Oded Balaban

THE aim of this paper is to explain a paradox in Plato's philosophy. On the one hand, Plato reduces virtue to knowledge; on the other, he rejects the possibility of knowledge or at least has serious doubts that it exists. I shall propose in this paper that the definition of virtue as knowledge is a logical outcome of Plato's denial of the particular aspect of knowledge as cognitive relation. This paper may also be considered as an attempt to resolve the Hintikka‐Santas polemic about whether there is a difference in Plato's philosophy between the function of knowledge and its object. ([3], [6] pp. 1–71). The first part of this paper consists in a critical exposition of Plato's rejection of cognitive relation as a function of knowledge. The second part is devoted to an account of Plato's assumptions in this regard. In the third section of the paper I shall show how, on the basis of these assumptions, Plato reduces virtue to knowledge. And finally, in the last section of the essay, I shall compare my interpretation of this issue with other modern interpretations, especially those of Gerasimos Santas and Jaakko Hintikka.

… the defenders of every kind of regime claim that it is a democracy, and fear that they might have to stop using the word if it were tied down to any one meaning. Words of this kind are often used in a consciously dishonest way. George Orwell (1968, pp. 132–3)Democracy admits no source of authority. It assumes that values are not derived from facts, and facts are not derived from values. This runs contrary to Plato’s “virtue [values] is knowledge.” According to Plato’s logic, experts should rule the republic. Contrary to his view, Democracy assumes that there are not experts on values. Therefore, democracy means the “decision” to rule by means of formal procedures like suffrage or rotation of rulers. Unlike in science, what prevails is not reason and authority based on knowledge. This is the ground for the needed measures against the tyranny of the majority to assure tolerance, freedom and equality before the law.

The aim of craft-analogies in Plato's early dialogues is to put forward a theory of knowledge in which only the content of intentional processes can be known. I will argue that, with this goal in mind, Plato offers an idea of craft that differs from, and is even opposed to the views of his time, as well as to those of our own day, by changing the prevailing definition of craft—from the expertise of means to the expertise of ends. I will address the far-reaching consequences of this shift. Part 1 will expose what I understand by Plato's approach to craft. Part 2 will expose Plato's denial of the actual existence of the process of knowledge reducing it to its object or reference. Part 3 will address what I think are misinterpretations of Plato approach. Part 4 will present some textual evidence. And in Part 5 I will analyse Plato's shuttle-analogy, the more sophisticated of his craft-analogies. Finally, I will append a critical note on Terence Irwin's understanding of virtue as craft-knowledge.

This paper seeks to exhibit and explain, by way of comparison, two ideal kinds of knowledge: knowledge based on classifications according to genera and species, as in Aristotelianism and common sense, and scientific knowledge based on the application of laws of nature. I will proceed by attempting (1) to determine the role that presuppositions play in knowledge in general by means of the distinction between content and form; (2) to describe and explain the main features of both ideal forms of knowledge; and, finally, (3) to analyze the relation between these two forms of knowledge as it is presented in Eddington's celebrated discussion of the “two tables”. I will be critical of the widespread view that modern science is the correct form of knowledge, and that common sense is merely an illusion.

L’objet de cet article est double: 1) montrer que la Science de la logique de Hegel est incapable de rendre compte de la nature de la relation de causalité. Hegel explique plutôt la relation de causalité en la réduisant à une relation de conditionnalité. 2) Soutenir ensuite que cet échec n’est pas le propre de l’hégélianisme mais qu’il est le résultat inévitable de tout effort intellectuel pour comprendre la relation de causalité, quand on ne prend pas en compte la contribution de la perception sensible à la connaissance. L’analyse philosophique peut alors conclure que la causalité, bien qu’elle soit perceptible par les sens, n’est pas compréhensible, tandis que la conditionnalité qui s’y substitue est compréhensible bien qu’elle ne soit pas perceptible.

In the Physics, Aristotle defines motion as 'the actuality of what is potentially, qua potential' (Phys. 201b5). This definition has been interpreted countless times and has been the subject of heated controvery. At issue today is whether ὲντελέχεια refers to motions as a process or a state. Accordingly, if the idea of ὲντελέχεια is believed to refer to a process, it is translated to mean actualization. If on the other hand it is taken to refer to a state, it is translated as meaning actuality. In the first instance, known as the 'state-view', a change is defined as being the state of a changing object when it is actually potentially F, for some F. In the second, or 'process-view', a change is defined as the actualization of a potentially. It seems to me that both views mistakenly assume that Aristotle succeeded in defining motion as motion. As a consequence, the discussion has focused on a presumed content that the definition does not offer. Indeed, were it the case that Aristotle's definition was adequate, there would hardly be any point in even considering the question of whether he had intended to regard motion as being a state or a process. In this paper I examine both of these views and offer an alternative interpretation of my own that differs markedly from either. Additionally, I shall show that just as Aristotle's definition represents a projection of his particular attitude toward nature - so also recent interpretations of his definition represent a projection of the attitudes of modern thinker's toward Aristotle's philosophy.

