Octavio García

We access most of our most cherished beliefs via testimony. Philosophy is no exception. We treat spoken and written philosophical testimony as evidence for philosophical claims. Nonetheless, this paper argues that philosophical testimony is unable to justify philosophical beliefs. If testimony is the only evidence we have to justify philosophical beliefs, this entails skepticism about philosophy. Call this the testimony challenge. First, the paper argues that philosophical testimony does not meet the conditions under which evidence can justify our beliefs. Second, it shows that philosophical testimony cannot provide preemptive epistemic reasons as science and mathematics do. Finally, it answers the self‐defeat objection and a set of objections aiming to block the thesis that philosophical testimony does not justify philosophical beliefs. The paper aims to rethink the role of philosophical testimony in philosophy and reinforce the skeptical worries raised by methodological and disagreement challenges.

In this paper I explore the metaphilosophical consequences of deep disagree-ments in philosophy. I argue that deep philosophical disagreements imply a challenge for philosophy since deep philosophical disagreements hinder ratio-nal decision between philosophical theories. That makes demanding or offe-ring reasons for philosophical theory useless. To overcome this, I argue that philosophical argument is an end in itself and not a means to rational reso-lution of deep philosophical disagreements. I describe two theories that at-tempt to explain deep disagreements in general. Next, I distinguish between intraphilosophical and interphilosophical disagreement. Thus, interphilosophical disagreements are those that are deep philosophical disagreements, while in-traphilosophical disagreements are disagreements between epistemic peers. Subsequently, I explore the consequences of deep philosophical disagreements and conclude that epistemic and practical reasons fail to provide a rational res-ponse to deep philosophical disagreements. Finally, I respond to two objections about argumentative language in philosophical debates and the impossibility of philosophical progress.