Nuraan Davids

Despite the historical origins of philosophy from a richly diverse tapestry of thinkers, which cuts across geopolitical, cultural and religious traditions, and despite interna- tionalising trends to develop both a more inclusive and authentic account of philo- sophical thinking, it remains largely unquestioned to equate philosophy of education with its western canon. These concerning biases are succinctly laid bare in Jackson and Kwak's (2025) editorial, 'Is philosophy of education western?' They are correct in their assertion that the persistent perspective of philosophy of education as western suggests that the world beyond Western Europe and North America appears insignificant, holding negative implications for the development of curricula, research, scholarly discourse, and educational practice and outcomes in the field globally. Jackson and Kwak (2025, p. 2) are also correct that the unfolding epistemic framing is not only a continuing marginalisation of 'non-western' thinkers and philosophies, but also expectations of the latter to be 'western facing in outlook, and a preparedness to 'sacrifice 'internally oriented explorations and articulations of thought from other positions! In this collective article, we seek to take Jackson (2025) thesis a step further - by acknowledging the colonial logic that has ensured the systemic subjugation, assimilation, or erasure of Indigenous and other 'non-western' philosophies, while also affirming philosophy of education as inclusively pluriversal. Our aim is not only to foreground marginalised voices and traditions, but also to restore the epistemic dignity of all philosophies. By bringing together the contributions in this article, we do not simply gesture toward 'alternative' knowledge systems as supplements to the dominant canon; rather, we affirm them as philosophies, constitutive of a genuinely pluriversal field of philosophy of education. [NB: An article composed of short contributions by several authors, Metz's section is titled 'What It Means to Be an African Philosophy of Education'.]

At many South African universities, there is a pervasive thought among several academics that once the professoriate has been reached, there seems to be no need to further advance scholarship. In this contribution, we argue against such a parochial understanding of what it means to be a scholar on three grounds: first, a scholar, anywhere and everywhere, ought to remain concerned with the pursuit of freedom of reason that does not recognize the pursuit of knowledge towards some predetermined end. Instead, the pursuit of knowledge should invariably be linked to the pursuit of something new and unimaginable. Second, a scholar should be a wanderer whose concern should always be towards what is reasonable, just, and unfinished. Third, a scholar devotes herself to doing good to herself and others in the world in relation to actions that are continuous and wandering. In these ways, the flourishing of a (South African) scholar ought to be linked to the cultivation of a wandering being whereby she acts with resolve to subvert societal dystopias in the world today.

The most recent spate of student protests in South Africa has not only unleashed unprecedented scenes of violence and intimidation among students and university authorities, but has brought into stark focus an urgent need for spaces of critique and deliberation. In this chapter, we reflect on the tensions, frustrations and anger that continue to cloud higher education, and contend that unless (South) African higher education reclaims the notion of critique, the possibility of a thinking university on the African continent would remain elusive. By drawing on the seminal ideas of Foucault and Rancière, we argue that through using critique, students would be obliged to put into question what they encounter restively, while also being open ontologically and poetically to that which is still to come. In this sense, critique as a form of dissonant thinking brings a discomfort in one’s reflection about something, yet, simultaneously stimulates one to reflect freely and in opposition to forms of coercion and domination. Such practices, we maintain, are commensurate with deliberative engagement itself because people would be invited to critique – that is, to put into question and look for other ways of constructing thoughts and practices.

In this chapter, we focus on Benhabib’s (The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents and Citizens, Cambridge University Press, 2004) conception of democratic iteration, as being at the core of democratic education. We posit that the premise of democratic iterations is not to alter the normative validity of practical discourses, but to determine the legitimacy of particular processes of opinion and will formation. In this regard, we focus on two examples: one commonly referred to as the French scarf affair and the other involving the prohibition of ‘black languages and hair’ in South African schools. We argue that it would be unjustifiable to delink democratic education from rational articulations and rearticulations and emotional will formation.

In this chapter, we give an account of gratitude in relation to education. By highlighting the vagueness of the concept of gratitude, we question whether it might be plausible to consider gratitude as a moral obligation, a social convention or a political obligation in relation to the state. By leaning on Derrida’s conception of friendship, we argue that gratitude cannot be gratitude, if it is not extended spontaneously and without any obligation. Gratitude, therefore is unconditional, and as such does not imply any reciprocity. Such an idea of gratitude impacts democratic education in a way whereby people engage with one another without the condition of relation.

