Norman Mooradian

This article describes the design of a course on the ethics of artificial intelligence offered as a seminar in an online master’s program in library and information science titled AI, Data, and Ethics. The course is presented as a model for programs in information science, as well as for adjacent fields such as computer science, communications, and others. The article explains key decision points in developing a course relevant to the professional knowledge and ethical concerns of information professionals. It describes the field, program, and students, as well as the ethics methodology employed, and it explains the course architecture and selection of topics based on their support of the two learning central objectives, which are to promote ethical analysis and ethical design knowledge. Lastly, it provides a detailed review of selected assignments, and it suggests specific ways that the course may be adapted for other graduate and undergraduate curricula.

The dissertation focuses on Plato's view in the Philebus that pleasure can be evaluated in respect of truth or falsity. My approach is unique in that I give a unifying account of a number of distinct cases of false pleasure. A central conclusion is that the idea behind the false pleasures doctrine is that the existence of certain pleasures depends upon their connection with illusion. I reject the view that false anticipatory pleasures are meant to be considered representationally false. I offer an interpretation which employs the partially normative notion of a pleasure's lacking its proper object

The scope and reach of information, driven by the explosive growth of information technologies and content types, has expanded dramatically over the past 30 years. The consequences of these changes to records and information management (RIM) professionals are profound, necessitating not only specialized knowledge but added responsibilities. RIM professionals require a professional ethics to guide them in their daily practice and to form a basis for developing and implementing organizational policies, and Mooradian’s new book provides a rigorous outline of such an ethics. Taking an authoritative principles/rules based approach to the subject, this book comprehensively addresses •the structure of ethics, outlining principles, moral rules, judgements, and exceptions; •ethical reasoning, from meaning and logic to dilemmas and decision methods; •the ethical core of RIM, discussing key topics such as organizational context, the positive value of accountability, conflicts of interest, and confidentiality; •important ethical concerns like copyright and intellectual property, whistleblowing, information leaks, disclosure, and privacy; and •the relationship between RIM ethics and information governance. An essential handbook for information professionals who manage records, archives, data, and other content, this book is also an ideal teaching text for students of information ethics

This article raises the question of how the ontological status of virtual objects bears on their intrinsic value. If virtual objects are unreal or less real than physical objects, does it mean that they will have less intrinsic value? If they have intrinsic value, what are the explanations for this value, and how do they relate to the ontological status of the virtual objects? First, the article reviews recent work concerning the ontological status of virtual reality and virtual objects. Second, it argues that in some cases the ontological status of virtual objects does undermine the value placed in them, in that the objects can fail to have the properties that ground the value attributions made to them, while in other cases their ontological status is not important. Finally, the article relates the grounding of value attributions to philosophical theories of value, in particular, perfectionism and hedonism.

The focus of this paper is the ethics of information giving in the context of complex sales. It is argued that, while current theoriesprovide a broad framework for describing the responsibilities of sales agents, they lack adequate descriptions of the conditionscharacteristic of complex sales situations. Without an adequate model of complex sales, ethical theories will fail to provide guidanceto sales agents facing issues that arise from features of sales situations not accounted for in the theories. To motivate this claim,I develop a brief case study in the area of information system sales. The problem can be remedied, however, if the theories take intoaccount the features of complex sales. A tentative list of such features is presented and their relevance to the case is discussed. Oneof the most important to emerge is the epistemic role of the buyer as the judge of competing information.

James Rachels’ seminal paper “ Why Privacy Is Important ” (1975) remains one of the most influential statements on the topic. It offers a general theory that explains why privacy is important in relation to mundane personal information and situations. According to the theory, privacy is important because it allows us to selectively disclose personal information and to engage in behaviors appropriate to and necessary for creating and maintaining diverse personal relationships. Without this control, it is implied, the diversity of relationships would diminish; relationships would “flatten out”, we might say. The aspect of the paper that addresses information flows (what I refer to as his information privacy theory) has been of particular interest to computer information privacy theorists. Despite its continued importance to computer privacy theorists, however, the information privacy theory appears to be contradicted by recent developments in computing. In particular, since the publication of Rachels’ paper we have seen an extensive amount of personal information collected. Further, recent developments in computing falling under the heading of social computing have brought about a new wave of personal information creation and collection. This paper will reassess and resituate Rachels’ information privacy theory in light of these developments. I will argue that the increasing collection of personal data will not flatten relationships as the information privacy theory predicts because such data lack contextual factors important to Rachels’ general theory. The paper will conclude by pointing to some areas where Rachels’ general theory and where his information privacy theory will continue to be relevant.