Oanh Nguyen

This study explores the connection between greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions disclosure and the competitive performance of family firm (FAFI) in the ASEAN-6 region (specifically Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam). It investigates whether GHG emissions disclosure acts as a mediating factor and evaluates the moderating influences of ESG initiatives and corporate governance (COGO) structures. Grounded in a dataset of 3255 firm-year observations from publicly listed enterprises between 2020 and 2024, sourced from Refinitiv Eikon, we applied maximum likelihood structural equation modeling to examine the proposed links. The findings indicate that FAFI tends to exhibit lower GHG emissions disclosure. GHG emissions disclosure harms competitiveness and serves as a mediator in the relationship between FAFI attributes and competitive performance. ESG practices have moderated the link between GHG emissions disclosure and competitiveness and have been moderated by COGO. This study provides actionable insights for FAFI in ASEAN. Thereby, it suggests ways to improve their competitiveness through GHG emissions management. The results highlight the significance of strong ESG initiatives, especially in the emissions phase, and underscore the important role of effective COGO in optimizing the value-creation potential of ESG. This research has added to our understanding of FAFI in ASEAN. The study has deeply analyzed how FAFI, GHG emissions disclosure, ESG, competitiveness, and COGO connect in ASEAN. The paper has clarified that GHG emissions disclosure acts as a mediator, and ESG activities have a moderating effect. The research has demonstrated how certain COGO mechanisms affect the strength of that moderating effect.

Indonesia’s weak labor movement transformed local wage councils from institutions of wage restraint into institutions that delivered generous wage increases. This article argues that the arrival of direct elections created an opportunity for unions to leverage elections to alter the balance of power on the wage councils. Activating that leverage required increased contentiousness and coordination among unions. As unions mobilized around wages, conflict with capital intensified and produced disruptive protests that led incumbents to side with workers. Unions also developed innovative tactics to sustain momentum in nonelection years. As unions turned the wage councils in their favor, employers fought back by shifting the scale of the conflict to the national level; the result was the recentralization of wage setting and more modest increases. In a global context of ever weakening organized labor, the Indonesian case shows how weak unions can gain power by mobilizing politically at the local level.