Olga Nikolić

This chapter provides a brief history of the concept of emancipation and its applications in and relationship with education, starting with the Enlightenment and considering both the continuation and the critique of this tradition that has further shaped the relationship between education and emancipation. The tension between two meanings of emancipation—personal, intellectual emancipation on the one hand, and political emancipation of the oppressed and the entire society on the other—comes into view in the divergence between Kantian and Marxists paths to emancipation. The chapter goes on to consider the ideas by notable classic thinkers who further developed the Enlightenment ideal of emancipatory education by democratizing it (Freire, Habermas, Dewey, Popper), but also outright questioned some of its main aspects (Peirce, Berlin, Rancière). Nevertheless, even the critics of the Enlightenment mentioned here stay faithful to the ideals of equality and freedom that were formulated in the Age of Reason. And here we are, facing “new” and “old” challenges and media. The chapter then presents the content of this volume, commenting on each chapter and reflecting on how the book Rethinking Education and Emancipation tackles the relationship between emancipation and education by considering contemporary struggles and crises, as well as rethinking and recontextualizing the classic ideas (authors), and building on more recent work.

This edited collection responds to the contemporary need for deeper analysis and rethinking of the relation between education and emancipation in a world beset by social, digital, educational and ecological crises. Among the diverse interdisciplinary perspectives explored are: rethinking the Anthropocene in the time of environmental emergency, the concept of relational thinking as emancipatory practice and a more encompassing concept of relational pedagogy that includes questions about the environment and digitalisation, the notion of indoctrination from the perspective of political education, reconnecting with the body as a form of emancipatory education and how schools reproduce socio-cultural ideologies in synergy with material and visual culture. The book chapters also consider the role of social media, postcolonialism and feminism in understanding emancipatory education and a historical reception of John Dewey’s ideas in other than Western contexts. This volume will be of interest to those seeking well-known as well as further and novel acquaintance with the philosophical and critical issues surrounding different forms and ideas of emancipation and/or/through education, including related practical propositions and examples. Educators, scholars in education, social justice, philosophy, sociology and curriculum developers will find this collection valuable in contemplating, practising and theorising the futures of emancipatory education across contexts and themes.

After Husserl?s transcendental turn and the discovery of the correlation between consciousness and the world the concept of the noema becomes one of the constant leitmotifs of Husserl?s philosophy. My paper will be devoted to the clarification of this concept and its implications for Husserl?s theory of sense. The leading question will be: How can the noema play the role of both the sense and the objective correlate of the intentional act? I will start with presenting the problematic of sense in Husserl?s phenomenology from the Logical Investigations to the Ideas I. The central part of my paper will be devoted to the influential debate regarding the interpretation of the noema. Finally, I intend to point out the most important ways in which the notion of the noema becomes enriched in later Husserl?s philosophy, as well as the difference between linguisitic and non-linguistic sense, based on the Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis. I hope to show that Husserl?s phenomenological theory of sense offers a valuable alternative to the exclusively language-oriented theories of sense.

Our main goal is to describe the structure of engaged acts and compassion and their constitutive interrelation to explicate the key role of engaged and compassionate acts for group constitution. In the first part of the paper, we formulate our guiding idea: the key to understanding compassion lies in understanding engagement and vice versa. We then consider the problematic nature of engaged acts: On the one hand, they do not meet the conditions to be attributed to the plural subject; on the other hand, they cannot be understood without presupposing the plural subject. To understand this, we rely primarily on Helm’s theory of emotions and the classical phenomenological analyses of the constitution of the plural subject, but we also point out the limitations of the latter. In the last two sections, we build on Nussbaum’s theory of compassion to describe the parallelism in the structure of compassion and engagement and to show their constitutive connection. Finally, we examine the specific way in which engaged acts “place burden” and transform a group into an institution.

The aim of this paper is to show, contra the right-libertarian critique of social justice, that there are good reasons for defending policies of social justice within a free society. In the first part of the paper, we will present two influential right-libertarian critiques of social justice, found in Friedrich Hayek's Law, Legislation and Liberty and Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State and Utopia. Based on their approach, policies of social justice are seen as an unjustified infringement on freedoms of individual members of a society. In response to this critique, we will introduce the distinction between formal and factual freedom and argue that the formal principle of freedom defended by Hayek and Nozick does not suffice for the protection of factual freedom of members of a society, because it does not recognise (1) the moral obligation to help those who, without their fault, lack factual freedom to a significant degree, and (2) the legal obligation of the state to protect civic dignity of all members of a society. In the second part of the paper, we offer an interpretation of Kant's argument on taxation, according to which civic dignity presupposes factual freedom, in order to argue that Kant's justification of taxation offers good reasons for claiming that the state has the legal obligation to protect factual freedom via the policies of social justice.