Oskari Sivula

In this paper, we characterise the field of space research ethics and the moral and political landscape it operates on. To lay the groundwork for our ethical analysis, we begin by introducing the diverse ways space research is conducted in practice and by discussing ongoing changes in its operational environment. We note that space research is necessary to facilitate our modern way of life and is integral to green and digital transformation. Following that, we identify key space research ethical issues in different domains and suggest tentative elements that trigger the need for research to undergo ethical review, to forward discussion and debate. The difficulty is to find suitable guidelines that are defined clearly enough to be action-guiding but simultaneously broad enough to address the complexity and global nature of space research. In the long term, the most feasible approach may be to define a tailored set of research ethical guidelines for particular fields, particular space environments, and particular research goals. We further address how the collective and global nature of space activities adds additional layers of challenges regarding the research ethical responsibility of the scientific community. In this context, we suggest that research ethics is not only a set of specific moral codes developed as a professional ethic for researchers, but also an institutionalised way to guide and support research activities and the integrity of researchers to maintain trust within the research community and the society at large.

In five articles and an introduction, this dissertation contributes to the emerging field of space ethics by exploring questions about environmental ethics in outer space, considered from a long-term perspective. In particular, it examines directed panspermia, which refers to the deliberate introduction of rudimentary lifeforms onto uninhabited celestial bodies in order to initiate biospheres beyond Earth. Such an act, if possible, could constitute humanity's most significant biological cosmic footprint. The central claims of this study are the following. Given uncertainty surrounding life beyond Earth, and given the fact that life on Earth will eventually end, we have compelling reasons to use directed panspermia as a way to safeguard life originating on Earth—either to efficiently promote value, or to conserve what is valuable. But there are major objections to this proposal, including the risks of interfering with potential indigenous life at a target planet and propagating suffering if, over time, sentient beings arise on the seeded planet. The objections’ strength depends on unresolved empirical and moral uncertainties. As a result, directed panspermia may turn out either extremely good or extremely bad. In light of this difficult choice, I argue for caution regarding biological contamination. Along the way I also consider two other objections to directed panspermia: appeals to the “unnaturalness” of planetary seeding, and the values of abiotic environments. While these factors may impact the permissibility of exoplanetary seeding, I argue that they are not as weighty as concerns about interference and suffering, especially when we measure them against the potential value of preserving the story of Earth-originating life in the cosmos.

Plant ethics has its own set of questions, concepts, and philosophical assumptions, of which many are novel and call for original ways of thinking. This chapter focuses on how some common methods in philosophical theorizing, such as analogies and thought experiments, fare in the context of plant ethics. Based on plant ethics literature, we identify and examine two methodological strategies for plant ethics. The first strategy focuses on finding possible morally relevant similarities between plants and animals, including humans. Based on these similarities, familiar arguments from animal and traditional ethics can be extended to plant ethics. This can be called the extensionist strategy. Our focus will be on analogy argumentation and analysis. The second strategy focuses on highlighting an ontological division between plants and animals. According to this strategy, morally relevant properties are different for plants than they are for animals. This will be called the otherness strategy. Here our focus will be on conceptual analysis, and we will discuss a constructive and deconstructive approach.

Longtermism, the view that emphasizes the importance of the long-term consequences of our actions, has predominantly been focused on humans. Gary O’Brien (2024) argues that this is a mistake and instead, longtermism should be animal inclusive. While I find merit in O’Brien’s core argument, I offer critiques to certain aspects of it in this article. Moreover, in the spirit of extending the sphere of moral considerability, I believe that we should also consider longtermism for environmental values more widely. This article proposes a non-anthropocentric approach to longtermism that acknowledges not only sentient animals but also ecological systems and all forms of life to invoke a more diverse discussion about longtermism. It also explores potentially effective interventions that such an extended perspective might yield.