The ontological arguments (OA) discussion is about the relations between essence and existence, and between analytic and synthetic judgments. Rationalists asserts that essence determines existence. Empiricists assert that existence cannot be deduced from thought. However, both made the error of disconnecting the objective existence of God from subjective thought about Him. We propose to demonstrate two interconnected theses: A) In the course of its historical development, the OA did not manage to refute empiricist critiques. B) His existence is only partial, since a full existence needs two sources; an idea and a sense-datum.(edited)

Bentham argues that Nature has placed mankind under the governance of pain and pleasure. They determine what we ought to do, as well as what we shall do. Bentham tries to answer two different questions. The first is whether people are actually looking for pleasure. It is a cognitive question about human nature, formulated at a meta-ethical level. The second is whether people ought to look for pleasure. The question is formulated on the ethical level and Bentham asserts that people ought to look for pleasure. In the first case, Bentham is a partner in a non-normative meta-ethical discussion about the character of human values. In the second case, he is not a partner and he is not making statements about facts. Is Bentham aware that the answer to one question does not necessarily imply the answer to the other?

THE aim of this paper is to explain a paradox in Plato's philosophy. On the one hand, Plato reduces virtue to knowledge; on the other, he rejects the possibility of knowledge or at least has serious doubts that it exists. I shall propose in this paper that the definition of virtue as knowledge is a logical outcome of Plato's denial of the particular aspect of knowledge as cognitive relation. This paper may also be considered as an attempt to resolve the Hintikka‐Santas polemic about whether there is a difference in Plato's philosophy between the function of knowledge and its object. ([3], [6] pp. 1–71). The first part of this paper consists in a critical exposition of Plato's rejection of cognitive relation as a function of knowledge. The second part is devoted to an account of Plato's assumptions in this regard. In the third section of the paper I shall show how, on the basis of these assumptions, Plato reduces virtue to knowledge. And finally, in the last section of the essay, I shall compare my interpretation of this issue with other modern interpretations, especially those of Gerasimos Santas and Jaakko Hintikka.

All the paradoxes in the Engberg-Pedersen interpretation and all the present-day discussions about whether energeia is an activity or a state, are not, in my opinion, the result of a defective reading of Aristotle but, rather, the influence of the prevailing values of our industrial society. These values - held, as it seems, by these commentators - are conspicuously teleological: they prevent us from grasping the qualitative difference between praxis and poesis and between energeia and kinesis. Indeed, since these teleological values do not take this difference into account, the commentators only ask, when Aristotle distinguishes between praxis and poesis, how much time praxis takes, or if it takes time at all, which is totally irrelevant. Duration in time is incompatible with praxis, not because praxis does not take time nor because it is a state, but because duration in time relates only to purposeful thinking and productive activity, which praxis is not. Commentators fail therefore to analyze successfully the meaning of the expression “actions in which the end (telos) inheres.” It is not clear to them what is meant by activities that are ends in themselves. Failing to grasp this fact, they resort to analysing the temporality of the activity, which is irrelevant to it.Time is a measure of efficiency, and therefore relevant in poesis which is concerned with achievement. The relation of poesis to time is an inverse one: the shorter the time taken for an activity the better the poesis.In ancient-Greek consciousness a valuable activity was that which was undertaken for its own sake and therefore without concern for the amount of time employed in its performance; whereas an action taken as a means to an end was regarded as immoral. In modern society, on the other hand, utilitarian values tend to make it almost incomprehensible that something should be done for its own sake: every human action is evaluated by its result, and when the focus is on the result the criteria of efficiency and utility are obviously relevant. The Greeks valued praxis more than poesis, whereas our culture values poesis and techne more than praxis. The understanding of Aristotle's concept of praxis is useful therefore not only in order to understand ancient-Greek culture, but also to understand better our own presuppositions.

HEGEL says that "when enquiry is made as to the kind of predicate belonging to [a] subject, the act of judgement necessarily implies an underlying concept [Begriff]; but this concept is expressed only by the predicate." According to this, some concept of the subject must precede predication. This circularity can be formulated as follows: If the statement is the "factory" in which concepts are produced, how is it that the concepts precede the statement and are not merely produced within it in their function as subjects? And, on the other hand, if the subject is not, prior to predication, a concept--if it has by itself no meaning--how can a predicate be matched to it? There would, in fact, be nothing to match. We are caught in a circular thesis that requires for its elucidation a fresh analysis of the relationship between concept and statement.

In the passage from the Enneads devoted to discussing and defining the nature of time, it is written that first one must experience eternity, which, as everyone knows, is the model and archetype of time. This initial warning, which is especially serious because we trust in its sincerity, appears to wipe out all hope of finding common ground with its author.Jorge Luis Borges, History of EternitySo let us leave the Platonists to wander off down a blind alley. Poor simpletons, they think they will find the secret of discourse about time in the link with eternity. Whereas I, who am powerless in the face of eternity, would prefer to ask: what link can be retained, in discourse about time, between past, present, and future? If there is some link, can the three kinds of time break free of their mutual bonds? Can predicting the future, a time that will be but has never existed before, be disconnected from what determines the future as a product of what already exists and what has already existed? Can the past be what it once was or will it always be what each age decides it should have been?