In this chapter, we proffer an argument for an interrelationship between the physical–intellectual and emotional dimensions of human life. In reference to the seminal thoughts of al-Attas, we argue that educational human encounters are constituted by the rational and the emotional dimensions of human action. Of pertinence to our non-bifurcationist view of knowledge, our contention is that human encounters about credible speech and respectful human conduct, have the potential to cultivate democratic human relations—referred to by al-Attas as actions grounded in adab. In the main, the point about democratic human encounters is that such encounters cannot be blind to the physical–intellectual and the emotional aspects of human life. Rather, as we argue, expressions of adab—that is, to act with refinement and decorum—can advance and enhance democratic encounters, through consciously averting disrespect and dismissiveness.

In this chapter, we offer an account of Berlin’s (Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford University Press, 1969) conceptions of positive and negative liberty. We bring into contestation the argument that an individual’s freedom to act autonomously, without any interference or constraint, can ever be the case, if one considers, that an individual’s action is always in relation to others, and hence, always conditional. We draw on Gutmann’s (Democratic Education, Princeton University Press, 1987) argument that an individual’s freedom does not happen independently from the exercise of freedom by others which, in turn, constrains their freedom as they do things in collaboration with others. Consequently, the exercise of freedom is both autonomous and interdependent: autonomous freedom is exercised through individual human agency; and interdependent human freedom is practised in relation with others. We contend that at the heart democratic education is the notion of deliberative freedom: to act with deliberative rationality, and to pursue one’s engagement with others on the basis of an emotive freedom, that enhances the possibility for co-learning and ethical judgement of a rational and emotive kind.

In this chapter, we analyse compassion as an emotive action in relation to democratic education—by paying specific attention to the student–supervisor relationship in relation to doctoral studies. We commence by providing insights into the types of challenges doctoral students typically present during their studies—highlighting the reality that for many of them, the external constraints brought about through socio-economic constraints and political strife both at home in their host countries often outweigh the internal demands of doctoral studies. For this reason, we argue that doctoral supervision cannot be limited to a reliance on constructions of rational argumentation and analyses, but necessarily involves emotive interactions seeped in capacities for compassionate action. Drawing on the seminal ideas of Martha Nussbaum, we show, firstly, that compassion can be construed as an emotive judgement; secondly, acting compassionately is tantamount to recognising the vulnerabilities of others and to do something about changing unsatisfactory human conditions; and thirdly, compassionate action is about enhancing democratic relations among people that can cultivate human flourishing.

In this chapter, we analyse Iqbal’s understanding of the practice of ijtihad that is inherently spiritual. In other words, implicit in his understanding and practice is the notion that people are not just open and reflective about the human relations in becoming—that is, relations of cooperation, coexistence and recognition of one another. Also, what Iqbal’s exposition of the practice of ijtihad encourages are forms of living whereby people become deeply (i.e., spiritually) concerned about their own, perhaps unwarranted practices. Introspection and a commitment towards identifying their deficiencies would become enabling practices to enhance human co-belonging and recognition of one another for the reason that people are prepared to take into critical scrutiny what they hold to be true. Their spiritual recognition that their own practices might be deeply flawed and in need of reparations is a profound recognition of ijtihadi proportions. That is, when people have internalised the fallibility of their own practices would they become more open to new re-beginnings. In this way, democratic education becomes a practice of immense spiritual propensity in the sense that people would be prepared and willing to amend distortions associated with their own indigenous ways of being and acting.

In this chapter, we examine the centrality of shura as a deliberative practice in relation to the political, social, economic and private. As such, we show that shura is as necessary in matters of political governance as it is between spouses in relation to the rearing of their children. Thereafter, we examine some of the implications of Rahman’s elucidation of shura for democratic education. Democratic education should remain open-ended and inconclusive as there is always more to know and to be deliberated on. That is, democratic education relies on forms of human engagement where the possibility is expanded for participants engaged in such practices to remain in potentiality. Likewise, Rahman’s cooperative view of shura accentuates the need to include all people engaged about matters of public concern—most notably, those voices, who might be in disagreement, and who would be most likely to be excluded from any consultation and participation.

