Óscar L. González-Castán

This book proposes a new set of concepts in epistemology and philosophy of science and provides a novel account of theory change using the notions of epistemic vulnerability, asymmetric fallibilism, and epistemic verisimilitude in a non-Popperian sense. The examination of the notion of epistemic vulnerability is inspired by a dissatisfaction with classical fallibilism as it unnecessarily emphasizes the possibility of error rather than the possibility of epistemic success in its various forms (truth, fruitful mistakes, etc.). The book follows this up by providing a different approach to theory change in science using the notion of increasing degrees of epistemic verisimilitude in which empirical and pragmatic successes go hand in hand with different kinds of error. As a consequence, it proposes a distinctive epistemological stance towards the history of science, namely, that of an epistemological agnosticism cum rational epistemic hope. This new model of theory change, and its application to several moments in the history of science, provides the groundwork for criticizing the main arguments in favor of realism, anti-realism, and semi-realism. The account that is put forward avoids the main flaws of these three contenders but collects many of their virtues. This new approach and the laid groundwork make the book a valuable asset for researchers in epistemology and philosophy of science, including professional philosophers and post-graduate students.

Vulnerability has become part of our everyday vocabulary. We are used to hearing that we ought to act so as to protect the highly vulnerable; the qualifier suggests that we are all vulnerable. In addition to being of contemporary relevance, the notion of vulnerability has also been at the heart of philosophical reflection since the birth of the discipline, playing a vital role across many different traditions. Its prevalence is unsurprising. Vulnerability, which partially defines us as human beings, has appeared in many guises: mortality, finitude, sin, ignorance, etc. However, no attempt has yet been made to fully apply the notion of vulnerability to the domains of epistemology and the philosophy of science, to relate it to our general human vulnerability, and to explore the wide range of consequences that derive from it. The contributors of this book fill this gap; they present new approaches to classical problems. They highlight different aspects of our cognitive vulnerability, from issues related to the realism/antirealism debate to reflections on epistemic success and trust.

Debates in epistemology and the philosophy of science have regarded fallibilism to be a central characteristic of our beliefs and scientific theories. Two antagonistic attitudes have arisen from this starting point: realism and anti-realism. I will argue that this dichotomy can be avoided by replacing fallibilism with the more neutral notion of cognitive vulnerability. Our search for knowledge is vulnerable for three reasons: (i) we can make mistakes of various sorts; (ii) we can identify our errors by improving our research methods and the quantity and quality of the relevant data; and (iii) we can express certain truths about the world. The first two points are relatively uncontroversial. The third, however, presents more difficulty. Nevertheless, by changing our theories under certain conditions, we can enhance their cognitive verisimilitude and the possibility of achieving cognitive success. The notion of cognitive vulnerability can counterbalance both realism and anti-realism.

In this paper I shall argue that Tim Williamson’s argument for the anti-luminosity of many mental states faces difficult logical, psychological and epistemological problems. From a logical point of view, his argument is correct. However, the contrary argument that says that the anti-luminosity thesis does not necessarily follow from it is also correct. This opens a sceptical scenario. Hence, if Williamson wants to convince us that we should rationally prefer his argument rather than the other, he needs to add considerations that are not merely logical. These are psychological and epistemological in nature. However, none of these considerations is convincing.

In this paper I shall propose the sketch of an explanatory model to deal with cases of weakness of will that has some advantages in comparison with other well-known and influential theories. The main thesis of this model, of classical inspiration, is that the weak-willed agent should be portrayed as someone who has a sort of divided self. The development of this idea will allow us to place back desire to the central stage in the explanation of this phenomenon. According to this model we do not need to give up the idea that the agent forms and maintains an unconditional intention of doing the action that he finally fails to do, as Davidson’s epistemic version of the phenomenon proposes, but we do no need to rely on the idea that there is a causal gap between intentions and actions, as Searle’s ontological version of it makes us think.

