• Walters State Community College
    Department Of Philosophy
    Assistant Professor
  • University of Tennessee, Knoxville
    Department of Philosophy
    Other faculty (Postdoc, Visiting, etc)
  •  1
  •  3
  •  18
    Shabo on logical versions of the Direct Argument
    Philosophical Studies 173 (8): 2125-2132. 2016.
    In a recent paper, Seth Shabo sets out to show that logical renderings of the Direct Argument for incompatibilism about moral responsibility and causal determinism, an influential incompatibilist argument for this conclusion, fail. In particular, Shabo argues that the Direct Argument—cashed out in logical terms—fails because it rests on an invalid rule of inference, Rule B. Shabo argues that Rule B, rendered logically, is subject to a counterexample that he constructs. If he’s right about this, …Read more
  •  39
    Rule A
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (4): 580-595. 2018.
    Rule A: if it's metaphysically necessary that p, we may validly infer that no one is even partly morally responsible for the fact that p. Our principal aim in this article is to highlight the importance of this rule and to respond to two recent challenges to it. We argue that rule A is more important to contemporary theories of moral responsibility than has previously been recognized. We then consider two recent challenges to the rule and argue that neither challenge successfully undermines the …Read more
  • High-resolution 7t fMRI of human hippocampal subfields during associative learning
    with N. A. Suthana, M. Donix, D. R. Wozny, A. Bazih, M. Jones, R. M. Heidemann, R. Trampel, A. D. Ekstrom, M. Scharf, B. Knowlton, and S. Y. Bookheimer
    © 2015 Massachusetts Institute of Technology.Examining the function of individual human hippocampal subfields remains challenging because of their small sizes and convoluted structures. Previous human fMRI studies at 3 T have successfully detected differences in activation between hippo-campal cornu ammonis field CA1, combined CA2, CA3, and dentate gyrus region, and the subiculum during associative memory tasks. In this study, we investigated hippocampal subfield activity in healthy participants…Read more
  •  32
    More on Defending Religious Exclusivism
    Faith and Philosophy 32 (2): 188-204. 2015.
    In his “Plantinga on Exclusivisim,” Richard Feldman argues that Alvin Plantinga, in an earlier paper, has not sufficiently addressed a particular problem for the religious exclusivist. The particular problem that Feldman thinks Plantinga has failed sufficiently to address is the problem of epistemic peer disagreement—that is, disagreement between two (or more) equally competent thinkers who share equally good reasons for, and are in equally good epistemic situations regarding, their contradicto…Read more
  •  45
    In his “Plantinga on Exclusivisim,” Richard Feldman argues that Alvin Plantinga, in an earlier paper, has not sufficiently addressed a particular problem for the religious exclusivist. The particular problem that Feldman thinks Plantinga has failed sufficiently to address is the problem of epistemic peer disagreement—that is, disagreement between two (or more) equally competent thinkers who share equally good reasons for, and are in equally good epistemic situations regarding, their contradicto…Read more
  •  335
    Truth and Moral Responsibility
    In Fabio Bacchini Massimo Dell'Utri & Stefano Caputo (eds.), New Advances in Causation, Agency, and Moral Responsibility, Cambridge Scholars Press. forthcoming.
    Most philosophers who study moral responsibility have done so in isolation of the concept of truth. Here, I show that thinking about the nature of truth has profound consequences for discussions of moral responsibility. In particular, by focusing on the very trivial nature of truth—that truth depends on the world and not the other way around—we can see that widely accepted counterexamples to one of the most influential incompatibilist arguments can be shown not only to be false, but also impos…Read more
  •  326
    Jesus' return as lottery puzzle: a reply to Donald Smith
    Religious Studies 48 (3): 305-313. 2012.
    In his recent paper, “Lottery Puzzles and Jesus’ Return,” Donald Smith says that Christians should accept a very robust skepticism about the future because a Christian ought to think that the probability of Jesus’ return happening at any future moment is inscrutable to her. But I think that Smith’s argument lacks the power to rationally persuade Christians who are antecedently uncommitted as to whether or not we can or do have any substantive knowledge about the future. Moreover, I think that …Read more
  •  19
    Kearns on Rule A
    Philosophia 43 (1): 205-215. 2015.
    The so-called Direct Argument for the incompatibility of moral responsibility and causal determinism depends on a rule of inference called Rule A, a rule that says no one is even partly morally responsible for a necessary truth. While most philosophers think that Rule A is valid, Stephen Kearns has recently offered several alleged counterexamples to the rule. In the paper, I show that Kearns’ counterexamples are unsuccessful