The ethical, societal, and political issues of Mars settlement seem like very distant problems, both spatially and temporally. However, there is a certain urgency to these matters. Whatever humanity does in the coming decades will affect generations upon generations of future humans and other living beings, as well as their environments. The initial agreements about how resources are governed and what kind of regime is established can persist for a long time. There can be a “Founder Effect” in space. This engenders questions about where to begin. Are the primary goals scientific, political, or economic? Will they be realised through international cooperation, or as a private enterprise? Will the first steps be taken in a just manner and for the common good? A settlement can become “locked-in” to initial technological, economic, behavioural, or political solutions, or caught in path dependencies. Inertia can take hold. Moreover, the process of designing and planning Mars settlements can itself become locked in this way, burdened by problematic histories, colonialist ways of thinking about settlements, and problematic values. It may even be the case that humans are neither technologically nor socially ready to settle other worlds.

This chapter examines planetary engineering and human-made biospheres from the perspective of the concept of (un)naturalness using terraformed Mars as a case study. It has been suggested that in the future it may be possible to make Mars habitable for life from Earth. This hypothetical process is known as terraforming or planetary ecosynthesis. The possibility of establishing a biosphere on Mars, or some other celestial body, opens up an interesting case of a biosphere that is unnatural. Furthermore, the concept of natural is central to many arguments in environmental ethics. For example, it has been suggested that the value of an ecosystem is dependent upon its history – it being natural of origin. Naturalness and unnaturalness discussions have centered around two questions. First, is naturalness morally relevant or should it otherwise affect decision-making? Second, how can naturalness be understood in different cases? This chapter addresses both questions in relation to terraforming Mars. First, it analyzes in what sense terraformed Mars and its biosphere would be unnatural. Second, it examines whether its unnaturalness undermines the value of the biosphere, and thus gives an important criterion for deciding whether humans should aim to terraform extraterrestrial environments or not.

The on-going space settlement debate has raised questions whether it is possible to settle other planets, and if it was, is it something humans should do. The problem with this space ethical discussion is that it can easily become too vague. To avoid this problem, we suggest a framework for identifying relevant variables that affect the feasibility constraints and desirability factors of establishing space settlements. The variables we focus on include the settlement stage, scale and time frame. Based on the relevant literature, we take mission cost, survival, habitation, water, in situ resources for food, oxygen and fuel energy and dependence on Earth as feasibility constraints that are relevant for the framework. None of them are hard constraints, but rather soft feasibility constraints that make it difficult to establish a permanent human settlement on Mars in the near- to medium-term future. However, in the past, humanity has achieved goals that first seemed infeasible. To justify the costs and effort, the goal must be highly morally desirable. We discuss five different desirability factors that could help justify the effort but as each framework has unique feasibility constraints, not all of these factors are sufficient or necessary to justify this effort. We argue that some of the desirability factors prominent in space ethical literature are not sufficient or necessary in our framework, and thus, we conclude that the normative grounds for establishing a permanent Mars settlement in the foreseeable future are weak.

The possibility of employing human enhancement interventions to aid in future space missions has been gaining attention lately. These possibilities have included one of the more controversial kinds of enhancements: biomedical moral enhancement. However, the discussion has thus far remained on a rather abstract level. In this paper we further this conversation by looking more closely at what type of interventions with what sort of effects we should expect when we are talking about biomedical moral enhancements. We suggest that a more grounded way to picture moral enhancement, at least in the near term, is to envision a form of cognitive enhancement that also provides some moral benefits by heightening the enhanced person's capability for acting according to their own subjective moral code. While this concept of moral adherence enhancement also has relevance for the moral enhancement discussion more widely, in this paper we apply it specifically in the context of space missions. We argue that there are weighty reasons to consider making biomedical enhancements of the proposed kind a mandatory feature of early-phase long-distance space travel because these missions are high-stakes in nature and take place in an environment where the enhancement could be seen as conferring important advantages while negating many of the traditional arguments weighed against it.

The possibility of seeding other planets with life poses a tricky dilemma. On the one hand, directed panspermia might be extremely good, while, on the other, it might be extremely bad depending on what factors are taken into consideration. Therefore, we need to understand better what is ethically at stake with planetary seeding. I map out possible conditions under which humanity should spread life to other solar systems. I identify two key variables that affect the desirability of propagating life throughout the galaxy. The first is axiological and depends on which value theory in environmental ethics is correct. The second is empirical and depends on whether life is common or not in our region of the universe. I also consider two ethical objections to an interplanetary life-seeding mission: the risk of interfering with indigenous life and the risk of increasing suffering in our galaxy.