Oruj Ismayilov

This monograph investigates the Qur’anic concept of shukr without reducing it to verbal gratitude, emotional thankfulness, or material prosperity. Beginning with the Qur’anic relationship among blessing, human capacities, divine provision, recognition, and action, the study develops an analytical reconstruction in which shukr can be examined as a responsible response to received blessing. The proposed framework distinguishes seeing from recognizing, recognition from acknowledgment, and acknowledgment from responsible response. It then examines the implications of divine source-recognition for human agency, possession, self-attribution, responsibility, social benefit, justice, and accountability. The study deliberately distinguishes direct textual claims from cumulative Qur’anic syntheses and from philosophical or interdisciplinary inferences. Its five-stage model—Seeing, Recognizing, Accepting the Implications, Taking Responsibility, and Acting—is therefore presented as an analytical reconstruction rather than as a formal five-stage doctrine stated by the Qur’an. The monograph’s principal contribution is structural: it systematizes relationships distributed across the Qur’anic corpus and places them within a coherent account of responsible reception while preserving the distinction between Qur’anic evidence and later analytical vocabulary.

Why can reality be known? The problem appears under many headings: the intelligibility of nature, the success of science, the applicability of mathematics, realism, representation, information, consciousness, and meaning. This monograph argues that these discussions intersect around a broader phenomenon that deserves explicit analysis. Reality is not merely orderly; it is repeatedly available for disciplined discovery. Human beings and other epistemic systems can encounter patterns, construct representations, expose them to correction, predict novel results, and accumulate knowledge across persons and generations. The study calls this phenomenon readability. Readability is defined as the objective availability of reality to constrained, corrigible, and progressively integrative inquiry. The concept is distinguished from order, intelligibility, information, meaning, and signification. Naturalism, physicalism, structural realism, informational and mathematical ontologies, and classical theism are compared without assuming that scientific success deductively proves any one of them. The final movement studies the Qurʾānic concept of āyāt as a framework in which revelation, nature, history, and the human self can function as domains of indication. The conclusion is deliberately qualified: the Qurʾānic theistic framework possesses distinctive resources for unifying objective order, the possibility of knowers, epistemic normativity, and signification, though the inference remains open to philosophical criticism.

This monograph advances a cumulative philosophical argument for what it terms the ‘readability thesis’: the claim that the universe exhibits persistent structural compatibility with intelligibility, symbolic information, consciousness, moral awareness, and existential orientation in a manner that exceeds what a purely mechanistic account of nature can coherently explain. The argument does not proceed from alleged gaps in scientific explanation—a strategy that remains permanently vulnerable to the progress of inquiry—but rather from the philosophically significant convergence of phenomena that collectively suggest a deeper ontological orientation within the fabric of existence itself. Drawing on resources from philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and Qurʾānic epistemology, the work develops its thesis across three interconnected investigations. Part One examines the intelligibility of the cosmos: the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics, the informational architecture of biological systems, and the extraordinary precision of cosmological fine- tuning. Part Two turns to the interior dimensions of existence: the irreducibility of subjective consciousness, the epistemological problem posed by the human orientation toward truth, the phenomenology of moral obligation and aesthetic experience, and the universal human confrontation with mortality and transcendence. Part Three situates these inquiries within the framework of Qurʾānic epistemology, arguing that the classical Islamic concept of āyāt—reality as a field of intelligible signs—provides a philosophically sophisticated account of how nature, consciousness, and revelation may be understood as interconnected dimensions of communicative intelligibility. The study concludes by arguing for tawḥīd—divine unity—not merely as theological assertion but as the most coherent metaphysical explanation for why reality consistently and cumulatively discloses rather than conceals. The work engages throughout with thinkers including Eugene Wigner, Thomas Nagel, David Chalmers, Alvin Plantinga, Roger Penrose, Paul Davies, Viktor Frankl, Charles Taylor, David Bentley Hart, Toshihiko Izutsu, Muḥammad Iqbal, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, and Fazlur Rahman, among others.