The philosophical project of providing appropriate conceptual resources to sketch concrete aspects of human life may have a twofold dimension. On the one hand, it might be considered as a descriptive enterprise. In such a case, the philosopher thinks of himself or herself as someone who does not try to change anything as if it were in need of some kind of refinement or improvement. Perhaps it might need some kind of clarification (phenomenological, linguistic, anthropological, historical, etc.), but clarification is always something relative to us. It is an act of changing the way we look at things but not of changing how things actually are. It is also a question of showing, not in Wittgenstein’s technical terms, but in the sense in which a radiograph shows the non-visible yet always present and solid, inner bone structure of a body. To some extent, both Husserl and Wittgenstein share this descriptive approach to the relationship between philosophy and human life. Husserl’s motto “Back to the things themselves” and Wittgenstein’s remark “everything lies open to view” could be interpreted in this non-disruptive and somehow humble, descriptive conception of philosophy. In this sense, they share a kind of polemical “radiographic” conception of philosophy that might be regarded as a very peculiar cultural enterprise. However the descriptive approach to philosophical problems should not be considered in all cases as an antagonising partner of the normative approach unless one takes as valid a strong transcendental Kantian viewpoint. The skeleton of a particular body can be described and, at the same time, be considered as an a priori, non-transcendental structure for the normal functioning not only of the living body to which it belongs but also as an a priori structure for the normal, average functioning of all the bodies of the same kind. Bodies that lack this kind of skeleton might suffer from various anomalies or diseases. Thus, such a radiograph might be regarded as a representative of the norm with which all average human bodies actually comply. Normativity, in this sense, is compatible with a descriptive approach. Husserl and Wittgenstein’s philosophies also provide, in different ways, valuable transcultural structures, dynamisms and abstract contents of human life. Making explicit these structures, dynamisms and contents requires one proceeding in a piecemeal way by distinguishing three different levels of analysis. The content of these different levels will be provided by some central statements of Husserl and Wittgenstein. More particularly, I shall consider some implications of the notions of Lebenswelt and Lebensform that are attached to their names, respectively.

En este ensayo propongo un modelo teórico para comprender el significado y alcance de los acuerdos racionales a partir de una concepción determinada de las relaciones entre justificación y verdad. Desde este modelo, al que denomino “acuerdo como signo”, se puede sostener que no todo consenso racional que surge dentro de una comunidad humana, incluidas las científicas, tiene por qué remitir única y exclusivamente a las creencias de ese grupo social y a sus modos internos de justificarlas sin que ellas supongan nunca una ventana abierta al mundo, como sostiene sin asomo de dudas el etnocentrismo de Rorty. Frente al modelo propuesto y valorado desde él, el modelo que sostiene Rorty supone un caso de sinécdoque

Son muchas las cuestiones que en la reflexión epistemológica contemporánea se han ido acumulando en torno a la doctrina coherentista de la verdad y la justificación. En este artículo propongo un conjunto de distinciones sistemáticamente organizadas para orientarse en la forma en que todos estos problemas encajan entre sí. Fundamentalmente estas distinciones tiene que ver con los aspectos descriptivos y prescriptivos que tienen las siguientes preguntas: ¿Cuál ha sido la creencia que pide paso en nuestro sistema de creencias? ¿Es racional aceptarla? ¿Cómo se ha realizado lógicamente la acomodación de la nueva creencia? ¿Se ha hecho siguiendo procedimientos racionales fiables? ¿Cómo se ha formado de hecho el sistema de creencias del que partimos? ¿Ha sido racional este proceso de formación? ¿Qué estructura tiene nuestro sistema de creencias? ¿Podemos revisar racionalmente esta estructura? ¿Es verdadero o racional el sistema de creencias resultante?

This paper addresses four different, albeit related, issues concerning Hilary Putnam's fact/value entanglement theory. It is organized around a series of questions. First, what set of problems does the theory attempt to resolve? The revision of the empiricists and the positivist traditions will be the main concern of this first section. Secondly, how does the notion of "fact/value entanglement" solves these problems? I argue that while Putnam has persuasively defended the possibility of an entanglement between descriptive functions and evaluative functions at the level of language use, he nevertheless provides us with only indirect indications about the existence and properties of the bearers of this kind of entanglement; namely the assumed existence of thick ethical concepts and their necessity for some central human practices. These indirect signs are not sufficient to buttress Putnam's entanglement thesis between facts and values. Thirdly, what are the most appropriate candidates to play the role of bearers of the description/evaluation entanglement? I challenge the claim that the ontological notion of entanglement between facts and values, itself obscure, is indispensable. Instead, I argue that we can substitute the idea of fact/value entanglement for the simpler, and less problematic, notion of human action. Finally, does Putnam commit a petitio pincipii when he attempts to lay down the criteria by which to judge if a thick ethical concept is being appropriately used in a given situation? I argue that Putnam faces what I shall call "Nietzsche's problem" - the problem of not prejudging, in giving the relevant examples for the discussion, how the situation should be morally valued

In this paper I shall briefly analyze Husserl’s and Wittgenstein’s divergent reactions against the positivist stance on natural science and on the new cultural role that philosophy should play in relation to science. To a great extent, their philosophies can be considered as a departure from positivism, although for quite different reasons. I shall argue that Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus, took positivism as a starting point that he tried to overcome from within. This endeavor led him to defend some theses of a pragmatist flavour as well as a peculiar type of radical agnosticism on ontological and epistemological issues. Husserl, however, considered that positivism was a dead-end for philosophy. Positivism has beheaded philosophy as a consequence of advancing a reductive view of science. Phenomenology is the attempt to understand the genetic and subjective processes that have ended up in an objective and scientific image of the world.