Ophelia Deroy

Self-touch plays a central role in the construction and plasticity of the bodily self. But which mechanisms support this role? Previous accounts emphasize the convergence of proprioceptive and tactile signals from the touching and the touched body parts. Here, we hypothesise that proprioceptive information is not necessary for self-touch modulation of body-ownership. Because eye move- ments do not rely on proprioceptive signals as limb movements do, we developed a novel oculomotor self-touch paradigm where voluntary eye movements gener- ated corresponding tactile sensations. We then compared the effectiveness of eye versus hand self-touch movements in generating an illusion of owning a rub- ber hand. Voluntary oculomotor self-touch was as effective as hand-driven self- touch, suggesting that proprioception does not contribute to body ownership during self-touch. Self-touch may contribute to a unified sense of bodily self by binding voluntary actions toward our own body with their tactile consequences.

Do we judge hate incidents similarly when they are performed using words or bodily actions? Hate speech incidents are rarely reported by bystanders, and whether or how much they should be punished remains a matter of legal, theoretical and social disagreement. In a pre-registered study (N = 1309), participants read about verbal and nonverbal attacks stemming from identical hateful intent, which created the same consequences for the victims. We asked them how much punishment the perpetrator should receive, how likely they would be to denounce such an incident and how much harm they judged the victim suffered. The results contradicted our pre-registered hypotheses and the predictions of dual moral theories, which hold that intention and harmful consequences are the sole psychological determinants of punishment. Instead, participants consistently rated verbal hate attacks as more deserving of punishment, denunciation and being more harmful to the victim than nonverbal attacks. This difference is explained by the concept of action aversion, suggesting that lay observers have different intrinsic associations with interactions involving words compared to bodily actions, regardless of consequences. This explanation has implications for social psychology, moral theories, and legislative efforts to sanction hate speech, which are considered.

People won’t hold cars responsible for traffic accidents, yet they do when artificial intelligence (AI) is involved. AI systems are held responsible when they act or merely advise a human agent. Does this mean that as soon as AI is involved responsibility follows? To find out, we examined whether purely instrumental AI systems stay clear of responsibility. We compared AI-powered with non-AI-powered car warning systems and measured their responsibility rating alongside their human users. Our findings show that responsibility is shared when the warning system is powered by AI but not by a purely mechanical system, even though people consider both systems as mere tools. Surprisingly, whether the warning prevents the accident introduces an outcome-bias: the AI takes higher credit than blame depending on what the human manages or fails to do.

Hate speech incidents often occur in social settings, from public transport to football stadiums. To counteract a prevailing passive attitude towards them, governmental authorities, sociologists, and philosophers stress bystanders’ responsibility to oppose or block hate speech. Here, across two online experiments with UK participants using custom visual vignettes, we provide empirical evidence that bystanders’ expression of opposition can affect how harmful these incidents are perceived, but only as part of a collective response: one expressed by a majority of bystanders present. Experiment 1 (N = 329) shows that the silence or intervention of three bystanders affects the harm caused by hate speech, but one bystander does not. Experiment 2 (N = 269) shows this is not simply a matter of numbers but rather one of norms: only unanimous opposition reduces the public perception of the damage created by the incident. Based on our results, we advance an empirical norm account: group responses to hate speech modulate its harm by indicating either a permissive or a disapproving social norm. Our account and results, showing the need to consider responses to hate speech at a collective level, have direct implications for social psychology, the philosophy of language and public policies.

This study explores whether labeling AI as either “trustworthy” or “reliable” influences user perceptions and acceptance of automotive AI technologies. Utilizing a one-way between-subjects design, the research presented online participants (N = 478) with a text presenting guidelines for either trustworthy or reliable AI, before asking them to evaluate 3 vignette scenarios and fill in a modified version of the Technology Acceptance Model which covers different variables, such as perceived ease of use, human-like trust, and overall attitude. While labeling AI as “trustworthy” did not significantly influence people’s judgements on specific scenarios, it increased perceived ease of use and human-like trust, namely benevolence, suggesting a facilitating influence on usability and an anthropomorphic effect on user perceptions. The study provides insights into how specific labels affect adopting certain perceptions of AI technology.

People are keen to exploit cooperative artificial agents for selfish gain. While this phenomenon has been observed in numerous Western societies, we show here that it is absent in Japan. We examined people’s willingness to cooperate with artificial agents and humans in two classic economic games requiring a choice between self interest and mutual benefit. Our participants in the United States cooperated with artificial agents significantly less than they did with humans, whereas participants in Japan exhibited equivalent levels of cooperation with both types of co-player. We found a notable difference in how people felt about exploiting their cooperative partner: people in Japan emotionally treated artificial agents and humans alike, whereas people in the United States felt bad about exploiting humans, but not machines. Our findings underscore the necessity for nuanced cultural considerations in the design and implementation of such technology across diverse societies.