In this chapter, we show how democratic education encourages respect, mutual engagement and the recognition of a plurality of views. Inasmuch as reasonable persons engage deliberatively with one another, they invariably draw on their emotions as they endeavour to reason together. Yet, when reasonable people engage openly and freely they take responsibility for one another’s views. Even when they are provoked by the emotions of distress and belligerence, they are responsible enough to make sure to restrain their hostility towards one another that potentially leads to open conflict. Rather, their belligerence and distress allow them to speak their minds without being silenced even when their views are provocative and dissenting. Through speech participants disturb doubts about the claims being proffered and collectively strive together to achieve conciliation when rival positions are taken into perspective.

In this chapter, we elucidate Ibn Sina’s notion of intuition (hads) in relation to practices that are rational, imaginative and perceptive. We explain his conceptions of knowledge and intuition [hads]—highlighting that to Ibn Sina, human beings do not only come into this world without any innate knowledge but, indeed, have the potentiality to come to their own ways of seeing themselves, others and the world around them, through their own experiences. By implication, human intuitive intelligence is constituted by both rational and emotive aspects. And, when humans engage in democratic educational practices, their deliberations should be underscored by both cognitive and emotive dimensions of knowing, acting and being.

In this chapter, we draw on some of the seminal ideas of Ibn al-Arabi, who is arguably one of the most influential and intellectual philosophers in Islamic philosophy. In drawing on his depiction of the ‘perfect man’ or the ‘perfect human’, we show that it is through the imagination that human beings might come to know God, and hence, come to self-realisation. Coming to self-realisation implies that human beings take account of their own haqq [right and proper action], and of their haqq in relation to others. The ‘perfect human’, therefore, assumes responsibility for himself, his actions and his intuitive connection with God. Following this discussion we examine the implications and enhancement of the ‘perfect human’ to and for democratic education.

If Islam continues to evoke skepticism, as it has done most intensely since 9/11, then it stands to reason that its tenets and education are viewed with equal mistrust, and as will be highlighted in this special issue, equal misunderstanding. The intention of this special edition is neither to counter the accusations Islam stands accused of, nor to offer solutions to the myriad challenges facing Muslims in majority and minority Muslim countries. As will be evidenced in the diverse offering of this compilation, the intention is to offer a different perspective, an opportunity, perhaps, to glance at both the tensions and the possibilities that Islam and Muslims have to offer not to only others, but, perhaps, more importantly, to themselves. As such, in many instances the edition, while attempting to encompass as broad a spectrum as possible in terms of multiplicity of religiosity and lived experiences of Muslims and Muslim society, is at once also a critical refection on what Muslims themselves often neglect. This means, that perhaps the tensions inherent in Islam are not so much externally constructed, as they are shaped by the reluctance of some Muslims to critically engage with their own Muslimness and way of being

Inasmuch as Muslim governments all over the world dissociate themselves from despicable acts of terror, few can deny the brutality and violence perpetrated especially by those in authoritative positions like political governments against humanity. Poignant examples are the ongoing massacre of Muslim communities in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan by those government or rebel forces intent on eliminating the other whom they happen to find unworthy of living. This article attempts to map Islamic education’s response to violence and terror often perpetrated against people considered to be in vehement disagreement with another, for instance, Muslim rebel forces assassinating Christians in Syria and destroying ancient monasteries, Muslim jihadist fighters kidnapping and assassinating people in revengeful acts of terror and Muslim government militia quelling resistant forces that oppose the government’s so-called reformist agenda. In arguing against any form of violence, we show how Islamic education cannot and should not be associated with any act of violence. Put differently, we take issue with any act of violence even if minimally applied to disrupt acts of violence. On the contrary, we argue that Islamic education is intimately connected to the practice of public deliberation that engenders a community of becoming that will always undermine violence. We develop our argument in the following way: firstly, we give an account of a maximalist view of Islamic education in relation to the notion of a Muslim community in becoming; secondly, in relation to Agamben’s seminal thoughts on potentiality and becoming, we show that a Muslim community in becoming is averse to violence; finally, we argue as to how forgiveness, risk-taking and civility as instances of deliberation can counteract terror, more specifically on the part of a Muslim community in potentiality and becoming.

