Nursena Cetingul

Free will, which is dealt with under the title of "acts of the servants" in the Kalām literature, is one of the fundamental issues of the science of Kalām. Benjamin Libet's famous experiment, which he conducted in order to seek an answer to the question of free will, caused the free will debates to move to the field of neuroscience. The logic of Libet's experiment is to compare the neural activity in the brain with the moment when a person is conscious while performing a voluntary act. In Libet's subjects, it was observed that brain activity in the decision-making process started at the moment of unconsciousness. The results of this experiment have long been interpreted in neuroscience as showing that free will is an illusion. Although Libet claimed that conscious intention creates a veto effect by stopping the action at the last moment, recent studies have shown that Libet's veto solution for free will does not work. The most vocal critics of the implications of the Libet experiment from the beginning have generally been philosophers. In this article, the criticisms of the Libet experiments by names such as Marcel Brass, Alfred Mele, and Peter Ulric Tse are presented. However, especially in recent years, neuroscientist Aaron Schurger's experimental and mathematical reinterpretation of the concept of readiness potential, which is key for Libet, and his proposal of an alternative model are mentioned. The article discusses Schurger's claim that the readiness potential may not actually reflect a brain that is ready. According to Schurger, the readiness potential is just random fluctuations that already exist in the brain and is not the sole cause of decisions. In fact, it has been argued that the readiness potential is related to neural noise in the brain rather than to the decision-making process. Thanks to Schurger's critique and the new model, it became clear that the Libet experiment did not rule out free will. But it does not constitute a proof of free will either. While the subject remains a mystery, it is unthinkable for Kalām to remain aloof from these debates. The article also touches upon the views of the Jabriyya, Ash'ariyya, Maturidiyya and Mu'tazilah in Kalām regarding the acts of the servants and questions what the Libet experiment can mean for these schools. Accordingly, while Jabriyya, with its deterministic view, may correspond to an erroneous interpretation of the Libet experiment, Mutazila may be the school that will have the most difficulty in explaining the Libet experiment. As a result, it seems that the views that consider both human agency and God's creation in voluntary acts are the most accurate. Moreover, despite the lack of a clear explanation of the theory of kasb in the Ash'ariyya, the Maturidiyya's assertion that the juz'i will is uncreated and that two influences affect voluntary acts suggests that this school provides the most solid foundation for free will. In order for such discussions to proceed on a healthy basis, it is very important to follow multidisciplinary methods. In addition, as much as Kalāmists should approach scientific studies seriously, it is important that they do not adopt a completely submissive attitude in the face of scientific claims, and that they learn the relevant critiques from experts in the field. Only in this way, we believe that the scientific inferences to be made will be based on a solid ground and that Kalāmists can make serious contributions to the solution.