The common-sense intuitions that sensory substitution devices are somehow visual leads to a dead end, not only because they obviously present differences with vision but also because they result in a dilemma where philosophers keep arguing about the right way to define vision. This chapter stresses that the dilemma proves impossible to overcome independently of the way vision is defined. Recognizing this dead end is an important first step that clears the way for a better understanding of sensory substitution in general where these sensory substitution devices stop being considered sensory in the first place. The capacities brought by these devices do not and cannot figure on the same list as one of the natural or existing senses.

Synaesthetes’ descriptions of experiences of coloured sounds are troubling for typical perceivers. Their phenomenological reports tend to be diverse and confusing. A way around this confusion is to analyse the experience of coloured sounds as the conjunction of _two_ sensory contents experienced in isolation by typical perceivers, that is, as the conjunction of a typical auditory experience and of an additional colour experience. This analysis is perhaps the most attractive and frequent, in philosophy and in cognitive neuroscience, but is it the best way to capture the condition? This chapter considers an alternative account which makes more sense of both the synaesthetic reports and the empirical evidence, and opens new ways to look at the perceptual status of synaesthetic experiences. Synaesthesia covers cases where individuals enjoy a single, richer experience than typical perceivers: their experience of a sound is for instance enriched by a colour dimension.

If synaesthesia is defined, as Cytowic once proposed, as a strange sensory blending, the category can include many other cases beyond the well-known colored-hearing and color-grapheme experiences. The extension of the category of synaesthesia to cases like mirror-touch, personification, crossmodal mappings, and drug experiences has helped produce a range of new evidence for the causes and prevalence of the condition. It also raises new questions regarding the unity of the synaesthetic label. The volume provides an overview of the varieties of sensory blending counted as ‘synaesthetic’, and discusses whether they should be viewed as a single condition or as several distinct, more or less related phenomena. The volume brings together contributions from leading cognitive neuroscientists and philosophers to consider for the first time the broader theoretical lessons arising from these cases of sensory blending, whether for the nature of perception and consciousness in general, the boundaries between perception, illusion, and imagination, the nature of vicarious experiences, or the unity of the senses.

Belief in substance dualism, the idea that mind and matter are two different kinds of substances, has been found to be a strong predictor of belief in free will. Why? Here, we test whether believing that mind and matter are different kinds of substance correlates with differences in how people think of free will and/or differences in how people interpret the scenarios used to test their conceptions. We provided participants (N = 515) with two hypothetical scenarios where the world was presented either as deterministic or not and asked them whether they thought that a given decision could be free in that world. Incompatibilist free will requires that determinism, the idea that at any instant only one possible future can follow from the state of the world, is false. Compatibilists hold that free will is possible even if determinism is true. In this study, we investigate if substance dualists are more compatibilist. We find that they are not, and that both dualists and physicalists agree that free will is incompatible with determinism. In addition, we show that dualists and physicalists are equally likely to commit bypassing, i.e., to misinterpret determinism as excluding mental causation. We also show that dualists have a stronger tendency to commit intrusion, i.e., to misinterpret determinism by importing indeterministic metaphysics into their interpretation of deterministic descriptions.

This edited volume on the philosophy of perception is based on the papers presented at the Wittgenstein Symposium 2017 (Kirchberg, Austria). It covers a wide range of recent topics in the philosophy of perception, from realism and objectivity in perception, intentionality and content, the distinction between perception and cognition, the cognitive penetrability of perception to the epistemology of perception. The volume contains papers by Tyler Burge, Howard Robinson, Olivier Massin, Michael Schmitz, Michael Tye, Marcello Fiocco, Guillaume Frechette, Sofia Miguens, Uriah Kriegel, Pierre Jacob, Mark Kalderon, Berit Brogaard, Athanassios Raftopoulos, Ophelia Deroy, Charles Travis, Johannes Roessler, Philipp Berghofer, Harald Wiltsche, Frederique de Vignemont, Romana Schuler, Ulrich Arnswald, David Stern and Hans Sluga.

We value what we choose more than what is imposed upon us. Choice-induced preferences are extensively demonstrated using behavioural and neural methods, mainly involving rewarding objects such as money or material goods. However, the impact of choice on experiences, especially in the realm of affective touch, remains less explored. In this study, we specifically investigate whether choice can enhance the pleasure derived from affective touch, thereby increasing its intrinsic rewarding value. We conducted an experiment in which participants were being touched by an experimenter and asked to rate how pleasant their experience of touch was. They were given either a choice or no choice over certain touch stimulus variables which differed in their relevance: some were of low relevance (relating to the colour of the glove that the experimenter would use to touch them), while others were of high relevance (relating to the location on their arm where they would be stroked). Before and during touching, pupillometry was used to measure the level of arousal. We found that having a choice over aspects of tactile stimuli—especially those relevant to oneself—enhanced the pleasant perception of the touch. In addition, having a choice increases arousal in anticipation of touch. Regardless of how relevant it is to the actual tactile stimulus, allowing one to choose may positively enhance a person’s perception of the physical contact they receive.

