Omid Shabani

Economic globalization has resulted in the transfer of national power to supranational actors and their supranational procedures and institutions. Concomitant with this trend is the ascendancy of the discourses of democracy and human rights that have given rise to the idea of cosmopolitan justice. These trends, in turn, have weakened statehood [ Entstaatlichung ], requiring theoretical envisioning and practical institutionalization of a supranational model of political association. Among the competing theories, in this article I will defend the Kantian project of constitutionalization of international law. In doing so, I take the doctrine of constitutional patriotism as an appropriate model of supranational political association in the European Union and defend it against the republican critique that rejects the idea as deficient. I argue that the European project of constitution-making can overcome the charges of democratic deficit and the lack of European demos by establishing the terms and conditions for democratic negotiation and institutionalizing shared practices of law-making. Key Words: constitutional patriotism • democratic deficit • the European Union • nation-state • supranational political community.

In this paper, I intend to appropriate the explanatory power of some of Habermas' recent ideas (such as complementary learning processes, modernization of faith, tolerance, and non-violence) for the purpose of examining the current political situation in Iran. I would like to argue that the recent history of Iran has offered an occasion for a development away from a dogmatic religious consciousness and toward a more tolerant one. I submit that these opposing modes of thought are, respectively, represented by the hardliners in power and the reformists in opposition. The current impasse, I argue, is the result of an asymmetrical learning process, where the conservative camp has not evolved along with the reformers. I submit that the way out of the impasse is a fully fledged non-violent movement of civil disobedience by the opposition. The politics of non-violence engagement can be realized by fostering a culture of tolerance as the acceptance of reasonable disagreements and the rejection of violent means in politics. I argue that such a movement has begun to emerge after the June 12 2009 presidential election in the form of the Green Hope Movement.

The Islamic Republic of Iran is no doubt an autocratic regime, where the supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamanie, has taken it upon himself to micromanage the suppression of the opposition for many years. In this respect and in the eyes of most Iranians, the resignation and submission of the Iranian reformists, including the former president Mohammad Khatami, is puzzling if not downright treacherous. By appropriating the insight of an Italian Renaissance writer, Baldassare Castiglione, in his book, Il Libro del Cortegiano or The Book of the Courtier, I hope to offer an alternative interpretation of the confounding position of the Iranian reformists. Contrary to its prevalent reading in its scholarship, which takes Il Libro del Cortegiano as an apolitical book, its more recent scholarship has discovered a political program, according to which in the absence of freedom aims to ameliorate the conduct of the tyrant through the actions of the courtier, who provides an example of honourable conduct and public service. I propose to adopt the ideal of cortegiano as a heuristic device that, when applied to the Iranian situation, can explain Mr. Khatami and his fellow reformists’ acquiescence that as a stratagem of resistance that, in the absence of a better alternative, works as the politics of the second best to make their “master” a better leader by offering an example of a more virtuous leader

Given the rise of religious movements during the past decade, some have argued that the basic principles of liberal democracy such as separation of church and state and principle of the public use of reason are too restrictive and ought to be rethought. I would like to argue along a Habermasian line that the principle of secular justification ought not to result in a private/public split in religious citizens’ identity if they recognize and adopt an “institutional translation proviso”. This proviso requires an epistemic ability on the part of religious citizens that enables them to translate their religious beliefs and insight into secular reasons when they pass beyond the informal public sphere into governmental institutions like courts and parliaments. Citizens can express and defend their claims in the public sphere in religious terms if they cannot find secular translation for them. However, this proposal requires a complementary change in the mentality of the secular citizens that recognizes the continued existence of religious communities in diverse liberal democracies.

The pressures of globalization have resulted in shrinking distances and increased contact among people, rendering state boundaries and jurisdiction insufficient to deal with claims of justice exclusively. This challenge requires that we move beyond the limits of statism in political theorizing and acquire a cosmopolitan approach. In this article, from a discourse theoretic perspective, I consider what cosmopolitan justice would entail for policy and law-making concerning immigration. It is argued that: (1) from a moral point of view we cannot consider the problem of migration solely from the perspective of the people of affluent countries and have to take into account the perspective of the refugees, asylum seekers, and immigrants; (2) the growing interdependency of global economies gives rise to a moral obligation to assist the immigrants with special duties devolving upon the First World as the result of the history of colonization; and (3) the immigration law ought to be integrated into higher, or constitutional, law-making. In doing so, the discourse theoretic approach decouples national sovereignty (territorial integrity) and democratic polity, overcoming the problem of prioritization of geography over claims of membership.

As recent controversies over satirical religious cartoons in Denmark and the wearing of traditional dress in France attest, multiculturalism is an increasingly contentious issue for contemporary democracies. The question of how to achieve a balance between a tolerant and open society and a just nation with a strong identity has become one of the most heated debates in the academic community—and a matter of immediate political urgency for many countries. _Multiculturalism and the Law_ brings together some of the sharpest and most influential scholars of our time, including Jürgen Habermas and Thomas McCarthy, to explore the pacifying role that democratic lawmaking offers as a solution to the instability and divisiveness fostered by cultural diversity. Can the law promote equality, inclusion, and solidarity? The emerging consensus among many political philosophers that it can is debated here by a distinguished group of thinkers, and their contributions are essential reading for both policy makers and a wide range of scholars

Over the past decade or so, the liberal principle of legitimacy, which requires the justification of coercive law based on public reason, has come under severe attack from all sides. Some have criticized what they see as the exclusion of religious reason from the public sphere. Still others argue that the liberal proviso assumes a too-narrowly secularist definition of public reason, which, in fact, is more restrictive than what the principle of separation of church and state demands. Critics argue that religious citizens’ participation in public debate should not be conditioned on whether they use public reason or not. Instead they should be free to use whatever reason they have—religious or not—in public deliberation on policy issues. While some political theorists have replied to these criticisms by engaging at the theoretical level with these arguments, I propose to assess them in practice. I start by granting the critics of public reason what they wish—namely to allow comprehensive reasons in discussion concerning justification of law—and examining the practical consequences of this measure. In assessing these consequences it will become apparent that, at the formal level of making and administering law, only those reasons that are accessible by all equally have a justificatory power.