O. Çağlar Dede

In her account of science known as critical contextual empiricism (CCE), Helen Longino has famously argued that critical discursive interaction provides the very basis for the objectivity of science. While highly influential, CCE has also been criticized for being overly idealized, failing not only as a descriptive but also as a normative account of scientific institutions and practices. In this paper, we examine Longino’s social account of science from the vantage point of a conception of argumentation as epistemic exchange. We show that CCE does not explicitly problematize some important aspects of scientific practices, in particular: the costs and risks involved in extensive critical discursive interaction; the imperative of responsible collective workload management in a scientific community; and the need for mechanisms of curation and filtering in any sufficiently large epistemic community. The argumentation as epistemic exchange model retains the core idea of CCE, namely the centrality of critical discursive interaction in science, but incorporates aspects of scientific practice neglected by CCE (costs and risks, workload management, curation). Our analysis thus adapts CCE to situations where scientists are ‘busy people’ who must contend with limited resources (of time, energy, funding etc.). To illustrate our proposal, we discuss practices of peer review as instances of epistemic exchange. While highlighting the intrinsic vulnerabilities of the peer review system, we also offer some recommendations on how to improve it.

The World Professional Association for Transgender Health guidelines Standards of Care 8 draw on ethical arguments based on individual autonomy, to argue that healthcare and other professionals should be advocates for trans people. Such guidelines presume the presence of medical services for trans people and a degree of consensus on medical ethics. Very little is known, however, about the ethical challenges associated with both providing and accessing trans healthcare, including gender affirmation, in the Global South. In light of the challenges associated with medical and legal gender affirmation in Indonesia, we conducted a qualitative study to understand the views of trans people, healthcare providers, and legal practitioners. In this qualitative study, we drew on a participatory methodology to conduct 46 semi-structured interviews between October and December 2023, with trans people (10 trans feminine people and 10 trans masculine people, each interviewed twice) and key informants (three healthcare providers and three lawyers and paralegals). Trans people were a central part of the research team from inception through to analysis and writing. Participants were recruited via community-led sampling. Data analysis of interview data took place through an immersion/crystallisation technique and preliminary inductive coding which highlighted key quotes. We focused on an inductive analysis using participant narratives to identify key concepts in the ethics of gender affirmation in Indonesia. We characterize the ethics of supportive healthcare workers, community members, and family members, as that akin to “accomplices,” a concept of ethics used in theories of racial justice which evaluate a willingness to support people to navigate laws and regulations which perpetuate injustices and violence. Overall, both trans people and key informants shared an understanding that the legal status of gender-affirming medical care was particularly ambiguous in Indonesia due to a lack of clarity in both laws and regulations. For trans participants, ethical arguments for the validity of legal and medical gender affirmation was premised on evidence that their gender identity and expression was already recognized within society, even if limited to immediate friends and family. Given that all participants expressed a desire for gender affirmation, but such services were widely unavailable, accomplices played a crucial role in supporting trans people to access healthcare. An empirical study based on an “ethics from below” helps to show that arguments grounded in autonomy, or based on biomedical evidence, are unlikely to alter unjust laws or facilitate a change to pathologizing guidelines governing understanding of trans people’s healthcare and legal needs in Indonesia. We provide an analysis that is sensitive to the ethics of facilitating gender affirmation in a context where that process is inherently social, and often articulated in relation to a prevailing religious morality.

Science is widely regarded as the most reliable epistemic source of providing knowledge about the world. Policymakers intend to make purposeful changes in the world. The practice of policymakers relying on scientific experts to make informed decisions about which policies to implement is called Evidence Based Policymaking. This thesis provides a perspective from the philosophy of science in order to discuss the justifiability of Evidence Based Policymaking (EBP) with respect to broadly democratic and liberal values. Justifying EBP with broadly democratic and liberal values entails that the practices of EBP promote, or at least are in harmony with, values such as democratic governance and enhancement of people’s freedom and autonomy. Identifying the conditions under which practices of EBP meet such desiderata minimally requires an understanding of how sciences and scientific experts are instrumental in realizing the public’s values, needs, interests, and pursuit of freedom. In order to approach this project, the thesis adopts a philosophical perspective to conceptualize how sciences are supposed to be guided by or promote society’s values, needs, and interests. Specifically, it adopts a perspective from the philosophy of science that focuses on the relationship between science and (societal) values. The kind of philosophy of science perspective on “values in science” that this thesis adopts has two overarching pursuits relevant for the project of the thesis. Firstly, it seeks to inform the debates about which values and non-epistemic considerations are supposed to inform scientific research. For instance, it discusses the proper sources/owners of the non-epistemic desiderata that inform scientific research and the proper social mechanisms to identify these non-epistemic desiderata (e.g. Kourany, 2010; Kitcher, 2011). Second, it offers theories of the non-epistemic values’ proper roles in scientific reasoning and research that specify how their involvement in science does not unduly compromise the epistemic pursuits of science. The values-in-science perspective thereby seeks to balance the instrumental value of science (i.e., its use to pursue certain societal projects and values) with its epistemic authority (i.e., its objectivity, non-dogmatism, and reliability). The thesis advances an understanding of EBP from the perspective of the values in science by addressing issues that come to the fore when EBP is acknowledged as a value-laden practice of informed decision-making.

I examine how Heather Douglas’ account of values in science applies to the assessment of actual cases of scientific practice. I focus on the case of applied toxicologists’ acceptance of molecular evidence-gathering methods and evidential sources. I demonstrate that a set of social and institutional processes plays a philosophically significant role in changing toxicologists’ inductive risk judgments about different kinds of evidence. I suggest that Douglas’ inductive risk framework can be integrated with a suitable account of evidence, such as Helen Longino’s contextual empiricism, to address the role of social context in the cases like the one examined here. I introduce such an integrated account and show how Longino’s contextual empiricism and inductive risk framework fruitfully complement each other in analyzing the novel aspects of the toxicology case.