Òscar Castro

The slime mould Physarum polycephalum has been used in developing unconventional computing devices for in which the slime mould played a role of a sensing, actuating, and computing device. These devices treated the slime mould as an active living substrate, yet it is a self-consistent living creature which evolved over millions of years and occupied most parts of the world, but in any case, that living entity did not own true cognition, just automated biochemical mechanisms. To “rehabilitate” slime mould from the rank of a purely living electronics element to a “creature of thoughts” we are analyzing the cognitive potential of P. polycephalum. We base our theory of minimal cognition of the slime mould on a bottom-up approach, from the biological and biophysical nature of the slime mould and its regulatory systems using frameworks such as Lyon’s biogenic cognition, Muller, di Primio-Lengelerś modifiable pathways, Bateson's “patterns that connect” framework, Maturana's autopoietic network, or proto-consciousness and Morgan's Canon.

In recent years, rewilding theories and initiatives have gained momentum as a credible solution to the loss of ecological diversity and stability. However, rewilding remains a controversial theory that draws our attention to the multiple links between intervention, history, and the value of nonhuman capacity for self-organization. Tracing the history of practices and theoretical frameworks of some emblematic projects and proposals in this field, we focus on the shortcomings and theoretical challenges of functional approaches, including notions of functional equivalence, and the difficulties posed by counterfactual reference points. At the heart of this analysis are the contradictions that some of these approaches pose with the crucial goal of rewilding, which is, in principle, to preserve immanence and spontaneous organization. By way of conclusion, the recommendation to deepen reflection on the past for a genuine and ethically sound incorporation of the feral into everyday life is presented.

En Self-Constitution. Agency, Identity, and Integrity (2009), Christine Korsgaard defiende la conclusión de que el imperativo categórico rige la acción humana porque es el único principio que permite alcanzar la unidad psíquica plena, la cual, según Korsgaard, es un prerrequisito esencial para la acción efectiva. Para los agentes humanos, alcanzar esa unidad -que consiste en hacer coherentes distintos impulsos hacia la acción- es una actividad constante, denominada "autoconstitución". De acuerdo con Korsgaard, ésta es la fuente originaria de la normatividad y de las identidades prácticas e incluso de la identidad personal. Después de exponer las ideas centrales del libro, presento dos objeciones: primero, critico la equiparación del imperativo categórico con la autoconstitución exitosa, pues no toda falla de auto-constitución es una falla moral. Segundo, argumento que la tesis de que la identidad personal es producto de la autoconstitución es problemática y que, al defenderla, Korsgaard confunde identidad práctica con identidad personal. In Self-Constitution. Agency, Identity, and Integrity (2009), Christine Korsgaard argues that the categorical imperative rules human action because it is the sole principle that allows us to reach the complete psychic unity that, Korsgaard thinks, is an essential prerequisite for effective action. Reaching this unity -which consists in making cohere diverging impulses for action- is for human agents a constant activity called "self-constitution." According to Korsgaard, this activity is the source of normativity, of human practical identities and even of personal identity. After explaining the main ideas of the book, I present two objections. First, I criticize the linkage of the categorical imperative to successful self-constitution, for not every failure of the latter counts as a moral failure. Second, I argue that the thesis that personal identity is a product of self-constitution is problematic and that it betrays a confusion between practical identity and personal identity

This paper discusses the meaning of an image rarely used within the religious and philosophical corpus of ancient India in order to describe the ultimate nature of God and the human being: a wall or canvas (Sanskrit, bhitti). The usage of such a peculiar image belongs to Abhinavagupta, the great exegete of the Tantric tradition who lived in Kashmir between the tenth and eleventh centuries A.D. After presenting some antecedents, the paper focuses on key passages taken fromAbhinavagupta’s work and shows how, far from being secondary, the image of a wall possesses a remarkable consistency and expressive power in accordance withAbhinavagupta’s doctrinal presuppositions, in particular his commitment to a dynamic and ultimately paradoxical view of the divine realm, the universe and salvation.