Humans and other animals possess the remarkable ability to effectively navigate a shared perceptual environment by discerning which objects and spaces are perceived by others and which remain private to themselves. Traditionally, this capacity has been encapsulated under the umbrella of joint attention or joint action. In this comprehensive review, we advocate for a broader and more mechanistic understanding of this phenomenon, termed co-perception. Co-perception encompasses the sensitivity to the perceptual engagement of others and the capability to differentiate between objects perceived privately and those perceived commonly with others. It represents a distinct concept from mere simultaneous individual perception. Moreover, discerning between private and common objects doesn't necessitate intricate mind-reading abilities or mutual coordination. The act of perceiving objects as either private or common provides a comprehensive account for social scenarios where individuals simply share the same context or may even engage in competition. This conceptual framework encourages a re-examination of classical paradigms that demonstrate social influences on perception. Furthermore, it suggests that the impacts of shared experiences extend beyond affective responses, also influencing perceptual processes. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Attention Philosophy > Foundations of Cognitive Science Philosophy > Psychological Capacities.

The sense of agency is the subjective feeling of control over one's own actions and the associated outcomes. Here, we asked whether and to what extent the reasons behind our choices (operationalized by value differences, expected utility, and counterfactual option sets) drive our sense of agency. We simultaneously tested these three dimensions during a novel value-based decision-making task while recording explicit (self-reported) and implicit (brain signals) measures of agency. Our results show that choices that are more reasonable also come with a stronger sense of agency: humans report higher levels of control over the outcomes of their actions if (1) they were able to choose between different option values compared to randomly picking between options of identical value, (2) their choices maximizes utility (compared to otherwise) and yields higher than expected utility, and (3) they realize that they have not missed out on hidden opportunities. EEG results showed supporting evidence for factors (1) and (3): We found a higher P300 amplitude for picking than choosing and a higher Late-Positive Component when participants realized they had missed out on possible but hidden opportunities. Together, these results suggest that human agency is not only driven by the goal-directedness of our actions but also by their perceived rationality.

In a Bayesian brain, every perceptual decision will take into account internal priors as well as new incoming evidence. A reality monitoring system—eventually providing the agent with a subjective sense of reality avoids them being confused about whether our experience is perceptual or imagined. Yet not all confusions we experience mean that we wonder whether we may be imagining: some confused experiences feel clearly perceptual but still feel not right. What happens in such confused perceptions, and can the Bayesian brain explain this kind of confusion? In this paper, we offer a characterisation of perceptual confusion and argue that it requires our subjective sense of reality to be a composite of several subjective markers, including a categorical one that can clearly identify an experience as perceptual and connect us to reality. Our composite account makes new predictions regarding the robustness, the non-linear development and the possible breakdowns of the sense of reality in perception.

Mental body-representations are highly plastic and can be modified after brief exposure to unexpected sensory feedback. While the role of vision, touch and proprioception in shaping body-representations has been highlighted by many studies, the auditory influences on mental body-representations remain poorly understood. Changes in body-representations by the manipulation of natural sounds produced when one's body impacts on surfaces have recently been evidenced. But will these changes also occur with non-naturalistic sounds, which provide no information about the impact produced by or on the body? Drawing on the well-documented capacity of dynamic changes in pitch to elicit impressions of motion along the vertical plane and of changes in object size, we asked participants to pull on their right index fingertip with their left hand while they were presented with brief sounds of rising, falling or constant pitches, and in the absence of visual information of their hands. Results show an "auditory Pinocchio" effect, with participants feeling and estimating their finger to be longer after the rising pitch condition. These results provide the first evidence that sounds that are not indicative of veridical movement, such as non-naturalistic sounds, can induce a Pinocchio-like change in body-representation when arbitrarily paired with a bodily action.

We cooperate with other people despite the risk of being exploited or hurt. If future artificial intelligence (AI) systems are benevolent and cooperative toward us, what will we do in return? Here we show that our cooperative dispositions are weaker when we interact with AI. In nine experiments, humans interacted with either another human or an AI agent in four classic social dilemma economic games and a newly designed game of Reciprocity that we introduce here. Contrary to the hypothesis that people mistrust algorithms, participants trusted their AI partners to be as cooperative as humans. However, they did not return AI's benevolence as much and exploited the AI more than humans. These findings warn that future self-driving cars or co-working robots, whose success depends on humans' returning their cooperativeness, run the risk of being exploited. This vulnerability calls not just for smarter machines but also better human-centered policies.

