Olivier Perru

The article examines a number of links between the metaphorical uses of the concept of metamorphosis in literature and the various changes of the meaning of the concept that took place at the beginning of the modern scientific age between the 17th and 19th centuries, a period during which the notion of metamorphosis resurfaced in conflict with evolutionist thinking. We present the extent to which the concept of animal metamorphosis, the object of multiple redefinitions over the course of this historical period, became the vector of a very strong metaphorical meaning, which emerged in the literature of the period and survives to this day in certain children’s storybooks belonging to what we term the genre of “realistic fiction”. We intend, from a pedagogical standpoint, to identify which specific attributes of these metaphors exist in those storybooks, and to gauge the extent to which those attributes contradict the scientific characteristics and fictional representations of the concept of metamorphosis.

At first, Georges Canguilhem’s philosophy is a philosophy of medicine recognizing the main contribution of biological knowledge to medicine. However, this philosophy also questions the nature of life. Life involves biological processes, but life is also normativity. In this paper, we question the normativity and the epistemological history in Canguilhem’s works to understand their relevance for current scientific questions. According to Canguilhem, the epistemological history of the life sciences concerns an activity of constitution of (biological) scientific disciplines. The relevance of Canguilhem is the fact that a historian of science has not only to restore a history of the scientific theories or a history of the development of the sciences in context, but he also has to explore the relationship and the limits between life science and its context in the process of genesis and scientific elaboration. Scientific work is a vital activity of the human being, the history of science is the history of this axiological activity, and this implies a philosophical approach. In this paper, we propose that the history of ecology may give a valuable example of a scientific elaboration from various elements and from diverse skills: ideologies that announce or extend a scientific construction also affect this discipline.

Our paper focuses on the theory of bud’s development in some works of the french botanist Aubert A. du Petit Thonars (1758–1831). From 1792 to 1801, he was a botanist traveller, visiting Tristan d’Acugna, Le Cap, Madagascar and L’Isle Bourbon, and he observed the growth of tropical trees. He concluded that, on the bark, many buds produced some bundles of fibres. He repeated his observations and experiments with European trees in France. For him, the bud’s activity produces fibres. Collections of fibres cause a organic unity. Du Petit Thouars carried on with the studies of Duhamel du Monceau about wood and bark. He discovered that these two vegetal tissues were independent, but grew from the same matter, which was called “cambium” by Duhamel du Monceau in 1758. Our botanist’s opinions and observations were discussed and his point of view was sternly combatted by the French physiologist Brisseau-Mirbel, but it was taken up again by Moquin-Tandon. Finally, the cellular theory and discoveries of vegetal tissues proved Brisseau-Mirbel right about building up of plants: they are made up of cells but they are not a composition of fibres.

Résumé Dans cet article, nous examinons la Démonstration de l’existence de Dieu de Fénelon ; la question posée est celle de la démarche apologétique, où le spectacle de la nature donne à voir l’activité du Créateur. Dans un regard qui suppose la foi, Fénelon met en relation le caractère admirable de l’ordre du monde et ce Dieu que nul ne conteste encore sérieusement. Réenchantant l’univers mécaniste, Fénelon en appelle à un Dieu seul capable de mettre en harmonie le mécanisme et la vie ainsi que le corps et l’âme. À la lumière de la science du temps, les espèces animales s’inscrivent dans un ordre équilibré et vivant, le corps organisé est le siège d’opérations d’assimilation et de génération, inaccessibles à la machine, il semble aussi fournir le support des pensées à l’âme. Faute de l’existence d’une cause assumant simultanément les dimensions matérielles, vitales et spirituelles, le lecteur se trouve renvoyé à l’action divine. S’agit-il ici d’occasionalisme fénelonien? Peut-on parler de postérité de Fénelon dans le discours sur la nature au xviii e siècle?

The aim of this paper is an epistemological analysis of mutualism modeling. From the Lotka-Volterra analysis, we look for some characteristics and epistemological inadequacies of this class of models. Volterra s’mathematical work was a response to a particular ecological situation. This situation is the rupture of the equilibrium between competing associated species. Starting from equations describing variations in competing populations, a change of sign is enough to transform them into equations describing variations in numbers of mutualistic populations. In terms of modeling, competition models have attracted a lot of attention while mutualism has been relatively neglected. If the relative growths of the two populations are the same, applied to mutualism Lotka-Volterra models indicate an equilibrium point. These models are used to make a distinction between obligatory and accidental mutualism. To be considered valid these models need to give an equilibrium point and provide the dominant characteristic of biological mutualism (obligatory or accidental). From the end of the 90s, some researchers have developed more realistic bio­logical models that allow a transition from parasitism to mutualism depending on the densities of the two partners. From an epistemological viewpoint, these models remain relative to a population level. They refer to the biological pop­ulations studies but they need to be complemented by an analysis of the same biological phenomenon at an individual level.

Le concept d'association chez Durkheim se rapporte d'abord à la société vue comme réalité autonome et individualisé. Le développement de l'association sociale est mesurable par la division du travail qui constitue la solidarité sociale. Le texte discute de la validité de ce regard sur la société comme unité de vie et du fondement biologique de cette unité. Les recherches des zoologistes du XIXe siècle sur l'unification progressive du vivant permettent à Durkheim de proposer une vision organique de l'État, centre et synthèse de l'organisation. Ce fondement biologique reste cohérent avec les spécificités humaines des faits sociaux. Le point de départ de Max Weber est tout autre : c'est l'individu en tant que sujet libre d'activité et capable de coopération. Les diverses formes de coopération sont alors au fondement des structures sociales qu'analyse Weber à travers l'histoire. Les deux méthodes peuvent être comparées dans leur capacité à rendre compte de la réalité des structures associatives dans la société.In Durkheim's works, the concept of association firstly relates to society, considered as an autonomous reality. The development of this social association can be measured by the division of labour, which builds up social solidarity. This paper argues about this view of society as a unit of life and its biological foundations. Concerning the progressive unification in living beings, researches of french zoologists during the 19th century enable Durkheim to give a new organicist conception of state. However, this biological founding remains consistent with the human specificities of social facts. Max Weber's starting point is entirely different because he deals with individual as a free subject, able to cooperate. So, diverse ways to cooperate are the foundings of social structures analyzed by Weber.