Scholars of Islamic Philosophy of Education widely consider Fazlur Rahman as one of the most distinguished Muslim philosophers of the twentieth century. His most well-known works include Avicenna’s Psychology, Prophecy in Islam: Philosophy and Orthodoxy, Islamic Methodology in History, Major Themes of the Qur’an, and Islam and Modernity – which offer significant insights into his theories on education. Fazlur Rahman is probably best known for his thesis on an Islamisation of knowledge, which has provided a significant contribution to his understanding of an Islamic philosophy of education. Proponents of an Islamisation of knowledge consider it as a counter response to what is perceived as the influence of western secularism. In this respect, and from Rahman’s perspective, an Islamisation of knowledge is key to reform in Islamic education, and hence, to the Muslim community. This chapter, therefore, commences with an overview of Rahman’s thesis on Islamic philosophy of education, by paying particular attention to his contention for an Islamisation of knowledge. This is followed by a critique of Rahman’s Islamisation approach and concludes with a consideration of the implications for contemporary debates in philosophy of education.

This article explores the idea of the worthwhile risk of education, as necessarily involving a transition from one of initiation and risk to that of co-belonging. We commence by considering a contention that while education is a human activity whereby an individual might be initiated into various encounters, the potential experience thereof is as yet un-encountered and strange, and only to be imagined. Following on the idea of education as the subject of imagination—that is, not knowing what to expect beforehand, and thereby being prepared to take some risk—we turn our attention to education as necessarily being accompanied by risk. In this sense, if an individual takes a risk to experience something new and strange, the possibility exists that she could disrupt what she is about to encounter, because engaging with the other, is an activity associated with taking a risk towards increasing imagination. In this way, initiation into something new and strange seems commensurate with the act of taking risks which could involve disruption. By building on ideas of education as a worthwhile risk that engages people deliberatively, we extend our argument to that of education as an initiation into a co-belonging, which recognises people’s ability to both deliberate, and not to deliberate.

The euphoria of the recent Arab Spring that was initiated in northern African countries such as Tunisia, Egypt and Libya and spilled over to Bahrain, Yemen and Syria brings into question as to whether democratic citizenship education or more pertinently, education for democratic citizenship can successfully be cultivated in most of the Arab and Muslim world. In reference to the Gulf Cooperation Council countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman and the United Arab Emirates) in the Middle East, we argue that unless gender inequality, mostly instigated by religious-tribal and patriarchal perspectives, is eradicated, it would be impossible to engender any plausible conception of education for democratic citizenship in most of the Arab and Muslim world. Our thesis rests on an understanding that, firstly, education in the Arab and Muslim world is located in an impoverished view of education for Muslims; and secondly, that the notable absence of democratic citizenship is enhanced by gender-based discrimination in society especially in the professions and politics. We contend that education for democratic citizenship in the Arab and Muslim world is necessary and ought to be framed along a pluralist imaginary of citizenship. However, considering the continued prevalence of authoritarianism at politico-social levels our argument is that it seems feasible to enhance and at times disrupt the cultivation of national education drawing on some of the features of a pluralist imaginary of citizenship

Despite unimaginable geopolitical reform and re-humanisation, which saw South Africa transition from colonialism, to apartheid, and now, to a democracy, Muslim education has retained both its character and content. Overdue questions remain unanswered as it becomes evident that while politics and the world of Muslims have shifted – locally and globally – Muslim education in South Africa has remained unchanged ideologically and pedagogically. With Arendt’s seminal essay, ‘Crisis in education’, at the back of our minds, we ask whether a lack of crisis in Muslim education and hence Muslim communities in South Africa, is, in fact, its crisis? Has the cocooning of Muslim education rendered its educational institutions and communities incapable of self-critique, reflection and interrogation? The Islamisation or integration of Muslim education, we posit – in light of a skewed understanding and implementation - has not been responded to persuasively. Put differently, Islamisation, as a recognition that a crisis in Muslim education has unfolded, has not been appropriately understood and its implementation seems to have exonerated a crisis in Muslim education to the extent that such a crisis has been subtly ignored. That is, Islamisation itself presented a crisis to Muslim education with very few, if any scholars, willing to engage with it as a crisis of Muslim education, to which we offer a democratic response.