Many policies and ethical guidelines recommend developing “trustworthy AI”. We argue that developing morally trustworthy AI is not only unethical, as it promotes trust in an entity that cannot be trustworthy, but it is also unnecessary for optimal calibration. Instead, we show that reliability, exclusive of moral trust, entails the appropriate normative constraints that enable optimal calibration and mitigate the vulnerability that arises in high-stakes hybrid decision-making environments, without also demanding, as moral trust would, the anthropomorphization of AI and thus epistemically dubious behavior. The normative demands of reliability for inter-agential action are argued to be met by an analogue to procedural metacognitive competence (i.e., the ability to evaluate the quality of one’s own informational states to regulate subsequent action). Drawing on recent empirical findings that suggest providing reliability scores (e.g., F1-scores) to human decision-makers improves calibration in the AI system, we argue that reliability scores provide a good index of competence and enable humans to determine how much they wish to rely on the system.

Despite facing significant criticism for assigning human-like characteristics to artificial intelligence, phrases like “trustworthy AI” are still commonly used in official documents and ethical guidelines. It is essential to consider why institutions continue to use these phrases, even though they are controversial. This article critically evaluates various reasons for using these terms, including ontological, legal, communicative, and psychological arguments. All these justifications share the common feature of trying to justify the official use of terms like “trustworthy AI” by appealing to the need to reflect pre-existing facts, be it the ontological status, ways of representing AI or legal categories. The article challenges the justifications for these linguistic practices observed in the field of AI ethics and AI science communication. In particular, it takes aim at two main arguments. The first is the notion that ethical discourse can move forward without the need for philosophical clarification, bypassing existing debates. The second justification argues that it’s acceptable to use anthropomorphic terms because they are consistent with the common concepts of AI held by non-experts—exaggerating this time the existing evidence and ignoring the possibility that folk beliefs about AI are not consistent and come closer to semi-propositional beliefs. The article sounds a strong warning against the use of human-centric language when discussing AI, both in terms of principle and the potential consequences. It argues that the use of such terminology risks shaping public opinion in ways that could have negative outcomes.

Humans are poorer at identifying smells and communicating about them, compared to other sensory domains. They also cannot easily organize odor sensations in a general conceptual space, where geometric distance could represent how similar or different all odors are. These two generalities are more or less accepted by psychologists, and they are often seen as connected: If there is no conceptual space for odors, then olfactory identification should indeed be poor. We propose here an important revision to this conclusion: We believe that the claim that there is no odor space is true only if by odor space, one means a conceptual space representing all possible odor sensations, in the paradigmatic sense used for instance for color. However, in a less paradigmatic sense, local conceptual spaces representing a given subset of odors do exist. Thus the absence of a global odor space does not warrant the conclusion that there is no olfactory conceptual map at all. Here we show how a localist account provides a new interpretation of experts and cross‐cultural categorization studies: Rather than being exceptions to the poor olfactory identification and communication usually seen elsewhere, experts and cross‐cultural categorization are here taken to corroborate the existence of local conceptual spaces.

Nudge is a popular public policy tool that harnesses well-known biases in human judgement to subtly guide people’s decisions, often to improve their choices or to achieve some socially desirable outcome. Thanks to recent developments in artificial intelligence (AI) methods new possibilities emerge of how and when our decisions can be nudged. On the one hand, algorithmically personalized nudges have the potential to vastly improve human daily lives. On the other hand, blindly outsourcing the development and implementation of nudges to “black box” AI systems means that the ultimate reasons for why such nudges work, that is, the underlying human cognitive processes that they harness, will often be unknown. In this paper, we unpack this concern by considering a series of examples and case studies that demonstrate how AI systems can learn to harness biases in human judgment to reach a specified goal. Drawing on an analogy in a philosophical debate concerning the methodology of economics, we call for the need of an interdisciplinary oversight of AI systems that are tasked and deployed to nudge human behaviours.

Whether multisensory integration exhibits a form of sensitivity to higher cognitive contents matters a lot, given the flow of recent results confirming the existence of so-called ‘semantic effects’ on multisensory integration. Pairs of congruent stimuli, for instance kettle shapes and whistling sounds, are shown to be more integrated than pairs of incongruent or noncongruent ones, for instance kettle shapes and barking sounds, or flashes and bips. Should this contrast be explained by the influence of beliefs or representations that certain cues belong to the same object? As with unisensory cases, This chapter argues that the method of contrast used to highlight semantic effects cannot distinguish between alternative explanations. As long as the effects can be explained without resorting to costly forms of top-down conceptual influences on perceptual processing, there is no reason to consider the threat of cognitive penetration as serious.