Orkhan Imanov

Cet article cherche à explorer les racines du corps deleuzien au-delà des arguments traditionnels de la philosophie du corps. Dans ce contexte, nous discuterons tout d'abord de la position du dualisme cartésien envers le corps et ses conséquences, qui constituent le point de départ de la philosophie moderne primitive. En même temps, cela reflète les anciennes conceptions traditionnelles du corps. Ces idées décrivent le corps comme un cadavre en soi. Avec Spinoza, puis Nietzsche, le corps et le dualisme âme/esprit sont remplacés par un monisme et un perspectivisme. Dans cette perspective, la question « que peut faire un corps? » est posée. S'appuyant sur les philosophies de Spinoza et Nietzsche, Deleuze décrit le corps comme un vaste principe de potentialité. Ce corps apparaît constamment comme la dimension de la multiplicité qui se construit elle-même. Ainsi, dans cet article, tout en discutant de la manière dont la position vis-à-vis du concept de corps change de Descartes à Deleuze au niveau ontologique, nous essayons simultanément de démontrer les capacités d'une nouvelle compréhension du corps.

This article explores the roots of the Deleuzian concept of desire which, as I argue, moves beyond the traditional logic of desire. Initially, the focus is on examining the dogmatic and traditional paradigms accounts of desire grounded in the framework of lack. This is followed by examining a non-dogmatic and nontraditional image of desire, linked to Deleuze’s (and Guattari’s) approach to a new logic of desire in contemporary philosophy. This new logic is deeply rooted in the machinistic production of desire as productive, schizoid, and creative. Throughout this exploration, the goal is to reconstruct Deleuzian or Deleuzoguattarian desire, which challenges the traditional framework of interpreting desire.

The article aims to explore the roots of Deleuzean body beyond the traditional arguments of the philosophy of the body. In this context, firstly, I discuss the attitude of Cartesian dualism toward the body, and its consequences, which form the beginning of early modern philosophy. At the same time, they reflect the old, traditional views on the body. Those visions describe the body as a corpse in itself. With Spinoza and later Nietzsche the body, and soul/mind dualism is replaced with monism and perspectivism. It is from this perspective that the question of “what can a body do?” is posed. Drawing on the philosophies of Spinoza and Nietzsche, Deleuze describes the body as a vast principle of potentiality. Such a body constantly appears as the dimension of the multiplicity that is self-constructing. Therefore, in this article, while discussing how the attitude toward the concept of the body changed from Descartes to Deleuze on the ontological level, I simultaneously try to demonstrate the capabilities of such a new understanding of the body.