Pablo Irizar

The fracturing of language at Babel (Gn 11.1-9) is one of the defining events which, for Augustine, gives language its current fallen characteristics and limitations. But does the fallen state of language necessarily imply that language creates a chiasm rather than a bridge between the human and the divine? And if so, is language used in vain to invoke God? This paper addresses these questions through an analysis of the role of language in Augustine’s Ostia ascent narrative (conf. 9, 24). According to a first line of interpretation, language creates a chiasm rather than a bridge between the human and the divine in the ‘Ostia ascent’. According to a second line of interpretation, though fractured, language does not create a chiasm but rather a bridge between the human and the divine. By identifying and intertextually analyzing three facets of the function of language in conf. 9, 24, namely the grammatical, the ontological, and the modal, this paper aims at substantiating the second line of interpretation. Part one explores Augustine’s use of the expression per uerbum (Jn 1.1-15) to analyze the grammar of human and divine language. Part two analyzes the ontological function of language as a mechanism of mediation by showing that the ascent in conf. 9, 24 is similar to the structure of manifestation evident in the transition from forma dei to forma serui (Phil 2.6-7) in Augustine’s s. 264. Finally, part three shows that for Augustine, the conversion from the schola superbiae of rhetoric pride to the humility of the schola pectoris implicitly requires the mode of language as a precondition for ascent in conf. 9, 24. As such, this paper concludes, the three facets of language, namely the ontological, grammatical and modal, function in conf. 9, 24 to unite, mediate and transform the human experience of the divine.

The interplay between grace and merit is a recurrent Augustinian theme that is often discussed in polemical or theoretical works. Only recently has scholarly attention turned to the study of grace and merit in Augustine’s pastoral praxis. As part of this ongoing effort, the present paper offers an analysis of Augustine’s rhetoric of the image in the sermons, with special attention to the effects that the preacher/hearer dialectic produces in the social ‘moral imagination’. It is argued that Augustine’s dialectic preaching on the interplay between grace and freedom results in ambiguity concerning the sphere and boundaries of moral action in the hearer’s ‘moral imagination’. The implication on the social imagination, it is concluded, is a constant fluidity in the foreground of moral agency which either empowers or constraints the boundaries of moral action to the extent that graceand/or merit are emphasized.

This essay offers a critical survey of recent research into Augustine’s interpretation of Gn 1.26. The first part contextualizes the discussion within the broader landscape of world creation narratives and origin myths. Against this background, the second part analyzes recent learned discussion on Augustine’s (anti-Manichean) interpretation of Gn 1.26 for the period 387-400. By way of preface, the study offers a concise state of the art on the study of Gn 1.26 in the work of Augustine. The survey suggests the image of God functions as an origin myth during the period in question. The conclusion suggests exploring the neglected communal embedding of Augustine’s interpretation of Gn 1:26 as a fruitful venue for future research.

The biblically-inspired motif of the divine image (imago dei, cf. Gen. 1.26) is a central anthropological concept in early Christian discourse. While this motif has been studied extensively, it has not yet been studied against the backdrop of the closely related epistemological terms imago, imaginatio and phantasia as these develop in Augustine’s early works (387-391). Given that Puffer (2014) characterizes the presence of imago dei in the early works as an ‘exterior’ characteristic of human beings, the question arises, how does the treatment of imago and imaginario/phantasia inform Augustine’s imago dei motil in the early works, and if so, how? In other words, is the background to Augustine’s anthropology of the divine image framed against the background of the epistemological status of image and imagination in the early works or vice-versa? The answer to this question, it is hoped, will illuminate aspects of the status of the image in Augustine’s early works. The working assumption is that since imago, imago Dei, and imaginario/phantasia are all linguistically related, they may also be conceptually related, specially pertaining to the (mis)trust of ‘exteriority’ of imago Dei.

SummaryDogmatic debates in early Christianity shaped philosophical discourse just as Greek philosophy offered the conceptual tools to engage and, accordingly to crystalize early Christian practice, into a formal system of belief. Thus, in the recently-published The Rise of Christian Theology and the End of Ancient Metaphysics, Johannes Zachhuber notes that “Patristic thought as a whole can be identified as a Christian philosophy.” Following suit – though not without nuance – this paper suggests treating Patristic scriptural exegesis as an exercise of speculative philosophy, as evidenced in Augustine’s interpretation of the figure of the cross at Eph 3.18, where the cross progressively becomes a simple yet compelling paradigm of divine manifestation. This paradigm can be framed according to Augustine’s mature articulation of the ‘ontological principle’ of manifestation in s. 165: “From the depth which you cannot see rises everything that you can see.” By engaging in scriptural exegesis, within a gestalt where Wisdom, sacred and profane alike, merge in the incarnate God manifest in Christ, Augustine articulates unprecedented philosophical principles.

El uso de Agustín de Filipenses 2:6-7 como la “regla de la fe” que le sirve para quitarle importancia a las preocupaciones de la cristología pronicea ha sido, correctamente, enfatizado repetidamente por parte de los expertos agustinólogos anglófonos. Empero, el énfasis en la polémica función del dueto forma servi/forma dei ha hecho que se pierda de vista su presencia y desarrollo en contextos no polémico. Esto es sorprendente dado que Agustín trata bastante más frecuentemente la perícopa en cuestión por fuera de contextos polémicos. El presente artículo tiene por objetivo completar este vacío catalogando los usos no polémicos de Filipenses 2:6-7 en el trabajo de Agustín y su desarrollo vis-à-vis del término forma entre los predecesores latinos inmediatos del siglo IV de Agustín. Así, este artículo espera ilustrar el sentido no polémico, frecuentemente ignorado, de Filipenses 2:6-7 dentro del discurso del cristianismo temprano.