is a moral realist ethical theory or a moral anti-realist ethical theory. This investigation offers an opportunity to expand upon the conception of Ubuntu since much of the literature so far has been done in Normative Ethics …
Read moreThis article investigates the Metaethics of Ubuntu by placing the debate that has raged on for decades in Western analytical discourse between Moral Realists and Moral Anti-Realists in an African Context. I consider whether Ubuntu, as it can be examined in literature today, is a moral realist ethical theory or a moral anti-realist ethical theory. This investigation offers an opportunity to expand upon the conception of Ubuntu since much of the literature so far has been done in Normative Ethics and Applied Ethics. The metaethical debate between moral realists and moral anti-realists in Western Analytic Philosophy arises from a disagreement on the foundations of morality. Moral Realists claim that moral judgments and principles are objective truths (i.e. existing independent of the mind) and Moral Anti-Realists deny this claim. I identify a similar debate between Moral Realist and Moral Anti-Realist surrounding Ubuntu. I argue that Ubuntu is a Moral Anti-Realist position, specifically a Moral Non-objectivist ethical theory.
