Olga Poller

In this article, we challenge Matushansky’s (Linguistics and Philosophy, 21, 573–627, 2008) small clause treatment of proper names in naming constructions. While she is widely credited with establishing, based on cross-linguistic evidence, that names should be viewed as predicates in naming constructions, we present a counterexample from Polish that questions the universal interpretation of the small clause hypothesis (SCH). This leads us to advocate for an alternative analysis of proper names in naming constructions, wherein they are considered components of the argument of a naming verb. We posit that this approach may have deflationist implications for predicativism concerning proper names, as it does not necessitate the existence of primitive name-predicates. We argue that there is no compelling positive evidence for the existence of predicative uses of names whose application conditions cannot be articulated using an equivalent phrase that quotes or mentions the name. Any apparent use of “Delia” as a predicate can be cast either (i) as not really a predicate, but rather an argument mentioning the name “Delia,” or (ii) as a genuine predicate, albeit one with an application condition defined by one of the well-established existing predicates, such as “individual called ‘Delia,’” where the name is mentioned. Predicative uses of names are thus dependent on the mention of names, and so there is a sense in which there are no primitive name-predicates.

In this paper I review the Neo-Davidsonian semantics of prepositional phrases and secondary predication. I argue that certain types of examples pose challenge to this semantics. I present an alternative to the Neo-Davidsonian analysis which successfully deals with the problematic examples. The core idea lies in representing theta-roles not as functions from events to their participants, but rather as argument-labels encoding the role of each argument in a given verb. As a result, natural-language predicates can now be treated in the manner in which relations are treated in the relational model of data, that is, as naming sets of tuples in which every object is given together with its role named by a corresponding attribute (a theta-role). Such a representation allows the employment of relational algebra operators to calculate the extensions of complex predicates (predicates built out of atomic predicates and/or atomic predicates and prepositions). I lay out the foundations of a relational FOL appropriate for the representation of natural-language predicates and present solutions to the problematic examples. From a practical perspective, the expressions of a relational FOL can be translated to a relational algebra or SQL, which makes it possible to operate with these three languages on the same relational model of data. From a philosophical perspective, a relational FOL permits a return to ‘property-based’ semantics, one in which properties named by predicates are those of individuals, and not of events.

In order to block controversial predictions of 2D semantics (The Nesting Problem), Chalmers and Rabern (2014) propose adding an additional constriction called “the liveness constraint” in definitions of epistemic modals. Without this constraint, all scenario‐world pairs counterfactual to a scenario‐world pair considered as actual in a 2D matrix for a contingenta prioripropositionϕappear problematic for 2D semantics. This is because, although it is false thatϕin such pairs, it isa prioritrue thatϕ. I consider two versions of 2D semantics, those with unstructured and structured intensions. I argue that the unstructured version of 2D semantics is over‐simplified and due to this, it has controversial predictions for counterfactual scenario‐world pairs – the definition of epistemic conceivability with the liveness constraint causes some contingent propositions to appear inconceivable in counterfactual scenario‐world pairs, while some other contingent propositions remain conceivable. In turn, the structured version of the 2D account of propositions has no explanation of how it is possible to possess purely qualitative knowledge without its being dependent on a particular individual or on a particular actual world.

In this paper I concern myself with The Superman Puzzle. I argue that the descriptive content associated with proper names, besides determining the proper name's reference, function as truthconditionally relevant adjuncts which can be used to express a manner, reason, goal, time or purpose of action. In that way a sentence with a proper name NN is doing something could be understood as NN is doing something as NN. I argue that the substitution of names can fail on modified readings because the different descriptive content of proper names modifies the main predicate differently. Here I present a formal representation of modified predicates which allows one to model intuitively the different truth-conditions of sentences from The Puzzle.

In this paper I argue that descriptive content associated with a proper name can serve as a truth-conditionally relevant adjunct and be an additional contribution of the name to the truth-conditions. Definite descriptions the so-and-so associated by speakers with a proper name can be used as qualifying prepositional phrases as so-and-so, so sentences containing a proper name NN is doing something could be understood as NN is doing something as NN (which means as so-and-so). Used as an adjunct, the descriptive content of a proper name expresses the additional circumstances of an action (a manner, reason, goal, time or purpose) and constitute a part of a predicate. I argue that qualifying prepositional phrases should be analyzed as predicate modifiers and propose a formal representation of modified predicates. The additional truth-conditional relevance of the descriptive content of a proper name helps to explain the phenomenon of the substitution failure of coreferential names in simple sentences.