This book examines how democratic education is conceptualised by exploring understandings of emotions in learning. The authors argue that emotion is both an embodiment and enhancement of democratic education: that rationality and emotion are not separate entities, but exist on a continuum. While democratic education would not exist if it were incommensurate with reason, making judgements about the human condition could not happen without invoking emotion. Synthesising Muslim scholarship with the perspectives of the Western world, the book draws on scholars such as Ibn al-Arabi, Ibn Sina and Fazlur Rahman to offer an enriched and expanded notion of democratic education. This engaging and reflective work will be of interest and value to students and scholars of educational philosophy and cultural studies.

Long portrayed as a virtuous profession, teaching has always been embedded in notions of trust and trustworthiness. Alongside expectations of epistemic cultivation and development, is an implicit handing over of discretionary powers to ‘the trusted teacher’. At the height of #blacklivesmatter protests in 2020, however, high school learners all over South Africa took to social media—@yousilenceweamplify—to express their hurt and anger at their dehumanising experiences at some of the country’s leading schools. Their accounts not only exposed some schools as intense sites of racial, religious, cultural, ethnic, and linguistic tension and conflict, but shattered presumptions about ‘the trusted teacher’. Following a consideration of what trust infers, and the potential harms that arise from epistemic mistrust, the paper considers what might be gained from philosophical engagements in the espousal of teaching as a relationship of epistemic trust, and which ensures the flourishing of both learner and teacher? How might philosophy of education assist teacher education programmes in attuning students to an understanding that being trustworthy as teachers resides in self-knowledge as well as knowledge of the differences of, and among others?

The term ‘postcolonial’ is often reserved for a discourse or discipline that purports to explain the deleterious effects of power in imperial and colonial relationships including cultural legacies although it is also part of the narrative of political independence (Peters, 2019). Amid increasing currents of migration, displacement, as well as the possibilities of new iterations of postcolonial citizenships, it seems very likely that the debates on postcolonialism will continue. If we agree that postcolonialism has developed within a broader politics of knowledge, then what kinds of knowledge do we need to disrupt dominant assumptive conceptual frameworks which have rendered the ‘other’ as passive and docile (Bhambra, 2014)? How might postcolonial theory and pedagogy take us out of western essentialism and exceptionalism, and into a new kind of world in which the racial, social, and cultural subjugation of any people becomes antithetical to the very idea of being?

Underscoring recurrent calls for the decolonization of university curricula in South Africa are underexplored presumptions that by only disrupting theoretical content, universities might release themselves from a colonialist grasp, that continues to dominate and distort higher education discourse. While it might be the case that certain theories hold enormous authoritative, ‘truthful’ sway, as propagated through Western interpretations and norms, there are inherent problems in exclusively approaching the decolonization project as a content-based hurdle, removed from the subjectivities of students’ social, lived, and learning realities. The argument advanced in this article is that until the epistemic harm of colonialism and apartheid are afforded careful recognition and attention—as in focusing on the lived experiences, realities, and stories of individuals—the hard work of delegitimizing coloniality, and its implicit structures of hegemonies and binaries cannot unfold. In addressing these harms, I commence by describing some of the contexts of epistemic harm, promulgated through colonialism and apartheid. This is followed by a consideration of decolonization, both as theory and practice-within-context. Here, I also foreground the #Rhodesmustfall campaign, as a particular moment of painful clarity about why decolonization, as well as transformation, has faltered in higher education in South Africa. In the second half, I focus on the necessity of prioritizing storytelling as a deep manifestation of decolonization. Stories, I maintain, provide access into unknown lives, and can subvert the invisible, normative framings, which dictate how we live in this world. As a manifestation of decolonization, students’ stories hold profound implications for the recognition and affirmation of pluralist identities, histories, knowledge, values, and world-views.

In post-apartheid South Africa, a foregrounding of democratic citizenship education through broadened and inclusive participation is especially evident in a decentralised school-based leadership, management, and governance system. Policy-wise, the involvement of parents in School Governing Body (SGB) structures is seen as an enactment of representative and collective consultation, key to the democratisation of schooling and education. In practice, however, the wide-sweeping authority of SGBs, has allowed several schools to continue a historical narrative of exclusion and inequality, effectively widening the gaps between historically advantaged and disadvantaged schools, and putting into effect renewed tensions of inequality and inequity. Key questions arise: has the state erred in its trust of SGBs to enact democratisation? Or are there limits to what democratisation can achieve? In considering these questions, the article explores re-considerations of governance so that interpretations of democratisation of schools are not used in the subversion of education as a public good.