This study examines the relationship between scientific inquiry, consciousness, and the Qurʾānic concept of āyāt (signs). It argues that the perceived conflict between science and religion often stems not from science itself but from scientism—the extension of scientific methodology into a comprehensive metaphysical worldview. The study first distinguishes methodological science from scientism and explores the implications of this distinction for the science–religion debate. It then analyzes the Qurʾānic concept of āyāt, arguing that the Qurʾān presents the cosmos as ordered, intelligible, and open to rational investigation. Finally, the paper engages contemporary debates on consciousness, mathematics, and the limits of reductionism. Drawing on analytic philosophy, philosophy of mind, philosophy of religion, and classical Islamic thought, it proposes that the Qurʾānic notion of āyāt provides a framework in which cosmic intelligibility and conscious subjectivity are philosophically interconnected rather than accidental. The study neither treats scientific gaps as proof of theism nor claims that the Qurʾān contains hidden scientific predictions, but argues that the exclusion of metaphysical reflection remains philosophically contested.

This study aims to re-examine the concepts of Destiny (Qadar), Free Will (Iradah), and Trial (Imtihan)—which are frequently misinterpreted in both the history of Islamic thought and contemporary social perception—through an interdisciplinary lens within the framework of the Qur’an’s system of universal laws (Sunnatullah). The primary problematic of this article is the concealment of human responsibility by shrouding oppressions, grave crimes, and biological negligences resulting from human volition in a metaphysical veil of “fate” or “trial.” Grounded in the principles of determinism and causality, this research elucidates the ontological distinctions between “active agency” and “passive fatalism” through striking cases such as the condition of children born with disabilities due to parental substance abuse, instances of sexual violence, and systemic social injustices. The fundamental findings demonstrate that oppression is not a divine decree but a human violation of the Sunnatullah; that victimhood is not a “predestined lot” but an “injustice” necessitating the pursuit of justice; and that a true trial is the process of an individual constructing their own destiny through their choices. Ultimately, the study proposes a “Revolution of Volition” centered on reason, science, and moral responsibility to liberate Islamic societies from the spiral of inertia and fatalistic resignation.

This article argues that the Qurʾānic obligation of worship is a necessary discipline of remembrance (zikr) against human forgetfulness (nisyān). As God is free of need, worship is not a practice benefiting the divine but a normative structure that reorients the human subject, stabilizes moral agency, and integrates remembrance into embodied life. A thematic–conceptual reading of the Qurʾān, combined with anthropological and teleological analysis, shows how zikr is institutionalized through obligatory practices, preventing it from being merely intermittent. Classical perspectives (al-Ghazālī, Ibn Rushd) clarify the relation between ritual, intention, and ethical formation. Common objections, such as sustaining morality without ritual, are addressed by examining the problem of continuity in moral life. The study concludes that obligation functions not as coercion, but as a structural guarantee for the persistence of remembrance in a forgetful human condition.

In contemporary and premodern discourse alike, the concept of striving (jihād) has frequently been reduced to fighting (qitāl), producing a persistent semantic and normative conflation. This study argues that such an identification constitutes a categorical mistake that obscures the Qur’anic conceptual architecture. Through a text-centered, semantic, and context-sensitive analysis, it shows that striving (jihād) is constructed in the Qur’an as a comprehensive normative framework of moral, intellectual, and social struggle, whereas fighting (qitāl) is presented as a conditional and strictly limited act, permitted only under specific circumstances and regulated by explicit ethical constraints. The Qur’anic usage of both terms is examined through their distinct semantic fields and discursive functions, demonstrating that the former cannot be collapsed into the latter without distorting the text’s normative priorities. Classical Islamic thinkers such as Ghazali and Ibn Rushd are engaged as part of a critical dialogue, not as decisive authorities, to illuminate how ethical intention, proportionality, and moral agency were historically conceptualized. It is concluded that reducing striving (jihād) to fighting (qitāl) impoverishes the Qur’anic moral horizon and reverses the intended relationship between ethical ends and contingent means, and that conceptual clarity requires reaffirming the Qur’an’s distinction between normative struggle and conditional warfare.

