Ole Martin Sandberg

This article takes the work and life of Conrad Waddington to illustrate the point that science, art and humanities can be mutually constituting fields that each bring light to aspects of reality that the others may not yet have the tools or the language for and that they can thereby work together to bring new revelations and progress. Borrowing a term from Lynn Margulis, I call this interaction a CreativeHolobiont. The article puts Waddington’s work on the development of organisms in the context of metaphysical questions of change and difference and describes his inspiration from the philosopher Alfred North Whitehead. It then moves on to touch upon later discoveries in biology which take us beyond the individual organism to a fully relational view of life. Finally, it discusses how this view hasbeen represented in artistic works recently and in the past.

This chapter takes gravity as a fundamental elementElements. Gravity is one of the physical forces without which there would not be life nor matter as we know it. Gravity can keep us grounded, but it can also be terrifying and discomforting. As a person suffering from acrophobia, I give a phenomenological account of how this condition is not merely a “fear of heights” but a debilitating somatic condition that affects the sensory apparatus and my being in the world. Acrophobia is one of many environment and place related phobias, which disrupt the harmonious relation between environment and body. I then relate this experience to the environmental and social challenge of climate change—a problem that is so immense it can give a similar feeling of debilitating dizziness. “Eco-paralysis” is different from “climate anxiety” just as acrophobia is different from a mere “fear of heights.” It is an embodied inability to act when faced with the complexity and gravity of our situation: One has to look away from the problem in order to regain sensory control. The challenge of our time is to find the balance, which involves focusing our attention on the ground while still being aware of the environmental abyss.

Using a course on climate change at the University of Iceland as a case study, this chapter illustrates the benefits of employing the methodologies of embodied critical thinking (ECT) in environmental education and of making the emotional and felt dimension an active focus in the educational process. Drawing on cognitive researchers like Eugene Gendlin and Antonio Damasio, the chapter emphasises the integral role of emotions in rationality and reflects on student responses, showcasing shifts from anxiety to hope and from despair to proactive engagement. Finally, it discusses the dilemma of the climate educator who must navigate emotionally challenging topics without amplifying existing negative attitudes or promoting false optimism. An answer might be found in Spinoza’s concept of “joy” and Gendlin’s sense of “felt shift” both of which relate to the process of rearticulating a problem in a way that, despite not solving the problem, gives you some clarity about what to do about it. The focus is on nurturing personal growth and awareness, driving a redefined understanding of climate change as a personal, interconnected issue. This elucidates the transformative potential of integrating personal experiences into climate education, empowering students to navigate complex global challenges.

In this paper, we argue that the concept of ‘species’ should not be the main focus of research and policies in biodiversity conservation. Diversity is important at all levels of life: within species as well as among them and within and among ecosystems. First, we give a brief overview of the debate about the necessity to find a unified concept of ‘species’. In this, we side with Charles Darwin, who insisted that no strict definition could be given to this term, which is ultimately a matter of arbitrary and pragmatic human language. This did not worry Darwin, and neither should it concern biologists or ecologists today. Darwin's great discovery relied on a recognition of the many differences within species, not on their similarities. Next, we argue that the focus on species and the neglect of other diversity measures in the conservation discourse have led to problems in public perception of—and policies on—conservation and biodiversity. In areas with few species, intraspecific diversity is often of utmost importance to ecosystem processes and functions, and such regions may provide the environmental conditions that enable and promote the diversification of specialised subgroups in the absence (or reduction) of interspecific competition. We give some examples of these processes based on research in marine and freshwater ecosystems, focusing on Iceland and the subarctic region. Finally, we refer to alternative, emerging methodologies of assessing ecosystem health which go beyond the quantitative method of counting species and subspecies and instead emphasise more complex phenomena such as relations, interactions and processes. These approaches, we suggest, are consistent with the philosophical tradition called ‘process ontology’, and we argue that both ecological research and conservation policy can benefit from a process philosophical perspective. Finally, we briefly discuss our motivations for finding this topic to be of importance.

A frequent misunderstanding about Peter Kropotkin, and anarchism more generally, is that by emphasising mutual aid as a factor of evolution and history, he advocates a view of human nature as essentially benign. This essay aims to disprove that claim by showing that Kropotkin explicitly rejects any notion of a fixed human essence and insists that we are composed of a multitude of autonomous but interacting faculties with no authentic or essential centre. This view of the human psyche reflects his view of the world in general: for Kropotkin, philosophy and science were not about finding universal mechanisms and eternal substances. Instead, he advances a view of the world that can only be described as process-thinking: a philosophical tendency that prioritises difference over identity and change over stability. Kropotkin’s process ontology also informs his view of politics, which rejects the idea of a harmonious social end state free of conflict and embraces diversity as a factor that promotes progress and movement. Kropotkin’s process philosophy has relevance to debates in such diverse fields as philosophy and metaphysics, political and social theory, and biology and ecology.

In The Selfish Gene, Richard Dawkins’ argues that evolution, being a process of ruthless competition, results in selfish behavior. Human nature is short-sighted and amoral due to our genes. But he also insists humans have a unique capacity for moral behavior: Using reason we can suppress the natural instincts and act against our nature. In this chapter I show that Dawkins view is as old as the theory of evolution itself. It was first advocated by T.H. Huxley and criticized by Peter Kropotkin. Kropotkin’s theory of mutual aid builds upon Darwin and seeks to establish a naturalistic grounding of human morality in the social instincts necessary for all social animals. This avoids the dualism implied in Dawkins’ and Huxley’s theories. It also raises questions of biological essentialism and determinism which the chapter discusses. Finally, the chapter compares the thoughts of Dawkins and Kropotkin with those of Friedrich Nietzsche. Nietzsche would have rejected Dawkins’ version of atheism that retains Christian views of the wickedness of bodily instincts. He was also critical of egalitarian movements which he thought were based in ressentiment. I show that Kropotkin’s views were in some ways quite close to Nietzsche’s as both advocate an affirmation of life.

This chapter tries to make sense of a particular aspect of our contemporary experience: the so-called “post-truth era.” This era is characterized by strong polarization where it seems like the arguments and opinions of the opposing sides are informed by different realities. When beliefs are still held despite being debunked by contradicting evidence, it is easy to dismiss the opponent as “irrational,” resulting in breakdown of communication. This chapter argues that such beliefs may still feel right because they connect to something deeper in the bodily awareness and lived experience, which Eugene Gendlin calls the “felt sense” or “felt meaning.” When we are disconnected from this bodily sense, it can result in various articulations which do not make sense at a surface level but critiquing the surface level articulations while ignoring their source often results in frustration and anger. Rather than dismissing people’s rationality, we should assume they have reasons for holding their beliefs, although they may not be able to articulate those reasons. Drawing on the works of Gendlin I argue for a sympathetic yet critical listening to the bodily sense which requires attention to the whole situation of our social environment.

Many fear that climate change will lead to the collapse of civilization. I argue both that this is unlikely and that the fear is potentially harmful. Using examples from recent disasters I argue that climate change is more likely to intensify the existing social order—a truly terrifying prospect. The fear of civilizational collapse is part of the climate crisis; it makes us fear change and prevents us from imagining different social relations which is necessary if we are to survive the coming disasters and prevent further escalation. Using affect theory, I claim that our visions of the future affect our ability to act in the present. Rather than imagining a terrifying societal breakdown, we can look at how communities have survived recent disasters to get an image of what we need to expand upon to prepare for the future.