Kant's account of polemical engagement in the Discipline of Pure Reason has thus far received relatively little scholarly attention. Existing interpretations maintain that the Discipline prohibits polemical engagement in favor of the juridical model of justification and resolution that Kant calls the court of reason, since metaphysical polemics are epistemically unproductive and ethically objectionable. This article challenges that view. I argue that the Discipline develops three distinct polemi…
Read moreKant's account of polemical engagement in the Discipline of Pure Reason has thus far received relatively little scholarly attention. Existing interpretations maintain that the Discipline prohibits polemical engagement in favor of the juridical model of justification and resolution that Kant calls the court of reason, since metaphysical polemics are epistemically unproductive and ethically objectionable. This article challenges that view. I argue that the Discipline develops three distinct polemical strategies: hypotheses as an offensive strategy in emergency cases, allowing one to counterattack an opponent who threatens the interests of practical reason; rules governing proof as a strategy of caution under conditions of incomplete knowledge; and the skeptical method as a preparatory strategy that opens the way to the court of reason by exposing the futility of polemical argumentation. The Discipline thus articulates a legitimate role for polemical engagement within the methodological framework of the Critique of Pure Reason.