This study demonstrates that Qur’an 17:1 describes a divinely initiated movement from epistemological darkness toward illumination—a pedagogical narrative rather than a geographical travelogue. Through semantic analysis and literary examination, the research reveals that the verse’s minimalist structure directs interpretation toward theological meaning rather than physical mechanics. The Qur’anic text provides only essentials: divine agency, nocturnal timing, two locations (al-Masjid al-Ḥarām and al-Masjid al-Aqṣā), and explicit purpose—“so that We might show him some of Our signs.” This contrasts sharply with elaborate ḥadīth narratives describing celestial mounts, heavenly ascensions, and encounters with previous prophets. Semantic analysis reveals that key terms (isrā, layl, āyāt) carry meanings beyond literal reference. Critically, Qur’an 17:12 designates night and day as “two signs” representing obscurity and illumination, providing an internal hermeneutical key for reading the “night journey” as symbolic transition. The study demonstrates precedents in al-Ghazālī, Ibn Rushd, and Ibn ‘Arabī, who recognized multiple levels of scriptural meaning. By applying tafsīr al-Qur’ān bi al-Qur’ān through contemporary methodologies, this research contributes to conversations about Qur’anic hermeneutics and how sacred narratives communicate transformative truth—the eternal journey from darkness toward divine light.

This study critically examines intercession (shafāʿah) and religious mediation in Islamic thought from a Qur'an-centric monotheistic (tawḥīd) perspective. Contemporary popular religiosity often ties salvation to the intercession of sanctified figures—prophets, saints (awliyāʾ), or shaykhs—creating tension with tawḥīd and the Qur'anic emphasis on individual responsibility. This research identifies the sources of this tension and establishes the Qur'anic boundaries of intercession. Employing an interdisciplinary methodology, the study analyzes intercession's semantic and theological framework through classical exegetical (tafsīr) and theological (kalām) traditions. It examines the prophetic office as exemplar rather than mediator, the sociological construction of religious authority, and the psychological dimensions of intercession as responsibility evasion. Hadith reports are evaluated using the "referral to the Qur'an" method (al-ʿarḍ ʿalā al-Qurʾān), engaging classical and modern thinkers including Ibn Taymiyyah, al-Ghazālī, Muḥammad ʿAbduh, ʿAlī Sharīʿatī, Muḥammad Iqbāl, and Malik Bennabi. Findings demonstrate that Qur'anic intercession belongs exclusively to God as exceptional grace dependent on His will. The expectation of intercession erodes moral responsibility, fosters passive dependency, and compromises tawḥīd's practical application. The study proposes the "Conscious Believer" model, grounded in unmediated worship, active responsibility ethics, critical reasoning, and social empowerment. This framework establishes tawḥīd not as mere theological doctrine but as a practical-ethical stance liberating individuals from mediating systems while demanding personal accountability. Keywords: Tawḥīd, Intercession (Shafāʿah), Individual Responsibility, Islamic Thought, Qur'anic Studies, Religious Authority

The disconnected letters (ḥurūf al-muqaṭṭaʿāt)—letter combinations such as Alif-Lam-Mim and Ha-Mim that appear at the beginning of twenty-nine Quranic suras—have long constituted one of the most enduring interpretive challenges in Islamic scholarship. Classical exegetes generally adopted tafwīḍ, entrusting their meaning to God alone, while many modern approaches have pursued numerological or symbolic explanations. Despite centuries of sustained inquiry, no scholarly consensus has emerged regarding what these letters mean. This monograph proposes a methodological reorientation by shifting the central question from meaning to function. Instead of asking “What do these letters mean?”, it investigates “What do these letters do within the structure of the Qur’anic text?” Drawing on reader-response theory, cognitive psychology, and close textual analysis, the study argues that the disconnected letters function as structural thresholds that calibrate readers’ cognitive and epistemic orientation at the openings of specific suras. Through systematic examination of their placement, distribution, and correlation with textual features, the study advances three principal findings. First, the selective distribution of the disconnected letters reflects functional deployment: suras that do not begin with these letters consistently employ alternative threshold mechanisms, such as praise formulas, oaths, or imperatives. Second, distinct letter groups correlate with different discourse types, including pedagogical exposition, polemical defense, and prophetic narrative. Third, the disconnected letters operate simultaneously as cognitive disruptors, acoustic attention-markers, and devices that activate reader engagement. By focusing on observable structural patterns rather than speculative semantic decoding, this functional interpretation accounts for features that semantic approaches have struggled to explain, while remaining consistent with the principle of epistemic humility articulated in the classical tradition. The study thus offers a structural-functional framework for understanding how non-semantic textual elements contribute to the communicative architecture of the Qur’an.

This study examines eternal hell (jahannam) from a Qur’anic perspective, addressing the critique that infinite punishment for finite life contradicts divine justice. Through analysis of key verses (Q 4:145, 39:71, 61:5, 63:10, 23:19), it demonstrates that hell is not arbitrary punishment but the ontological consequence of dispositional orientations that individuals have volitionally cultivated and fixated during their earthly existence. The concept of “ontological fixation” provides a coherent interpretive framework for understanding Qur’anic expressions such as the “sealing of hearts” (khatm al-qalb) and the irreversibility of persistent misguidance. These concepts signify not divine determinism but the culmination of a process initiated and sustained by human choice, in which repeated rejection of truth transforms moral orientation into an immutable existential state. The stratified structure of hell reflects precise correspondence between degrees of moral-spiritual corruption and eschatological consequence, presented in symmetrical relation to paradise. This study integrates classical exegesis (al-Ṭabarī, al-Rāzī, al-Zamakhsharī) with contemporary scholarship (Rahman, Izutsu, Abou El Fadl) to demonstrate that eternal hell derives not from temporal duration but from the permanence of character. Divine mercy and intercession are evaluated within this ontological framework, presenting a coherent response to both classical theological debates and modern critiques of divine justice. Keywords: Qur’an, eternal hell, ontological fixation, divine justice, moral responsibility, afterlife, human agency, cognitive dimension Keywords: Qur’an, eternal hell, ontological fixation, divine justice, moral responsibility, human agency

The apparent tension between evolutionary biology and traditional Islamic narratives of human creation has long posed challenges for contemporary Muslim scholarship. This study proposes a synthetic philosophical-theological model that integrates paleoanthropological evidence with Qur’anic metaphysics, arguing that biological evolution and divine creation are not mutually exclusive but represent complementary dimensions of human origins. Central to this framework is the ontological distinction between bashar (the biological human organism) and insān (the morally responsible, volitionally autonomous human being). While acknowledging that Homo sapiens emerged through evolutionary processes spanning approximately 300,000 years, this model posits that the essential qualities defining humanity—consciousness, free will, and moral accountability—were realized through a metaphysical intervention described in the Qur’an as nafkh al-rūḥ (the inbreathing of the spirit). Adam is thus reinterpreted not as the first biological member of the species, but as the first volitional individual, marking humanity’s transition from biological determinism to moral agency. Drawing upon classical Islamic philosophy, particularly the hylomorphic tradition of Ibn Sīnā and the theological anthropology of al-Māturīdī, alongside contemporary philosophy of mind, this study addresses the “hard problem of consciousness” and offers an explanatory framework that respects both scientific data and revealed knowledge. The model’s practical implications extend to Islamic pedagogy, hermeneutics, and the religion-science dialogue, providing methodological tools for reconciling empirical findings with theological commitments.